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On the Right to Justification and Discursive Respect

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 August 2015

THOMAS M. BESCH
THOMAS M. BESCH*
Affiliation:
University of Hradec Kralove
*
*<thomas.besch@sydney.edu.au>
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Abstract

Rainer Forst’s constructivism argues that a right to justification provides a reasonably non-rejectable foundation of justice. With an exemplary focus on his attempt to ground human rights, I argue that this right cannot provide such a foundation. To accord to others such a right is to include them in the scope of discursive respect. But it is reasonably contested whether we should accord to others equal discursive respect. It follows that Forst’s constructivism cannot ground human rights, or justice, categorically. At best, it can ground them hypothetically. This opens the door wide for ethical foundations of human rights.

Le constructivisme de Rainer Forst fait valoir que le droit à la justification fournit une base de la justice qui ne peut raisonnablement être rejetée. En mettant l’accent de façon exemplaire sur sa tentative de fondation des droits de l’homme, je soutiens que ce droit ne peut pas fournir une telle fondation. Accorder ce droit aux autres revient à les inclure dans le champ d’application du respect discursif. Or, le fait que l’on doive accorder aux autres un respect discursif égal fait l’objet d’une contestation sérieuse. Il en résulte que le constructivisme de Forst ne peut pas fonder catégoriquement les droits de l’homme, ni la justice. Au mieux, il les fonde de façon hypothétique. Cela ouvre grand la porte aux fondements éthiques des droits de l’homme.

Type
Articles
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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 54 , Issue 4 , December 2015 , pp. 703 - 726
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Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2015 

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