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The Theory of Forms, Relations and Infinite Regress1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 June 2010

T. G. Smith
Affiliation:
University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon

Extract

Several difficulties that accompany Plato's theory of Forms have received considerable attention in the philosophical literature in the past half century. A great deal of discussion and controversy surrounds the dialogue Parmenides and the group of considerations commonly called the “Third Man Argument”. Our purpose here is to strike out in one direction suggested by this passage (Parmenides 132 a-b, 132 d), but it can in no way be thought of as an exegesis nor a logical elucidation of the “Third Man Argument” itself. While what we shall say here has an obvious affinity and connection with the Parmenides passage, the two principal questions that concern us here are of a more general nature than the specific points in the Parmenides. The first is whether Plato's theory of Forms involves a regress which is ruinous to the theory. The second is, if a self-destructive regress is a necessary consequence of the theory, what elements of Plato's theory make the regress inescapable.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1969

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References

2 Taylor, A. E., “Parmenides, Zeno and Socrates,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XVI (1915–16)Google Scholar; Cherniss, H., Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato and the Academy, (Baltimore, 1944)Google Scholar; Ross, D., Plato’s Theory of Ideas, (Oxford, 1951)Google Scholar; Vlastos, G., “The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides,” Philosophical Review, (1954)Google Scholar; Allen, R. E., “Participation and Predication in Plato’s Middle Dialogues,” Philosophical Review, LXIX (1960).Google Scholar

3 Greek Philosophy, (Macmillan, 1953)Google Scholar.