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Epistemic Contextualism, Unarticulated Constituents and Hidden Variables

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 February 2015

AHMAD REZA HEMMATI MOGHADDAM*
Affiliation:
Islamic Azad University (Science and Research Branch), Tehran, Iran Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM), Tehran, Iran

Abstract

Epistemic contextualism was devised mainly to provide a solution to the problem of skepticism based on a thesis about the truth conditions of knowledge attributing sentences. In this paper, I’ll examine two possible semantic bases of epistemic contextualism i.e., (i) the epistemic standard is an unarticulated constituent, (ii) the epistemic standard is a hidden variable. After showing that the unarticulated constituent thesis is incompatible with epistemic contextualism, I’ll argue that the hidden variable account remains unconvincing. My aim in this paper is to show that questions remain that must be answered before epistemic contextualism can claim success in the project of resolving skepticism.

Le contextualisme épistémique fut conçu pour offrir une solution au problème du scepticisme à partir d’une thèse sur les conditions de vérité des attributions de connaissance. J’examinerai, dans cet article, deux bases sémantiques possibles du contextualisme épistémique : (i) la norme épistémique est un constituant inarticulé; (ii) la norme épistémique est une variable cachée. Je soutiens que la thèse du constituant inarticulé est incompatible avec le contextualisme épistémique, et que la thèse de la variable cachée reste peu convaincante. L'objectif de cet article est de montrer que plusieurs questions demeurent et doivent être résolues avant que le contextualisme épistémique puisse prétendre trouver une solution au problème du scepticisme.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2015 

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