Skip to main content Accessibility help

The Robbery Paradox

  • Mark Vorobej (a1)


James E. Tomberlin [6] has recently argued that the logical systems of conditional obligation proposed by Azizah al-Hibri [1] and Peter Mott [5] are incapable of resolving at least one variant of the notorious contrary to duty imperative paradox, formulated originally by Chisholm [2]. Tomberlin concedes that these systems offer the very best of the' “conditional obligation approach” to deontic logic and concludes his critical discussion with the pessimistic remark that “the best of this approach is simply not good enough. Deontic logic … is obliged to turn elsewhere for its proper formulation and resolution of the deontic paradoxes” ([6], 373). Below I argue that Tomberlin's three central arguments against al-Hibri and Mott are fallacious.



Hide All
[1]al-Hibri, A., Deontic Logic (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1978).
[2]Chisholm, R., “Contrary to Duty Imperatives and Deontic Logic”, Analysis 24 (1963), 3336.
[3]DeCew, J. W., “Conditional Obligation and Counterfactuals”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (1981), 5572.
[4]Leblanc, H. and Wisdom, W., Deductive Logic (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972).
[5]Mott, P., “On Chisholm's Paradox”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (1973), 197211.
[6]Tomberlin, J. E., “Contrary to Duty Imperatives and Conditional Obligation”, Nous 15 (1981), 357375.
[7]van Fraassen, B. C., “The Logic of Conditional Obligation”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 1 (1972), 417438.

The Robbery Paradox

  • Mark Vorobej (a1)


Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between <date>. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed