1 See, e.g., Gaspar Martins (Angola), UN doc. S/PV.5043, September 23, 2004, p. 13, and Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008(Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2008).
4 See, e.g., the debate in the UN Security Council organized by South African President Thabo Mbeki, UN doc. S/PV.5868, April 16, 2008.
5 Cited in Susan E. Rice, “Why Darfur Can't Be Left to Africa,” Washington Post, August 7, 2005, p. B4.
7 UN doc. S/PV.5868, April 16, 2008, p. 34.
11 For a more general defense of pluralism, see Robert H. Jackson, The Global Covenant(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
12 Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide(London: Zed, 2000).
13 IISS, Strategic Survey 1996/97(New York: Oxford University Press for the IISS, 1997), p. 223.
14 Author's interview with former AU official, January 23, 2008.
15 Report of the Commission for Africa, Our Common Interest(London: DFID, 2005), p. 167.
16 Other relevant instruments at the continental level include the Common African Defence and Security Policy, the early warning system, and the Panel of the Wise.
17 AU doc. PSC/AHG/ST(X), May 25, 2004, para. 1.
18 For an overview, see Jackie Cilliers, The African Standby Force: An Update on Progress(Pretoria: ISS Paper No.160, 2008).
19 Roadmap for the Operationalization of the African Standby Force(AU doc. EXP/AU-RECs/ASF/4(I), Addis Ababa, March 22–23, 2005), p. A-1.
20 For an overview, see Raymond W. Copson, The United States in Africa(London: Zed, 2007).
21 Tom Porteous, Britain in Africa(London: Zed, 2008).
22 GPOI's budget is about $80 million to $100 million per year. To count toward the 75, 000 goal, individuals must receive at least 24 hours of training on approved tasks. Units trained collectively must use similar standards, and each member must be present for at least 80 percent of the training and show 80 percent mastery of the skills they have learned. Roughly 5 percent of the troops trained are trained as “trainers”. By mid 2007, roughly 27, 500 African troops had been trained, 1400 as trainers. Alix J. Boucher and Victoria K. Holt, US Training, African Peacekeeping: The Global Peace Operations Initiative(Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center Issue Brief, July 2007), p. 3.
23 Since 1990, the UN has deployed to Africa twenty-four peacekeeping operations involving a combined maximum deployment of approximately 144, 375 uniformed personnel.
26 UN General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome(UN doc. A/60/L.1, September 15, 2005), para. 139.
27 Ben Kioko, “The Right of Intervention under the African Union's Constitutive Act,” International Review of the Red Cross 85, no. 852 (2003), p. 821. See also Jeremy L. Levitt, “The Peace and Security Council of the African Union: The Known Unknowns,” Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 13 (Spring 2003), pp. 125–26.
28 The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: “The Ezulwini Consensus” (AU doc. Ext/EX.CL/2(vii), March 7–8, 2005), p. 6.
29 Jeffrey Herbst, “Crafting Regional Cooperation in Africa,” in Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston, eds., Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 138.
30 See AU Assembly, “Decision on the Scale of Assessment” (Doc. EX.CL/192 (VII)), Fifth Ordinary Summit, July 4–5, 2005, Sirte, Libya.
31 Herbst, “Crafting Regional Cooperation,” p. 139.
33 Regionalization is commonly understood as the idea that “each region … should be responsible for its own peacemaking and peacekeeping, with some financial and technical support from the West but few, if any, military or police contingents from outside the region.” Marrack Goulding, Peacemonger(London: John Murray, 2002), p. 217.
34 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished: A U.S.-UN Saga(London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), p. 306.
35 Goulding, Peacemonger, p. 217.
36 Jean-Marie Guéhenno, “Everybody's Doing It,” World Today 59, no. 8/9 (2003), pp. 35–36.
37 Michael Pugh, “The World Order Politics of Regionalization,” in Michael Pugh and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, eds., The United Nations and Regional Security(Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003), pp. 31–46.
38 IISS, Strategic Survey 1996/97, p. 224.
39 See John Hillen, Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations(Washington, D.C.: Brasseys, 2000, second edition).
40 Cited in Roberta Cohen and William G. O'Neill, “Last Stand in Sudan?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists(March/April 2006), p. 53.
43 The Commission of Inquiry subsequently concluded that although the GoS and janjawiid forces were responsible for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under international law, “the Government of Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide.” Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the Secretary-General, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 (2004) of September 18, 2004(UN doc. S/2005/60), annex, para. 318.
44 The AU deployed a team of 80 military observers protected by a force of 300 troops in order to help monitor the Addis Ababa agreement of May 28, 2004, which included the formation of a Ceasefire Monitoring Commission. The mission was then increased to 3, 320 personnel in October 2004 and to approximately 7, 700 uniformed personnel in April 2005.
45 The light support package was to involve a logistics, personnel (approximately 200), equipment, and humanitarian aid component. The heavy support package was to include a signals unit, communications unit, and logistics staff as part of 2, 250 military personnel. IRIN, “Sudan: New Hope for Darfur as Government Accepts UN Support Package,” April 20, 2007.
46 See the chapters by Laurie Nathan, Dawit Toga, and Alex de Waal in Alex de Waal, ed., War in Darfur and the Search for Peace(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), pp. 214–83.
47 AU doc. PSC/MIN/2(XLVI), March 10, 2006, para. 13, p. 7.
48 In this sense, the recent decision by the U.S. government to cut its funding for UN peace operations is a significant step in the wrong direction.
49 The most recent attempt to do this is Report of the Secretary-General on the Relationship between the United Nations and Regional Organizations, in Particular the African Union, in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security(UN doc. S/2008/18, March 24, 2008).
50 Some relevant practical ideas can be found in Alex de Waal, ed., Demilitarizing the Mind: African Agendas for Peace and Security(Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, 2002).