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On Gibbard’s Defence of the Dispositional Theory of Meaning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 August 2018

ALI SABOOHI Open the ORCID record for ALI SABOOHI [Opens in a new window]
ALI SABOOHI*
Affiliation:
Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM, Tehran)
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*<alisaboohi44@gmail.com>
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Abstract

According to the dispositional theory of meaning and content, what a speaker means by an expression is determined by her dispositions to use it. The literature contains two well-known objections against this theory: the problem of finitude and the problem of error. In his book Meaning and Normativity, Allan Gibbard propounds a novel defence against these objections. In this paper, I argue that Gibbard’s suggestions fail to save the dispositional theory. Moreover, I argue that Gibbard’s deflationary view about facts prevents him from saying anything about the property of meaning that would hold any interest for a naturalist.

Selon la théorie dispositionnelle du sens et du contenu, ce qu’un locuteur veut dire par une expression est déterminé par ses dispositions à l’utiliser. La littérature contient deux objections bien connues contre cette théorie: le problème de la finitude et le problème de l’erreur. Dans son livre Meaning and Normativity, Allan Gibbard propose une nouvelle défense de la théorie dispositionnelle du sens et du contenu. Dans cet article, je soutiens que les suggestions de Gibbard ne parviennent pas à sauver la théorie dispositionnelle. De plus, je soutiens que le point de vue déflationniste de Gibbard sur les faits l’empêche de dire quoi que ce soit à propos de la propriété du sens qui aurait un intérêt quelconque pour un naturaliste.

Keywords

dispositional theory of meaningbelief holismerror and finitudebest fit ascriptionssimplicity
Type
Original Article/Article original
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 58 , Issue 3 , September 2019 , pp. 513 - 525
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2018 

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