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The Linguistic Capacity of Performative Speech

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

TILO WESCHE
TILO WESCHE*
Affiliation:
Carl von Ossietzky University Oldenburg
*
*<Tilo.Wesche@unibas.ch>
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Abstract

In my paper, I shall briefly explore a philosophy of performative speech acts, which is in line with Charles Taylor’s investigation into the human linguistic capacity. It complements the full shape of the linguistic capacity and gives an account of how reason enters thinking due to language. Language creates openness to reasons by, as I emphasize, means of a critique of self-deception, which could be accomplished by linguistic capacity.

Dans ce commentaire, je me pencherai brièvement sur une philosophie du discours performatif qui s’inscrit dans la foulée de l’exploration par Taylor des capacités linguistiques humaines. Cette philosophie vient compléter la pleine étendue de la capacité linguistique, et montrer comment la raison pénètre la pensée grâce au langage. Le langage crée en effet une ouverture à la raison grâce — et c’est ce sur quoi je me concentrerai — à une critique de l’auto-tromperie, qui peut être réalisée grâce à la capacité linguistique.

Keywords

performative speech actlinguistic capacitiesself-deceptioncritiqueJürgen Habermas
Type
Special Issue: Charles Taylor’s The Language Animal
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 56 , Issue 4 , December 2017 , pp. 643 - 652
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2017 

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