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Testing Rationality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 March 2018

MICHAEL NEUMANN
MICHAEL NEUMANN*
Affiliation:
Trent University
*
*<mneumann@trentu.ca>
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Abstract

Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, Dan Ariely and others detect irrationality when decision makers get led astray by how a decision problem is framed. They find that test subjects respond inconsistently when the same decision problem is described differently. But when are two decisions the same? The participants in their experiments are not decision theorists and cannot be counted on to read or approach the problems ‘properly.’ They may find sources of utility where researchers least suspect, and change payoffs that ‘ought’ to remain constant.

Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, Dan Ariely et quelques autres prétendent trouver de l’irrationalité quand des décideurs sont trompés par la formulation du problème qu’ils abordent. Les chercheurs notent que les sujets offrent des réponses incohérentes lorsqu’un même problème est formulé de plusieurs façons différentes. Mais quand doit-on estimer que deux problèmes sont «les mêmes»? Les sujets ne sont pas des chercheurs ni des experts en théorie de la décision. On ne peut s’attendre à ce qu’ils lisent les problèmes «comme il faut». Peut-être découvrent-ils des sources d’utilité là où les chercheurs n’en soupçonnaient guère; peut-être changent-ils des valeurs qui «devraient» rester constantes.

Keywords

rational choicebehavioural economicsdecision theoryutilityrationality
Type
Original Article/Article original
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 57 , Issue 3 , September 2018 , pp. 615 - 631
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2018 

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