¹ Terry, Nardin, “Humanitarian Imperialism,” Ethics & International Affairs 19, no. 2 (2005), p. 21 . All in-text citation references are to this article .Google Scholar

² I've held my current view since 1988. See the first edition of my book Humanitarian Intervention. See also David, Luban, “The Romance of the Nation-State,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 9, no. 2 (1980), p. 395Google Scholar; and Reisman, W. Michael, “Coercion and Self-Determination,” American Journal of International Law 78, no. 3 (1984), p. 642CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ The “crimes against humanity” standard is less strict than “imminent or ongoing massacres,” as it may include, for example, widespread torture, apartheid, or forced disappearances. This is why Nardin cautiously writes “specific crimes against humanity” (emphasis added)Google Scholar.

⁴ I thank Horacio Spector for this pointGoogle Scholar.

⁵ Nardin suggests that I support intervention to end ordinary oppression (p. 22). Not so. My standard is severe tyranny, which is less than genocide or mass murder but more than ordinary oppressionGoogle Scholar.

⁶ See Buchanan, Allen, “Reforming the International Law of Humanitarian Intervention,” in Holzgrefe, J. L. and Keohane, Robert O., eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 130–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷ See Tesón, Fernando R., “The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention,” in Holzgrefe, and Keohane, , eds., Humanitarian Intervention, p. 53Google Scholar.

⁸ I point out, however, that, contrary to what Nardin suggests, during the military operation the Coalition took special care to minimize civilian casualties. The deaths that have occurred since are principally attributable to the insurgency, a criminal enterprise, and the operations necessary to defeat the insurgentsGoogle Scholar.

⁹ Similarly, some have suggested that those violations of the laws of war have cancelled the moral worth of the intervention. See, e.g., Danner, Mark, “We Are All Torturers Now,” New York Times, January 6, 2005, p. A27Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Nardin also criticizes me for picking only the “good” traditions in American diplomacy, thus omitting references to the “bad” ones. I do not say, however, that the idealistic, liberating and transformative tradition of the American republic was the only tradition in American foreign policy, only that I read the Iraq war as part of that oneGoogle Scholar.