1. Loh, Robert, Escape from Red China (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1962), p. 289Google Scholar; See alsoKraus, Richard, “The Evolving Concept of Class in the Chinese People's Republic” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1974)Google Scholar; Chapter Two, footnote 92.

2. Baum, Richard and Teiwes, Frederic C., Ssu-ch'ing: The Socialist Movement of 1962–66 (Berkeley: University of California Centre for Chinese Studies, 1968)Google Scholar;

3. Houn, Fianklin, To Change a Nation (Glencoe: Free Press, 1961)Google Scholar;Liu, Alan P. L., Communications and National Integration in Communist China (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971)Google Scholar;Yu, Frederic T. C., Mass Persuasion in Communist China (New York: Praeger, 1964)Google Scholar.

4. Grants from the Council on Foreign Relations, the Joint Committee on Contemporary China of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies, and the East Asian Institute of Columbia University made possible the research for this paper, based on interviewing in Hong Kong carried out in 1964–65 and 1971–72; the protocols are filed at the East Asian Institute of Columbia University. It is also based on a survey of the Red Guard press, which shed much light upon this subject, and on the pertinent categories in the clipping files of the Union Research Institute (paras. 1125–11254). The work depends heavily upon the capable research guidance provided by a former lower ranking provincial cadre, whose identity must remain anonymous. I draw upon earlier interviews of the same individual by Kenneth Lieberthal. On two trips to China in December 1972 and June 1973, I sought to confirm the information obtained in Hong Kong; in general, I found the impressions acquired outside China to be accurate. I profited from the comments of Andrew Nathan and William Hsu upon an earlier draft.

5. The following section is based upon interviewing in Hong Kong. It is supported by Red Guard disclosures (see vignettes below).

6. For discussions of selection of an official to deliver the work report, in this case not to a work conference but to the First Session of the Eighth Party Congress, seeMacFarquhar, Roderick, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, 1. Contradictions among the People, 1956–57 (London: Oxford University Press, New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 100–102, 161–64Google Scholar; For discussion of the background of the work report to the Ninth Party Congress, see En-lai, Chou, “Report to the Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China,” 24 08 1973, Peking Review, Nos. 35 and 36 (7 09 1973), pp. 17–18Google Scholar;

7. For work meetings of the Central Committee, seeChang, Parris, “Research notes on the changingloci of decision making in the CCP,” The China Quarterly, No. 44 (1970), pp. 181–94Google Scholar;

8. “Facts about Liu Chien-hsun's Crimes,” pamphlet published by General Command Headquarters of Revolutionary Rebels of Organs of CCP Honan Provincial Committee, 12 March 1967, inSurvey of China Mainland Magazines Supplement, No. 32 (25 11 1968), p.3Google Scholar;

9. Naturally, questions arise concerning the accuracy of the Red Guard press. No doubt false charges were made, but the stories acquire plausibility when checked against the documents of the time and when similar stories surface in many different publications. For example, Canton publications criticized Ta'o Chu for his reception of Liu Shao-ch'i in 1959, while Liu sought time to study economic matters. Tientsin publications criticize Liu Shao-ch'i for his use of Nan-k'ai economists to prepare for his 1959 review of the economy. The 1959 officially reported daily appearances of Liu Shao-ch'i reveal an absence during the time Red Guards claim Liu was in Canton. A fair inference, then, is that Liu Shao-ch'i spent time in 1959 in Canton reviewing and thinking about the Chinese economy. Or, when the Red Guards refer to the 1953 Hungarian problem, and Brzezinski's Soviet Bloc contains a discussion of this problem, one's confidence in the Red Guard report is enhanced. In sum, the Red Guard materials cannot be used alone; but they can effectively be used providing that this is done in combination with other existing evidence.

10. The Conference is mentioned inHsiao-p'ing, Teng, “Report on the Revision of the CCP Constitution,” Eighth National Congress of the CCP (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1956), Vol. 1, p. 197Google Scholar; Note also the June 1953 Plenary Session of the Politburo, held at this time, which seemingly resulted in a commitment to embark upon the first Five-Year Plan.(Hsueh-hsi tzu-liao) (Study Materials), Compiled by the Congress of Red Guards of Universities and Colleges of Canton, July 1969, translated in SCMM-S, No. 34 (6 10 1969), p. 11Google Scholar;

11. This information, contained in but two sentences may shed significant new light on the Kao Kang affair. It comes fromP'i T'an chan-pao, edited by Agricultural Revolutionary Rebel Liaison Station, 25 08 1967 (special edition), p. 6Google Scholar; column 1, in files of Union Research Institute. On the July 1953 Hungarian problem, seeBrzezinski, Zbigniew, The Soviet Bloc (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 162–63Google Scholar;

12. P'i T'an chan-pao, ibid. This information fits into the existing accounts of Kao's behaviour in 1953. SeeTeiwes, Frederick C., “Rectification Campaigns and Purges in Communist China, 1950–1960” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1971)Google Scholar; chapter 11, andBridgham, Philip C., “Factionalism in the Central Committee,” in Lewis, John (ed.), Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 203–35Google Scholar;

13. P'i T'an chan-pao, ibid.

14. Hung wei chan-pao (Red Guard Combat News), 8 01 1967, in SCMPS, No. 166 (13 03 1967), p. 22Google Scholar;

15. Hung-se pao-ting in SCMP, No. 3935 (9 05 1967), p. 12Google Scholar;

16. “Facts about Liu Chien-shun's crimes,” p. 12.

17. A similar example concerns the behaviour of Po I-po at the Lushan Conference. See,“Ten great crimes committed by the counter-revolutionary Po I-po,” Ching-kang-shan (Ching-kang Mountain), 1 01 1967, in SCMP-S, No. 162 (14 02 1967), p. 12Google Scholar;

18. “Ta'ao Chu is the Khrushchev of Central-South China,” pamphlet of the Canton Liaison Centre of Wuhan Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters,Tsetung, Mao Thought Red Guards, in Current Background, No. 824 (27 04 1967), p. 20Google Scholar;

19. Although this section is based on interviews, references to this type of meeting can be found in written sources. SeeCentral People's Government Council, Kung-wen ch'u-li chih-hsing pan-fa (Temporary Methods for Handling Public Documents), issued 29 12 1951 (Peking: People's Press, 1952), p. 16Google Scholar; AlsoFan, Su (ed.), Hsin kung-wen shou-ts'e (New Public Document Handbook) (Shanghai: Pei-hsin shu-chu, 1953), pp. 9Google Scholar and 20.

20. Although this is generally true, forums can be quite large and/or have a fixed agenda. The best known such tso-fan hui was the Yenan Forum on Art and Literature, where Mao set forth his basic orientation towards that field.

21. They are described inAhn, Byung-joon, “Adjustments in the Great Leap Forward and their ideological legacy,” Johnson, Chalmers (ed.), Ideology and Politics in Contemporary China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1973), pp. 257–301Google Scholar;

22. “Notification by CCP Central Committee and Cultural Revolutionary group gathering opinions on the convening of the Ninth Congress,”Tzu-liao chuan-ch'i (Special Collection of Materials), 11 1968 in SCMP-S, No. 245 (3 03 1969), pp. 5–8Google Scholar;

23. Ibid. p. 6.

24. This paragraph is based on information secured in Hong Kong in early 1972.

25. Constructed from Red Guard quotations of Liu's remarks, especially in SCMM-S, No. 25 (13 May 1968), and SCMPS, No. 173, pp. 1–20.

26. For Chinese sources on the document system, see Central People's Government Council, Kung-wen ch'u-li chih-hsing pan-fa; Su Fan (ed.), Hsin kung-wen shou-ts'e; Meng Ping and Hsa Li (eds.), Kung-wen ti chi-pen chih-shih (n.p., n.d.). Although the administrative rules were enacted in the early 1950s, they are still in effect.

27. The differences among documents are briefly explained inFalkenheim, Victor, “Provincial Administration in Fukien: 1949–1966” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1972), pp. 248–55Google Scholar;

28. Peking:Hung-wei pao (Red Guard Paper), 10 11 1967, in SCMP-S, No. 219 (29 02 1968), p. 21Google Scholar;

29. The following is based on Hong Kong interviewing; it is generally supported byFan, Su (ed.), Hsin kung-wen, p. 44Google Scholar;

30. The pivotal role of the secretariat is outlined in Central People's Government Council, “Decision for all levels on secretarial organs and on the responsibilities of secretarial chiefs and of office heads in agencies without secretariat chiefs,” 26 July 1951 inFan, Su (ed.), Hsin kung-wen, pp. 94–99Google Scholar; See also Jen-min jih-pao, 30 November 1951; Che-chiang jih-pao, 16 January 1952; Kuang-ming jih-pao, 26 December 1952;Hsin-hua jih-pao (Chungking), 4 06 1953Google Scholar;Hsueh-hsi (Study), No. 106, 18 02 '1957, pp. 17Google Scholar; and Hsin Hu-nan pao, 4 March 1957.

31. For news items, see Jen-min jih-pao, 27 December 1956 and 31 November 1957; CKung-cKing hsin-hua jih-pao, 10 May 1953 and 17 May 1953;Shanghai, , Chieh-fang jih-pao, 27 12 1952Google Scholar;Canton, , Nan-fang jih-pao, 26 07 1952Google Scholar;Tientsin, , Ta-kung pao, 18 08 1953Google Scholar; and Nei-meng-ku jih-pao, 16 January 1957.

32. Tzu-liao chuan-chi (Special Collection of Materials), compiled by the Political Department of the Canton Workers Congress, 11 1968, in SCMP-S, No. 246 (12 03 1969), p. 15Google Scholar;

33. SeeAhn, Byung-joon, “Ideology, policy, and power in Chinese politics and the evolution of the Cultural Revolution, 1959–1965” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1971)Google Scholar;

34. Good examples and discussion of investigation work can be found in Jen'min jih-pao, 1 January 1957, 8 January 1955; Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien pao (China Youth Daily), 7 September 1956; Chiang-hsi jih-pao, 18 December 1956. For pamphlets on how to engage in investigation work, see “Selections of Mao Tsetung” (with contribution by Yü, Su;), Sheng-ch'an tsu-chih yii nung-ts'un tiao-ch'a (Organization of Production and Rural Investigation) (Hong Kong: New Democracy Press, 1946)Google Scholar;Pai, , Tsen-yang tso tiao-ch'a yen-chiu kung-tso (How to Engage in Investigative Research Work) (Peking: San-lien Shu-tien, 1950)Google Scholar;Duang-yuan, Yü, Tiao-ch'a yen-chiu (Investigative Research) (Canton: Hsin-hua shu-tien, 1950)Google Scholar;

35. The control process in the Chinese bureaucracy is covered inSchurmann, Franz, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; rev. ed., chapter 5.

36. Peking, Cheng-fa kung-she, No. 17 (04 7, 1967)Google Scholar; in SCMP, No. 3958, pp. 10–23 (13 06 1967).

37. The following is based onLiu Shao-ch'i tsui-hsing lu (The Criminal Record of Liu Shao-ch'i), compiled by the Yung-hsiang-tung Combat Regiment of Hsiang-ta'an Administrative Bureau Organs, 09 1957; translated in SCMMS, No. 26 (27 06 1968), pp. 10–17Google Scholar; Other Red Guard sources contain quotations from the same Liu visit. More importantly, as substantiating evidence, NCNA carried no accounts of Liu Shao-ch'i's activities from 12 February to 19 May except for two appearances in Changsha - where Red Guard sources also locate him.

38. Ibid. p. 14.

39. See, for example, Jen-min jih-pao, 30 November 1951; Kuang-chou jih-pao, 14 December 1954; Ch'un-chung jih-pao, 20 December 1951;Shanghai, , Wen-huipao, 11 03 1957Google Scholar;

40. Work by David Lampton at the University of Michigan on the role of doctors in the formulation of medical policy and by John Burns on the role of peasants in making local agricultural policy - and both of whom are modifying interest group analysis on the Chinese case - should shed more light on this point.

41. The following account summarized my reading of the URI files on bureaucratic communications, 1949–69.

42. For example inter alia, Kuang-ming jih-pao, 6 August 1952;Hsin-hua jihpao (Chungking), 24 01 1953Google Scholar;

43. For example, Jen-nun jih-pao, 8 June 1954.

44. For example, ibid. 25 February 1950; Chieh-fang jih-pao, 12 June 1951.

45. See, inter alia, Jen-min jih-pao, 31 November 1951; Tien-chin jih-pao, 14 September 1952; Che-chiang jih-pao, 24 January 1954; Fu-chien jih-pao, 23 November 1952.

46. SeeChoh-ming, Li, The Statistical System of Communist China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962)Google Scholar;

47. A definitive account of changes in local government during this time isLieberthal, Jane, “From co-operative to commune: an analysis of rural administrative policy in China, 1955–58,” M.A. Essay, Columbia University, 1971Google Scholar;

48. For examples, see Ho-pei jih-pao, 15 June 1957; Kan-su jih-pao, 13 December 1956; Jen-min jih-pao, 18 December 1956; Lu-ta jih-pao, 22 November 1956;Hsin-hua jih-pao (Nanking), 25 10 1956Google Scholar; Ta-kung pao, 27 July 1956.

49. See Hsin Hu-nan pao, 6 February 1957; Pei-ching jih pao, 11 March 1957; and especially Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien pao (China Youth Bulletin), 4 December 1957.

50 This is a key argument in Franz Schumann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China.

51. See,Porch, Harriet E., Civil Aviation in China since 1949, RAND Corporation Memorandum, RM-4666-PR, 06 1966Google Scholar;

52. Consider also the role of the aeroplane in the Wuhan Incident and the Lin Piao incident.

53. See ParrisChang, H., “Provincial Party leaders' rategies for survival during the Cultural Revolution,” Scalapino, Robert (ed.), Elites in the People's Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), pp. 501–38Google Scholar; and Richard Baum, “Elite behavior under conditions of stress,” ibid. pp. 540–75.

54. This theme is developed in Byung-joon Ahn, “Ideology, Policy, and Power.”

55. See in particularWu, Silas, Communication and Imperial Control in China: Evolution of the Palace Memorial System (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; andFairbank, John and Teng, Ssu-yü, Ch'ing Administration: Three Studies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 1–107Google Scholar.

56. SeeSpence, Jonathan, Ts'ao Yin and the K'Cang-hsi Emperor (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967)Google Scholar;

57. See in particularHinton, William, Fanshen: A Documentary History of the Chinese Revolution (New York: Random House, 1966)Google Scholar; andSelden, Mark, The Yenan Way (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Press, 1971)Google Scholar;

58. See in particularWilensky, Harold, Organizational Intelligence (New York, Basic Books, 1967)Google Scholar; A problem which I have faced in developing a comparative perspective for this paper is that the empirical literature on communications within total governmental systems is relatively undeveloped. Karl Deutsch's pathbreaking work,The Nerves of Government (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963)Google Scholar; has not really generated much empirical work. The political science literature focusses on elite-to-mass communications. We turn, therefore, to organizational theory literature for comparisons, but there too the research does not seem to concentrate upon our concerns: the relative importance and effect of different types of communications in different contexts.