Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-sxzjt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-24T06:08:03.126Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Le comportement et le concept de choix

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 July 2013

JEAN BACCELLI
JEAN BACCELLI*
Affiliation:
Institut Jean Nicod — École Normale Supérieure, Paris
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This note considers the conceptual part of Sen’s «Internal Consistency of Choice». Amongst the various claims this paper features, two are singled out. A first, negative, claim is that no formal condition of choice consistency is normatively compelling without exception. A second, positive, claim, is that a formal condition of choice consistency is normatively compelling only under some assumptions involving preference. Here, the puzzling choices Sen puts forward are scrutinized and it is argued that such a scrutiny leads to question the negative claim, but in a subtle way, so that the positive claim is comforted, even strengthened.

Cette note examine la partie conceptuelle d’un article de Sen, «Internal Consistency of Choice». Elle isole deux thèses parmi celles que Sen défend. Une première, négative, est qu’aucune condition formelle de cohérence du choix n’est normativement valable sans exception. Une seconde, positive, est qu’une condition formelle de cohérence du choix n’est normativement valable que sous des suppositions faisant intervenir la préférence. Nous procédons à une analyse détaillée des choix énigmatiques dont Sen prend argument et affirmons que cet examen mène à remettre en cause la thèse négative, mais d’une manière subtile qui confirme — même renforce — la thèse positive.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 52 , Issue 1 , March 2013 , pp. 43 - 60
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2013 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Références bibliographiques

Arrow, Kenneth J. 1959 «Rational Choice Functions and Orderings», Economica, vol. 26, no 102, p. 121–127.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bhattacharyya, Aditi, Pattanaik, Prasanta K. et Xu, Yongsheng 2011 «Choice, Internal Consistency, and Rationality», Economics and Philosophy, vol. 27, no 2, p. 123–149.Google Scholar
Bossert, Walter et Suzumura, Kotaro 2011 «Rationality, External Norms and the Epistemic Value of Menus», Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37, no 4, p. 729–741.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dietrich, Frantz et List, Christianmss «Reason-Based Rationalization» (version de travail).Google Scholar
Gul, Faruk et Pesendorfer, Wolfgang 2008 «The Case for Mindless Economics», dans Caplin, Andrew et Schotter, Andrewdir., The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 3–40.Google Scholar
Hammond, Peter J. 1988 «Consequentialist Foundations for Expected Utility», Theory and Decision, vol. 25, no 1, p. 25–78.Google Scholar
Hausman, Daniel M. 2000 «Revealed Preference, Belief and Game Theory», Economics and Philosophy, vol. 16, no 1, p. 99–115.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Houthakker, Hendrik S. 1950 «Revealed Preference and the Utility Function», Economica, vol. 17, no 66, p. 159–174.Google Scholar
Kreps, David M. 1979 «A Representation Theorem for “Preference for Flexibility”», Econometrica, vol. 47, no 3, p. 565–577.Google Scholar
Little, Ian M.D. 1949 «A Reformulation of the Theory of Consumer’s Behaviour», Oxford Economic Papers, New Series, vol. 1, no 1, p. 90–99.Google Scholar
Luce, R. Duncan et Raiffa, Howard 1957 Games and Decisions, New York (NY), John Wiley & Sons.Google Scholar
MasCollel, Andreu, Whinston, Michael D. et Green, Jerry R. 1995 Micro-Economic Theory, Oxford, Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Mongin, Philippe 2000 «Les préférences révélées et la formation de la théorie du consommateur», Revue économique, vol. 51, no 5, p. 1125–1152.Google Scholar
Mongin, Philippe 2011 «La théorie de la décision et la psychologie du sens commun», Social Science Information, vol. 50, nos 3-4, p. 351–374.Google Scholar
Pettit, Philip 1991 «Decision Theory and Folk Psychology», dans Bacharach, Michael et Hurley, Susan, dir., Foundations of Decision Theory, Oxford, Blackwell, p. 147–175.Google Scholar
Samuelson, Paul A. 1938 «A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer Behaviour», Economica, vol. 5, no 17, p. 61–71.Google Scholar
Samuelson, Paul A. 1950 «The Problem of Integrability in Utility Theory», Economica, vol. 17, no 68, p. 355–385.Google Scholar
Sen, Amartya K. 1971 «Choice Functions and Revealed Preference», The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 38, no 3, p. 307–317.Google Scholar
Sen, Amartya K. 1973 «Behaviour and the Concept of Preference», Economica, vol. 40, no 159, p. 241–259.Google Scholar
Sen, Amartya K. 1977 «Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory», Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 6, no 4, p. 317–344.Google Scholar
Sen, Amartya K. 1985 Commodities and Capabilities, Amsterdam, Elsevier.Google Scholar
Sen, Amartya K. 2004 «Internal Consistency of Choice» [1993], dans Rationality and Freedom, Cambridge, Belknap Press, p. 121–157.Google Scholar
Sen, Amartya K. 2004 «Maximization and the Act of Choice» [1997], dans Rationality and Freedom, Cambridge, Belknap Press, p. 158–205.Google Scholar
Wong, Stanley 2006 The Foundations of Paul Samuelson’s Revealed Preference Theory [1978], New York (NY), Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar