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The Conceptual Utility of Malum prohibitum

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 June 2016

STUART P. GREEN
STUART P. GREEN*
Affiliation:
Rutgers School of Law
*
*<sgreen@kinoy.rutgers.edu>
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Abstract

As a means for thinking more precisely about the moral content of criminal offenses, this article argues that we should think of malum in se and malum prohibitum not as binary categories into which an offense does or not fit, but rather as contrasting, scalar qualities that all criminal offenses, to one degree or another, possess. Under this approach, an offense is malum in se to the extent that it criminalizes conduct that is morally wrong independent of the law, while it is malum prohibitum to the extent it criminalizes conduct that is morally wrong (if at all) in virtue of its being illegal.

Afin de réfléchir plus précisément au contenu moral des infractions criminelles, il est soutenu ici que nous devrions envisager le malum in se et le malum prohibitum non pas comme des catégories binaires dans lesquelles peuvent — ou pas — être classées les différentes infractions, mais plutôt comme des qualités contrastées et scalaires que toutes les infractions criminelles possèdent à un degré ou à un autre. Suivant cette approche, une infraction est malum in se dans la mesure où elle criminalise une conduite qui est moralement répréhensible indépendamment de la loi, alors qu’elle est malum prohibitum dans la mesure où elle criminalise une conduite qui est moralement répréhensible (si elle l’est) en vertu du fait qu’elle est illégale.

Type
Special Topic: Mala in se and Mala prohibita
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 55 , Issue 1 , March 2016 , pp. 33 - 43
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2016 

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