Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-559fc8cf4f-q7jt5 Total loading time: 0.263 Render date: 2021-03-04T10:58:39.185Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "metricsAbstractViews": false, "figures": false, "newCiteModal": false, "newCitedByModal": true }

Testing Rationality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 March 2018

MICHAEL NEUMANN
Affiliation:
Trent University
Corresponding
E-mail address:

Abstract

Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, Dan Ariely and others detect irrationality when decision makers get led astray by how a decision problem is framed. They find that test subjects respond inconsistently when the same decision problem is described differently. But when are two decisions the same? The participants in their experiments are not decision theorists and cannot be counted on to read or approach the problems ‘properly.’ They may find sources of utility where researchers least suspect, and change payoffs that ‘ought’ to remain constant.

Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, Dan Ariely et quelques autres prétendent trouver de l’irrationalité quand des décideurs sont trompés par la formulation du problème qu’ils abordent. Les chercheurs notent que les sujets offrent des réponses incohérentes lorsqu’un même problème est formulé de plusieurs façons différentes. Mais quand doit-on estimer que deux problèmes sont «les mêmes»? Les sujets ne sont pas des chercheurs ni des experts en théorie de la décision. On ne peut s’attendre à ce qu’ils lisent les problèmes «comme il faut». Peut-être découvrent-ils des sources d’utilité là où les chercheurs n’en soupçonnaient guère; peut-être changent-ils des valeurs qui «devraient» rester constantes.

Type
Original Article/Article original
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2018 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below.

References

Ariely, Dan 2008 Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions. New York: Harper-Collins.Google Scholar
Berg, Nathan 2014 “The consistency and ecological rationality schools of normative economics: Singular versus plural metrics for assessing bounded rationality.” Journal of Economic Methodology 21 (4): 375395.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Broome, John 2004 Ethics out of Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Cohen, Marvin S. 1993 “The Bottom Line: Naturalistic Decision Aiding,” in Decision making in action: Models and methods, edited by Klein, G.A., Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R., and Zsambok, C.E.. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation, pp. 51102.Google Scholar
Horowitz, Tamara 1998 “Philosophical Intuitions and Psychological Theory.” Ethics 108 (2): 367385.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kahneman, Daniel, Knetsch, Jack L., and Thaler, Richard H. 1991 “Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 (1): 193206.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kamm, Frances M. 1998 “Moral Intuitions, Cognitive Psychology, and the Harming-Versus-Not-Aiding Distinction.” Ethics 108 (3): 463488.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McKenzie, Richard 2010 Predictably Rational?: In Search of Defenses for Rational Behavior in Economics. Berlin: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McMeil, Barbara J., Pauker, Stephen G., Sox, Harold C., and Tversky, Amos 2004 “On the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies,” in Preference, Belief, and Similarity: Selected Writings of Amos Tversky, edited by Shafir, Eldar. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, pp. 583591.Google Scholar
Samuels, Richard, Stich, Steven, and Tremoulet, P.D. 1999 “Rethinking Rationality: From Bleak Implications to Darwinian Modules,” in Cognition, Agency and Rationality, edited by Korta, K., Sosa, E., and Arrazola, X. X. Philosophical Studies Series 79. Springer, Dordrecht, pp. 2162.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shafit, Eldar (Ed.) 2004 Preference, Belief, and Similarity: Selected Writings of Amos Tversky. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Shampanier, Kristina, Mazar, Nina, and Ariely, Dan 2007 “How Small Is Zero Price? The True Value of Free Products.” Marketing Science 26 (6): 742757.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tversky, Amos, and Kahneman, Daniel 1974 “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.” Science 185 (4157): 11241131.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tversky, Amos, and Kahneman, Daniel 1979 “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk.” Econometrica 47 (2): 263292.Google Scholar
Tversky, Amos, and Kahneman, Daniel 1981 “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice. Science 211 (4481): 453–445.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Altmetric attention score

Full text views

Full text views reflects PDF downloads, PDFs sent to Google Drive, Dropbox and Kindle and HTML full text views.

Total number of HTML views: 36
Total number of PDF views: 92 *
View data table for this chart

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between 20th March 2018 - 4th March 2021. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Send article to Kindle

To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Testing Rationality
Available formats
×

Send article to Dropbox

To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

Testing Rationality
Available formats
×

Send article to Google Drive

To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

Testing Rationality
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response


Your details


Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *