² Cf.Boyle, Andrew, Montagu Norman. A Biography (New York: Weybright and Talley, (1967))Google Scholar. Thereafter Boyle, , Montagu Norman. SirClay's, Henry important work is to be mentioned here, too: Lord Norman (London: Macmillan/New York: St Martin's Press, (1957))Google Scholar. Thereafter Clay, Lord Norman. Unlike Boyle's, Sir Henry's work leaves Norman's childhood and psyche alone and concentrates instead on his activities as a central banker. Sir Henry's efforts resulted in a book which, together with Lester W. Chandler's work on Norman's opposite number across the Atlantic, Benjamin Strong (Benjamin Strong, Central Banker, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, (1958)), constitute part of the pioneering and, even today, fundamental literature on interwar international monetary relations.

³ In writing this paper I relied primarily on my own research carried out in various archives in Europe and the USA. An independent study of the primary sources seemed to be justified as I wished to raise questions on which the historiography of the field had little to offer. This, however, does not make it less necessary to acknowledge my considerable debt to the vast amount of scholarship that has been invested in the study of the field. I wish to list here only the most important items in the literature: Brown, W. A., The International Gold Standard Reinterpreted, 2 vols (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, (1940))Google Scholar; Clarke, S. V. O., Central Bank Cooperation: (1924)–31 (New York: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, (1967))Google Scholar; Costigliola, F. C., The Politics of Financial Stabilization: American Reconstruction Policy in Europe (1924)–(1930), PhD thesis (Cornell University, (1973))Google Scholar; idem, ‘Anglo-American Financial Rivalry in the 1920s’, Journal of Economic History, Vol. 37, no. 4 ((1977)), 911–34; Moggridge, D. E., British Monetary Policy, 1924–1931: The Norman Conquest of $4.86 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1972))Google Scholar; Sayers, R. S., The Bank of England 1891–1944, 3 vols (London: Cambridge University Press, (1976))Google Scholar; Williams, David, ‘The Evolution of the Sterling System’, in Whitlesey, C. R. and Wilson, J. S. G., eds. Essays in Money and Banking in Honour of R. S. Sayers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1968)).Google Scholar

⁴ Leffingwell to Norman, copy, 19 April 1944, 1030, Box 6, Folder 133, Leffingwell Papers, Yale University Library, New Haven, Conn.

⁵ Norman to Leffingwell, Isle of Man, 6 June 1944 ibid.

⁶ Leffingwell to Basil Blackett (Controller of Finance, Treasury, London), New York, 6 Oct. (1921), Box 1, Folder 9,

⁷ ‘The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. Not, indeed, immediately, but after a certain interval; for in the field of economic and political philosophy there are not many who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty years of age, so that the ideas which civil servants and politicians and even agitators apply to current events are not likely to be the newest.’ Keynes, J. M., The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (New York & London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, (1964)), 383–4.Google Scholar

⁸ Idem, ‘An Introduction’, The Manchester Guardian Commercial Supplement: Reconstruction in Europe, 18 May (1922), Section II, p. 66.

⁹ Idem, ‘The Stabilisation of the European Exchanges, A Plan for Genoa’, ibid., 20 April (1922), Section I, p. 4 (my emphasis).

¹⁰ ‘Commentary by the Governor’, 2 Feb. (1925), T 172/1499B, Treasury Files, Public Record Office, London.

¹¹ The minutes of these informal meetings (leading up to the Brussels International Monetary Conference) are held in the Archives of De Nederlandsche Bank (thereafter NBAV) Doss. 94, Doos nr. 39. Among the participants of the 13 Oct. and 2–3 Nov. 1919 meetings were Fred I. Kent (New York), Paul M. Warburg (New York), Raphael Géorges Lévy (Paris), John M. Keynes (London), Gerard Vissering, J. van Vollenhoven, P. J. C. Tetrode, G. H. M. Delprat, Ter Meulen (Amsterdam), Emil Glückstadt (Copenhagen), Rodolphe de Haller (Bern), G. Pictet (Geneva), Patrick Volckmar (Christiania) and Marcus Wallenberg (Stockholm)Google Scholar.

¹² Norman's note, entitled ‘Central Banks’ and dated 16 Feb., was enclosed to his letter to Strong dated 17 Feb. 1921, 1116.2 (3) Benjamin Strong Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Strong's additions to the text, amounting (from a European point of view) only to insignificant modifications, were communicated to Norman in a letter of 21 Mar. 1921. For the text of the amended version, see Clay, Lord Norman, 282–4.

¹³ Norman to Vissering, 12 Oct. (1921), Internationale Besprekingen 2, Doss. 16, NBAV.

¹⁴ Émile Moreau, Souvenirs d'un Gouverneur de la Banque de France (Paris: Librairire de Médicis, (1954)), 137. Quoted by Boyle, Montagu Norman, 205.

¹⁵ My emphasis. Norman's reaction leading to a note in the margin of Siepmann's letter was evoked by the following section: ‘I think it will be well to have a fairly long distribution list and not to be too dignified about vouchsafing information to people who are not central banks. I hope you agree that this is good policy.’ H. A. Siepmann to the Governor [Norman], Budapest, 18 Sept. (1925), OV 33/39, Bank of England, Central Archives (thereafter BECA).

¹⁶ Quoted by Clay, Lord Norman, 289.

¹⁷ As to the currency resolutions of Genoa, R. G. Hawtrey, at the time expert at the Treasury, emphasised in (1925) that ‘from the beginning to the end the plan embodied in the resolutions was an English one’. ‘The Genoa Currency Resolutions’, 4 Feb. 1925, T 172/14499B. F. H. Nixon, director of the Economic and Financial Section of the League of Nations, was also of the opinion that ‘the whole of the financial work was in the hands of the British delegation’. ‘Financial Commission of Genoa. Memorandum by Mr. F. H. Nixon, May 1922’, Marcus Wallenberg Papers, Skandinaviska Enskilda Bankens arkiv, Stockholm. Sen. Wallenberg, a Stockholm banker, was a member of the League's Financial Committee.

¹⁸ ‘Agenda. Resolutions proposed for adoption by the Central and Reserve Banks represented at Meetings to be held at the Bank of England, Part I. Resolutions concerning Co-operation’, Draft, 13 June 1922, Riksbankens Arkiv, Stockholm (hereafter RBA). Also in Doss. 2, II, NBAV.

¹⁹ Norman to Havenstein, 5 Dec. 1921, copy, 1116.2 (3), Strong Papers.

²⁰ Moll to Norman, 6 Feb. 1924, copy, RBA.

²¹ Norman to Moll, 29 Mar. 1924, RBA. My emphasis.

²² Norman to Strong, 9 June 1921, copy, BECA.

²³ ibid., 14 Nov. 1921, copy, BECA.

²⁴ The inability of French politicians to consider the issue of financial–economic reconstruction separate from the interests of French security was regarded by Norman as the heaviest burden on post-war Europe. On their first personal meeting, Norman told Émile Moreau, the Governor of the Banque de France: ‘I want very much to help the Bank of France. But I detest your Government and your Treasury. For them I shall do nothing.’ Moreau, Souvenirs, 49, quoted by Boyle, Montagu Norman, 198.

²⁵ ‘If and when the time comes, the League of Nations Scheme will have to be dressed up in somewhat different garments to make it non-political and so palatable to Vissering, to yourself and to this Country,’ he wrote in the letter to Strong of 14 Nov. 1921. And indeed, later on he would undertake to play a major role in bringing the Austrian action of the League to success, as a later version of the programme satisfied him as to the non-political character of the whole project. His good contacts with the New York House of Morgan were crucial in placing the American tranche of the loan. After the successful flotation of the Austrian Loan, Sir Arthur Salter (later Lord Salter), Director of the Economic and Financial Section of the League, wrote: ‘Norman’s assistance (though his reaction is to my taste a little too dramatic at times when difficulties arise) was invaluable.' Salter to Sir Basil Blackett, Geneva, 6 July 1923, copy, S. 115, A. Salter Papers, League of Nations Archives, United Nations Library.

²⁶ Salter, General Secretary of the Reparations Commission in 1920–2, was twice Director of the Economic and Financial Section of the League of Nations' Finance Committee – from 1919 to 1920 and 1922 to 1931.

²⁷ Salter, Lord, Memoirs of a Public Servant (London: Faber & Faber, (1961)), 177–8.Google Scholar

²⁸ Concerning the regulation of capital exports from Britain and the control exercised by the Bank of England see Atkin, John M., ‘Official Regulation of British Overseas Investment, 1914–1931’, Economic History Review, Vol. 23, no. 2 ((1970)), 326–30Google Scholar; idem, British Overseas Investment, 1918–1931 (New York: Arno Press, (1977)); see also Moggridge, Policy 206–11.

²⁹ ‘Czecho-Slovak Loan. Memo by Mr. Nixon [Aug. 1922], enclosure in the letter of Frank H. Nixon (Director of the Economic and Financial Section 1920–2) dated 5 Aug. 1922. The addressee cannot be identified precisely, but the copy reveals that his title was ‘Governor’, his nationality American, and that he must have been the leader of some association lobbying for the League of Nations idea in the US. ‘We in Europe who are strong supporters of the League’, Nixon concluded his letter, ‘count with great confidence upon your vigorous and well-informed activity on behalf of the League in the United States.’ Letter and enclosures in S. 123, No. 5, Salter Papers.

³⁰ A concise presentation was produced by one of the section's senior members, the Dutch J. van Walré de Bordes, concerning the League's activities, up till Aug. 1922, in connection with the Austrian stabilisation: ‘The Work of the League for the Financial Reconstruction of Austria’, 3 Aug. 1922, attached as one of the enclosures in Nixon's letter of 5 Aug.

³¹ ‘In due course, when sufficient progress has been make, the question should come up of dealing with Austria on the lines of the League of Nations Scheme (with which object our proposed consortium of Central Banks may be suitable.’ Norman to Vissering, 16 Nov. 1921, Doss. 16, Internationale Besprekingen 1, NBAV.

³² Sir Henry Strakosch, London banker with interests in South African gold mining, member of the Finance Committee of the League of Nations (1920)–37.

³³ Sir Otto Ernst Niemeyer, senior civil servant in the Treasury (1906–27), Controller of Finance (1922–7), member of the Finance Committee of the League of Nations (1922–37) and managing director of the Bank of England (1927–52).

³⁴ Alexander Loveday, economist and statistician, worked for the League of Nations between 1919 and 1946.

³⁵ Norman to Havenstein, copy, 3 Oct. 1923, OV 34/72, BECA.

³⁶ Quoted by Boyle, Montagu Norman, 197.

³⁷ Platt, D. C. M., Foreign Finance in Continental Europe and the United States, 1815–1870 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984)Google Scholar.

³⁸ Cf.Péteri, György, ‘Reserve and Vehicle Currencies in the Financial Structures of Hungary, 1924–1931’, The Journal of European Economic History (1992), forthcoming.Google Scholar

³⁹ Société des Nations, Memorandum sur les Monnaies et les Banques Centrales 1913–1925, Vol. 1 (Geneva, (1926)), 65.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Norman to Strong, 8 Oct. 1923, copy, BECA.

⁴¹ Cf.Teichova, A., ‘Versailles and the Expansion of the Bank of England into Central Europe’, in Horn, & Kocka, , eds. Recht und Entwicklung der Grossunternehmen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Göttingen, (1979)).Google Scholar

⁴² Norman's note entitled ‘Central Banks’, dated 16 Feb. 1922, enclosed in Norman to Strong, 17 Feb. 1921, 1116.2 (3), Strong Papers.

⁴³ Norman to Strong, 7 Nov. 1921, copy, BECA.

⁴⁴ Committee of Treasury Minutes, Book 47, 19 Oct. 1921, BECA (my emphasis).

⁴⁵ Norman to Strong, 1 Dec. 1921, copy, BECA. Norman found it rather unfortunate that the Entente survived the war, as it served, in his view, exclusively French interests: ‘I think we should have done more good had we formally divorced ourselves a year or more ago; for nothing has been done of late by the allies to which we either did not object or only unwillingly agreed.’ ibid., 8 Oct. 1923, copy, BECA.

⁴⁶ ibid., 9 Apr. 1923, copy, BECA. Similar views were held by Otto Niemeyer. And he was quite plain as to Britain's political interests. In his letter to the Foreign Office, explaining why it would be most advantageous for Britain to direct the issue of Hungary's stabilisation to the League's Finance Committee, he wrote: ‘If we could tie up another loose end in this way we should, I believe, extend and increase our consolidation in South-East-Europe.’ Niemeyer to M. W. Lampson (Foreign Office), 16 Mar. 1923, copy, OV 33/70, BECA.

⁴⁷ Hawtrey, , ‘The Memorial for an International Conference on the Financial Situation’,26 Jan. 1920,T 172/1157Google Scholar

⁴⁸ ‘When you [are] back into harness just you look around & see if you cant join hands with us (Bank I mean) in some of our ventures!! What about Germany? or Greece? or Hungary? all central-bank business pure & simple which is already started: or Albania & Danzig which are to follow? I am sure you would like to take a hand but I fear you cant. America as a country is less and less disposed to take a hand & so I guess will continue till after the Presidential Election. It is Jack Morgan personally whom we have to thank for the fact that Austria got money in New York.’ Norman to Strong, 8 Oct. 1923, copy, BECA.

⁴⁹ Copies of the memorandum are to be found in Doss. 2, II, NBAV, and enclosed in Norman to Strong, 7 Jan. 1924, copy, BECA.

⁵⁰ Norman to Clegg, 10 Jan. 1924, copy OV 34/117, BECA (my emphasis).

⁵¹ ‘Summary of Vissering’s paper on "Monetary Reconstruction in Germany", 4th December 1923', with Norman's commentaries stressing among others: ‘The essential difference between this and "C" is gold versus sterling". OV 34/117, BECA.

⁵² Norman to Vissering, 14 Jan. 1924, Doss. 2, II, NBAV.

⁵³ Kindersley to Norman, telegram, Paris, 19 Feb. 1924, and Norman to Kindersley, telegram, copy, 20 Feb. 1924, 34/120, BECA.

⁵⁴ Max M. Warburg to Paul M. Warburg, Hamburg, 10 Mar. 1924, telegram copy, 20.0/2, Strong Papers.

⁵⁵ Paul Warburg to Vissering, telegram, New York, 15 Mar. 1924, Doss. 2, II, NBAV; Paul Warburg to Max Warburg, telegram, copy, 10 Mar. 1924, 120.0/2, Strong Papers.

⁵⁶ Young was presiding over the currency sub-committee where J. Stamp was the British member.

⁵⁷ Paul Warburg to O. D. Young, copy, 21 Mar. 1924, 120.0/2, Strong Papers.

⁵⁸ For quite a long time, before and during the war, Paul Warburg acted as the Council's chairman.

⁵⁹ The communiqué was sent by Owen Young to Kindersley, and to other members of the Committee, in a telegram dated 15 May 1924. Enclosed in Kindersley to Norman, 15 May 1924, OV 34/120, BECA.

⁶⁰ A. C. Miller to Paul Warburg, copy, 27 Mar. 1924, 120.0 (2), Strong Papers.

⁶¹ Strong to Paul Warburg, copy, 11 Mar. 1924, Strong Papers.

⁶² Strong to Jay, Paris, 4 Apr. 1924, copy, 1000.5, Strong Papers.

⁶³ Schacht wrote to Paul Warburg: ‘It is our desire not to base ourselves entirely on the Pound Sterling…it appears to me that this matter is clearly elucidated in the Dawes Report, according to which only "gold" comes into question as the basis for the future German Reichsbank. There is also not the least doubt, as far as I am concerned, that we cannot have any real economic basis in Europe until the currencies, at least of the leading and most important countries, are again placed on a gold basis.’ Berlin, 31 May 1924. An English trans. of the letter was enclosed in Warburg to Strong, 12 June 1924, 120.0 [2], Strong Papers.

⁶⁴ Norman to Vissering, 14 Jan. 1924, Doss. 2, II, NBAV.

⁶⁵ Strong to Jay, Paris, 23–8 Apr. 1924, copy, 1000.5, Strong Papers.

⁶⁶ Strong to James A. Logan (non-official American delegate to the Paris Reparations Committee), 11 July 1924, copy, 1011.1 (1), Strong Papers.

⁶⁷ Norman to Vissering, 15 Apr. 1924, Doss. 2, II, NBAV.

⁶⁸ Cf. League of Nations, The Financial Reconstruction of Austria. General Survey and Principal Documents (Geneva, 1926), 90–1.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Norman to Strong, 16 June 1924, copy, BECA (my emphasis).