¹ See the account by a Polish defector who saw a full stenographic record of the Plenum, July: Bialer, Seweryn, ‘I Chose Truth,” News From Behind the Iron Curtain, V, No. 10, 10 1956, pp. 9–16.Google Scholar This account has been generally accepted as reliable; see Brzezinski, Zbigniew, The Soviet Bloc, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 495Google Scholar, note 43, and Schapiro, Leonard, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1959), p. 558, note.Google Scholar

² For annotated texts, see Wolfe, Bertram D., Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost (New York: Praeger, 1957)Google Scholar and Nicolaevsky, Boris I., “The Crimes of the Stalin Era,” The New LeaderGoogle Scholar (undated supplement).

³ Zagoria, Donald S., The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956–1961 (Princeton Un. Press, 1962)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and “Sino-Soviet Frictions in the Underdeveloped Countries,” Problems of Communism, X, No. 2, 03–04 1961, pp. 1–13Google Scholar; Brzezinski, Zbigniew, The Soviet Bloc, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1961)Google Scholar, especially the epilogue, “The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Dispute,” pp. 409–442Google Scholar, “The Challenge of Change of the Soviet Bloc,” Foreign Affairs, XXXIX, No. 3, 04 1961, pp. 430–443Google Scholar (also in his Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 141–161)Google Scholar, “Patterns and Limits of the Sino-Soviet Dispute,” Problems of Communism, IX, No. 5, 09–10 1960, pp. 1–7Google Scholar, and “Deviation Control: A Study in the Dynamics of Doctrinal Conflict,” American Political Science Review, LVI, No. 1, 03 1962, pp. 5–22Google Scholar; London, Kurt L., ed., Unity and Contradiction (New York: Praeger, 1962)Google Scholar; Hudson, G. F., Lowenthal, Richard and MacFarquhar, Roderick, eds., The Sino-Soviet Dispute (New York: Praeger, 1961)Google Scholar; Lowenthal, Richard, “Schism Among the Faithful,” Problems of Communism, XI, No. 1, 01–02 1962, pp. 1–14Google Scholar; Charles, David A., “The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai,” The China Quarterly, No. 8, 10–12 1961, pp. 63–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For a summary of unpublished documents, concerning the Moscow 1960 meetings and before, which, in spite of initial allegations of their being forged (Lazitch, Branko, “Une nouvelle mystification,” Est et Ouest, XIII, No. 253, 03 1–15, 1961, pp. 1–4Google Scholar, and Wohl, Paul in the Christian Science Monitor, 02 14, 1961)Google Scholar, I would consider (with Harsch, , Christian Science Monitor, 02 15, 1961Google Scholar, and Brzezinski, , The Soviet Bloc, 2nd ed., p. 512)Google Scholar reliable and reflecting in general the actual course of events, see Crankshaw, Edward in The Observer (London), 02 12, 19, 1961Google Scholar, and May 6 and 20, 1962; for his analysis, “Khrushchev and China,” Atlantic Monthly, CCVII, No. 5, 05 1961, pp. 43–47Google Scholar; their material is now confirmed and expanded in the extremely revealing Italian and French communist documents on the meetings, Interventi detta delegazione del P.C.I. alla Conferenza degli 81 Partiti comunisti e operai (Rome: Sezione centrale di stampa e propaganda della Direzione del PCI, January 15, 1962) (Joint Press Research Service (JPRS) 12461, February 14, 1962) and Contribution de la délégation française à la conférence des partis communistes et ouvriers, Moscou, Novembre 1960 (n.p., n.d. [Paris: PCF, 11 1961])Google Scholar, and in several articles in the Belgian CP newspaper Le Drapeau Rouge, by Terfve, Jean, 01 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15–17, 1962Google Scholar (JPRS 12759, 03 2, 1962)Google Scholar; by Burnelle, Ernest, 01 19–29, 1962Google Scholar (JPRS 12615, 02 23, 1962)Google Scholar, both pro-Soviet; and the pro-Chinese one by Jacques Grippa and the pro-Soviet answer by the Belgian CP Politburo, February 22, 1962 (JPRS 13314, April 4, 1962, pp. 10–91). For summary and analysis of the Italian, French and Belgian documentation, see “Documents sur la crise de l'Internationale communiste,” Est et Ouest, XIV, No. 275, 03 16–31, 1962, pp. 1–11Google Scholar, and “Nouveaux documents sur la crise du movement communiste international,” ibid. XIV, No. 277, April 16–30, 1962, pp. 5–11.

⁴ The author is now preparing a book on Albania and the Sino-Soviet rift.

⁵ Cited in footnote 3, supra.

⁶ See the excellent one by Dallin, Alexander, “Long Divisions and Fine Fractions,” Problems of Communism, XI, No. 2, 03–04 1962, pp. 7–16.Google Scholar

⁷ Cited in footnote 3, supra.

⁸ e.g., Brzezinski, , The Soviet Bloc, 2nd ed., pp. 427–429.Google Scholar

⁹ For analysis of the conference, see especially Zagoria, , op. cit., pp. 345–369Google Scholar, which, however, must be supplemented by the Italian, French and Belgian material.

¹⁰ Matern in Neues Deutschland, 02 12, 1961.Google Scholar

¹¹ The Observer, 05, 6, 1962.Google Scholar

¹² This is also in “Intervention de Maurice Thorez,” Contribution, pp. 31, 34.Google Scholar

¹³ Crankshaw, , The Observer, 05 20, 1962.Google Scholar

¹⁴ The Observer, 05 6, 1962.Google Scholar

¹⁵ “Déclaration de la délégation du parti communiste français,” Contribution, p. 37.Google Scholar

¹⁶ “Lettera,” Interventi, p. 77.Google Scholar

¹⁷ “Primo intervento,” Interventi, p. 68.Google Scholar The first sentence of this quotation was in the final declaration; the rest of it presumably represents the substance if not indeed the actual text of the original Soviet draft and of the Cuban-Brazilian amendment.

¹⁸ “Intervention de Maurice Thorez,” Contribution, pp. 32–33.Google Scholar

¹⁹ “Primo intervento,” Interventi, p. 68Google Scholar, and “Lettera,” ibid., p. 77; “Intervention de Maurice Thorez,” Contribution, pp. 32–33.Google Scholar The final general reaffirmation may have been taken from an Italian amendment (see Interventi, p. 77).Google Scholar

²⁰ “Intervention de Maurice Thorez,” Contribution, p. 30.Google Scholar (The Palish amendment in my view did not, as stated in Est et Ouest, XIVGoogle Scholar, No. 277, April 16–30, 1962, p. 8, deal with the question of the USSR's leadership of the camp.) “Primo intervento,” Interventi, p. 46.Google Scholar

²¹ The Albanians stated in early 1962 that the Russians promised at the meetings not to use this formulation to “impose” the XX Congress's decisions on other parties. (“Deeper and Deeper into the Mire of Anti-Marxism,” Zëri i Popullit, 01 9, 1962.)Google Scholar

²² Ibid.; cf. the Belgian CP Politburo statement, Le Drapeau Rouge, 02 22, 1962Google Scholar, and “Intervention de Maurice Thorez,” Contribution, pp. 30–31.Google Scholar The Thorez material indicates that the Chinese supported the maintenance of the CPSU as “the head” of the movement. See Hoxha in Zeri i Popullit, 11 8, 1961Google Scholar, for the Albanian and presumably the Chinese position on this point. The 1957 Declaration, signed only by the ruling parties, spoke of the camp of Socialism “headed by the Soviet Union”; it seems likely that the Chinese, wishing to repeat this formulation, were the ones who proposed that the 1960 Declaration also be signed only by the ruling parties (see “Intervention de Maurice Thorez,” Contribution, p. 41).Google Scholar Among the twelve ruling parties, the Albanians would have supported the Chinese, and the North Koreans and North Vietnamese would probably have been neutral; the Chinese numerical inferiority would therefore have been much less than among all 81 parties.

²³ Khrushchev, N. S., “For New Victories of the World Communist Movement,” Kommunist, No. 1, 01 1961, pp. 3–37Google Scholar, and World Marxist Review, IV, No. 1, 01 1961, pp. 3–28.Google Scholar

²⁴ Crankshaw, , The Observer, 02 12, 1961Google Scholar; the Chinese denounced his use of the term “humanism” (Le Drapeau Rouge, 02 22, 1962).Google Scholar

²⁵ “primo intervento,” Interventi, p. 69Google Scholar; “Déclaration de la délégation du parti communiste français.” Contribution, pp. 42–43.Google Scholar

²⁶ Crankshaw, op. cit.

²⁷ “Primo intervento,” Interventi, p. 48Google Scholar; “Secondo intervento,” ibid. p. 72.

²⁸ Le Drapeau Rouge, 02 22, 1962Google Scholar; cf. the briefer but similar version in “Primo intervento,” Interventi, pp. 56, 59.Google Scholar

²⁹ Belgian CP Politburo, Le Drapeau Rouge, 02 22, 1962.Google Scholar

³⁰ “Primo intervento,” Interventi, pp. 69–70Google Scholar; cf. “Intervention de Maurice Thorez,” Contribution, pp. 31–32Google Scholar, which gives the same summary of Teng's position.

³¹ Crankshaw, op. cit.

³² “Intervention de Maurice Thorez,” Contribution, pp. 5, 11, 14–15.Google Scholar Teng's line on the WPC was the same as the Chinese one at the December 1961 Stockholm WPC meeting; see the speech of Ch'eng-chih, Liao in Peking Review, IV, No. 51, 12 22, 1961, pp. 12–14.Google Scholar Teng's attack on Khrushchev's pro-Indian policy is also in Crankshaw, , The Observer, 05 6, 1962Google Scholar

³³ Quoted by Crankshaw, , The Observer, 05 6, 1962.Google Scholar

³⁴ Ibid. This seems to have been one of the most serious Chinese grievances against Khrushchev; see Longo to the PCI CC, L'Unità, 12 23, 1961.Google Scholar

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ “Intervention de Maurice Thorez,” Contribution, pp. 5–36.Google Scholar

³⁷ Ibid. p. 6.

³⁸ Ibid. pp. 13–14, 16, 24–25, 27.

³⁹ Ibid. p. 34.

⁴⁰ For a detailed analysis of Soviet-Albanian relations, see the author's forthcoming book on Albania and the Sino-Soviet rift, from which this is in part taken.

⁴¹ “Khrushchev Has Been Devoting His Time to Aggravating the Divergencies with Our Party and State Instead of Solving Them,” Zeri i Popullit, 03 25, 1962.Google Scholar As of June 1962 Moscow had not challenged Ais version.

⁴² Khrushchev to the XXII CPSU Congress, Pravda, 10 29, 1961.Google Scholar

⁴³ The only detailed available official communist documentation concerning this Hoxha speech are the attacks on it in “Primo intervento,” Interventi, pp. 48–51Google Scholar, and in “Déclaration de la délégation du parti communiste français,” Contribution, pp. 38–40.Google Scholar There also exist three apparently reliable but incomplete summaries of the Hoxha speech; the most extensive is in BBC European Service, C.R.U. Talk No. 2,098, June 9, 1961, from which all the following quotations are taken; see also Zorza, Victor in The GuardianGoogle Scholar (Manchester) and Floyd, David in The Daly Telegraph (London), 06 9, 1961.Google Scholar “Primo intervento” and “Déclaration” have largely confirmed these three, as has “Marxism-Leninism Will Triumph,” Zëri i Poputtit, 11 1, 1961.Google Scholar The report Hoxha made to the December 19–20 PPSh CC Plenum (Zëri i Popullit, 12 21, 1961)Google Scholar has remained unpublished. See also Hoxha, speech, November 7, 1961, in Zëri i Popullit, 11 8, 1961.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Cf. Interventi, pp. 45–71, at pp. 48–49.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ To Vima (Athens), 06 28, 1960.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ This has now also been alleged in “Khrushchev…,” Zëri i Popullit, 03 25, 1962.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ This is particularly interesting in view of the November 1961 statement by the Indonesian CP head, Aidit, in Djakarta that membership in the camp is determined by whether or not a country is “objectively” building socialism, and therefore Albania cannot be expelled from it, since even Khrushchev admits she is building it. (People's Daily, 12 1, 1961.)Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Cf. “A Year of Historic Proofs,” Zëri i Popullit, 12 6, 1961.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Cf. my forthcoming book on Soviet-Albanian relations.

⁵⁰ Brzezuski, , The Soviet Bloc, 2nd ed., p. 432, footnote.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Pravda, 11 26, 1960Google Scholar; Radio Budapest, 11 27, 1961Google Scholar, in B.B.C. Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 2, No. 501, p. 3Google Scholar (summary), November 29, 1960.

⁵² Florin, Peter, “Zur abenteuerlichen Politik der albanischen Führer,” Einheit, XIII, No. 3, 03 1962, pp. 14–26, at p. 24.Google Scholar

⁵³ “Primo intervento,” Interventi, pp. 48–49.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 49.

⁵⁵ Ibid. p. 50.

⁵⁶ Ibid. pp. 48, 50.

⁵⁷ Ibid. p. 59.

⁵⁸ Ibid. pp. 59–60.

⁵⁹ “Déclaration de la délégation du parti communiste français,” Contribution, p. 38.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ “Secondo Intervento,” Interventi, p. 71.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Quoted in Florin, , op. cit., p. 25.Google Scholar

⁶² Tsedenbal to the II MPRP CC Plenum, Pravda, 02 3, 1962.Google Scholar

⁶³ Belgian CP Politburo statement, Le Drapeau Rouge, 02 22, 1962.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Crankshaw, , The Observer, 05 20, 1962.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ “Secondo intervento,” Interventi, pp. 72–73, at p. 73.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ “Déclaration de Maurice Thorez,” Contribution, p. 47.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ “Secondo intervento,” Interventi, pp. 72–73.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ “Déclaration de Maurice Thorez,” Contribution, p. 48.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Crankshaw, (The Observer, 05 6, 1962)Google Scholar reports that “only the Albanians, the Koreans, the Indonesians, the Siamese, the Vietnamese, the Burmese, the Malayans, and the Japanese spoke up for China.”

⁷⁰ “Give Full Play to the Revolutionary Spirit of the 1957 Moscow Declaration,” People's Daily, 11 21, 1960Google Scholar (excerpts: Hudson, Lowenthal, , and MacFarquhar, , op. cit., pp. 171–173)Google Scholar; “Unity Under the Banner of Marxism-Leninism,” Pravda, 11 23, 1960Google Scholar (excerpts: ibid. p. 173).

⁷¹ Quoted from Hudson, , Lowenthal, and MacFarquhar, , op. cit., pp. 172–173.Google Scholar

⁷² “Lettera,” Interventi, pp. 74–77Google Scholar, at p. 74. This PCI letter was written to Khrushchev so that he would receive it “before the end of the work of the drafting committee.”

⁷³ Ibid. p. 75.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ That the Russians also favoured this is clear from Florin, op. cit.

⁷⁶ Ho Chi Minh, according to at least one Indian press report, mediated. (K. V. Narain in the Hindu Weekly Review, 02 6, 13, 1961.)Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Zagoria, , The Sino-Soviet Conflict, pp. 367–368.Google Scholar See ibid. pp. 345–365 for a detailed analysis of the statement, on which the following is in part based.

⁷⁸ Belgian CP Politburo statement, in Le Drapeau Rouge, 02 22, 1962.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Khrushchev, op. cit.

⁸⁰ Cf. Dallin, op. cit.