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Self-Defense in International Law and Rights of Persons

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2012

Fernando R. Tesón
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Extract

In War and Self-Defense David Rodin uncovers many flaws of current thinking about war. Rodin correctly points out that the justification of national self-defense goes beyond the justification of individual self-defense. He accurately rejects the standard notion of moral symmetry—the accepted view that both just and unjust warriors can permissibly kill enemies as long as they observe the laws of war. Rodin vindicates the right view: if a war is unjust, each and every injury caused by the unjust warrior is a criminal act. There are no morally justified killings by those who fight unjust wars. Further, Rodin rightly rejects various holistic theories of self-defense. Last but not least, he correctly denounces what I have called the Hegelian Myth, the idea that tyrannical governments are worth defending against interventions aimed at deposing them because they are protected by the principle of sovereignty.

Type
Articles
Information
Ethics & International Affairs , Volume 18 , Issue 1 , March 2004 , pp. 87 - 91
Copyright
Copyright © Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs 2004

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References

1 Rodin, David, War and Self-Defense (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003Google Scholar). All in-text citation references are to this book.

2 See Tesón, Fernando R., Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality (Ardsley, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, 1997Google Scholar).

3 For the rest of this comment, when I use “self-defense” I mean “national self-defense” unless otherwise indicatedGoogle Scholar.

4 See Walzer, Michael, “The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 9 (Spring 1980), pp. 209–29Google Scholar; and Tesón, Fernando R., “The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention,” in Holzgrefe, J. L. and Keohane, Robert O., eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 99Google Scholar.

5 Someone who has unlawfully abducted a person still has the moral duty to protect the person from harm, even if he is not the person's lawful “protector.”Google Scholar

6 For discussions on territory, see Brilmayer, Lea, “Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation,” Yale Journal of International Law 16 (Winter 1991), pp. 177–202Google Scholar; Buchanan, Allen, Secession (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 38–45Google Scholar; and Tesón, Fernando R., A Philosophy of International Law (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 144–47Google Scholar.

7 UN Security Council action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is a partial exception to this. However, under Article 51 (self-defense broadly understood) states may unilaterally evict invadersGoogle Scholar.