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Fondamentalisme ou constructivisme des raisons? Les limites du réalisme normatif de Thomas Scanlon

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 August 2018

FÉLIX AUBÉ BEAUDOIN  and
PATRICK TURMEL
FÉLIX AUBÉ BEAUDOIN*
Affiliation:
Université Laval
PATRICK TURMEL
Affiliation:
Université Laval
*
*<felix.aube-beaudoin.1@ulaval.ca>
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Abstract

We argue that Reasons Fundamentalism, as defended by T.M. Scanlon, faces two important difficulties—one ontological, the other epistemological—namely the ontological proliferation problem and the reliability challenge. We suggest that formal constructivism can avoid these difficulties, and that Scanlon would do well to adopt it. We also show that Scanlon’s three main objections to this view depend either on a misunderstanding of what formal constructivism is or on a question-begging argument in favour of realism.

Dans cet article, nous soutenons que le fondamentalisme des raisons défendu par T.M. Scanlon fait face à deux difficultés importantes — l’une ontologique, l’autre épistémologique —, soit le problème de la permissivité ontologique et le défi de la fiabilité. Nous suggérons que le constructivisme formel permet de les éviter et que Scanlon gagnerait à l’adopter. Nous montrons également que ses trois principales objections envers cette théorie reposent soit sur une mécompréhension du constructivisme formel, soit sur une pétition de principe en faveur du réalisme.

Keywords

constructivismeScanlonfondamentalisme des raisonsmétaéthiqueréalisme normatif
Type
Dossier : Le constructivisme métaéthique / Metaethical Constructivism
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 57 , Issue 3 , September 2018 , pp. 549 - 570
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2018 

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