¹ Kung, Ch'u, Wo Yü Hung-chün (The Red Army and I), Hong Kong: Nan-feng Ch'u-pan-she, 1954, p. 364.Google Scholar

² Hung-se Chung-hua, 149 (14 February 1934), p. 3Google Scholar; also appears in Sheng, Lu, “Fu-chou yü Jui-chin” (Foochow and Juichin), Kuo-wen Chou-pao, 12:9 (11 March 1935), p. 11.Google Scholar

³ The full title of the agreement was “The Anti-Japanese, Anti-Chiang Preliminary Agreement” (Fan-Jih Fan-Chiang ti Ch'u-pu Hsieh-ting). Texts of it appear in Sheng Lu, op. cit., p. 2; and in Hung-se Chung-hua, 149 (14 February 1934), p. 4.Google ScholarAn incomplete text of the agreement appeared in 1951 in Hu, Hua and others (ed.), Chung-kuo Hsin Min-chu-chu-i Ko-ming Shih Ts'an-k'ao Tzu-liao (Ref0erence Materials for China's New Democratic Revolutionary History), Shanghai: Shang-wu Yin-shu Kuan, 1951, pp. 259–260.Google Scholar This edition contains only the preamble and first four articles of the agreement and cites as the source for these excerpts: Chiu-kuo Shih-pao (National Salvation News), 29 January 1936. There are only minor differences between the parts of the agreement presented here and the same sections given by Sheng Lu. However, the articles from number 5 on are omitted, as are the signatures of the plenipotentiaries. Hu Hua somewhat deceptively entitles the selection an “anti-Japanese Fighting Agreement” (K'ang-jih Tso-chan Hsieh-ting). However, the text of the preamble (as in Sheng Lu) ref0ers to it as a “Preliminary Agreement” (Ch'u-pu Hsieh-ting). Article 9 of the agreement (in the Sheng Lu text) calls for the concluding of a Fighting Agreement as soon as possible after fulfilment of the terms of the Preliminary Agreement. These terms were never fulfilled and the Fighting Agreement never materialized. In contrast with all other available texts, the Hu Hua edition unaccountably dates the agreement as 21 November 1933 rather than 26 October.Google Scholar

Although the various texts mentioned above are probably authentic, there remains some question as to how accurately they describe the actual agreement between Juichin and Foochow. None of the available texts was published by the rebel side, so we have only the Communist version of the agreement for analysis. Moreover, the Communists withheld publication until January (no day given), 1934—well after the collapse of the alliance. In fact, the earliest available text did not appear until 14 February (in Hung-se Chung-hua) after the rebellion had been completely smashed. The official reason given for the delay in publication was the secrecy restriction (Art. 8).Google Scholar

⁴ This interpretation was supported in the Chu-Mao statement (para. 2) of 11 February 1934 after the collapse of the revolt. Hung-se Chung-hua, 149 (14 February 1934), p. 3; Sheng Lu, op. cit., p. 10.Google Scholar

⁵ Members of the Executive Committee included: Ch'en, Ming-shu (chairman), Li, Chi-shen, Chiang, Kuang-nai, Ts'ai, T'ing-k'ai, Tai, Chi, Eugene, Ch'en, Fang Chen-wu George, Hsü and Huang, Ch'i-hsiang. See China Weekly Review, 66:13 (25 November 1933), p. 510Google Scholar; and The China Yearbook, 1934, pp. 373–374.Google Scholar

⁶ Quoted in China Weekly Review, 67:2 (9 December 1933), p. 47.Google Scholar On 27 November (well before the interview with the Japanese newspaperman) Canton sources told U.S. Minister Nelson T. Johnson in private of having evidence of intrigue between the Fukien leaders, especially Ch'en Ming-shu, and the Japanese. See Johnson's memorandum in Foreign Relations of the U.S.: 1933, III, p. 469. According to an American Communist-front source, on 29 November the garrison commander at Amoy publicly promised to protect the interests of foreign Powers, including foreign concessions, and declared that he would put a ban on Communist activities. “Analysis of the Fukien Rebellion in China,” China Today, I:1 (January 1934) [Old Series], p. 4.Google Scholar

⁷ Harold, saacs, “Radicalism and Realities: A Fukien Close-Up,” China Forum,3:3 (21 December 1933), p. 5.Google Scholar

⁸ “Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an-tang Chung-yang Wei-yüan-hui Wei Fu-chien Shih-pien Kao Ch'üan-kuo Min-chung” (Statement of the CCP Central Committee to the People of the Entire Nation on the Fukien Incident), Tou-cheng, (Struggle) (Kiangsi), No. 38 (12 December 1933), pp. 1–3. The statement was reprinted in Sheng Lu, op. cit., pp. 6–7.Google Scholar

⁹ The “two-path” theory was the standard Communist line at the time. The formulation of it in the December 5 statement was a relatively mild one, the choice being between colonialism, on the one hand, and “opposition” to imperialism and the KMT, on the other. Although the latter was viewed as requiring a “revolutionary victory” of the masses, the statement did not specify that this must be led by the Soviets or CCP. Mao Tse-tung had put the agreement in much stronger terms as recently as the summer of 1933 when, in issuing a call for the 2nd National Soviet Congress, he declared: “The facts plainly indicate that the road to the power of the Soviets is the only road to victory, the salvation of the Chinese masses.” International Press Correspondence, 13:54 (8 December 1933), p. 1230.Google Scholar It is inaccurate to say, as does Prof. Hsiao Tso-liang (op. cit., 251) that the choice presented in the December 5 statement of the Central Committee was between a China “Soviet or Colonial—leaving no room for a third road.” Likewise, it is incorrect to say that: “The argument used … against support for the Fukien revolt was that only two roads existed, that there was no middle way.” Robert, North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963, p. 162. As has been shown above, opposition to the rebel regime was based on its ref0usal to honour previous pledges—both to the people of Fukien and to the Communists. The 5 December statement continued to offer support to the non-Communist rebel regime provided it would mend its ways.Google Scholar

¹⁰ For footnote, see p. 41.Google Scholar

¹¹ This telegram was later published under the title: “Chung-hua Su-wei-ai Lin-shih Chung-yang Cheng-fu Chih Fu-chien Jen-min Ko-ming Cheng-fu Yü Shih-chiu-lu-chün Ti Ti-i Tien” (1st Telegram from the Chinese Soviet Provisional Central Government to the Fukien People's Revolutionary Government and 19th Route Army). John, Rue in his Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 1927–1935 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), p. 261, argues that Mao and Chu took a position during the Fukien revolt essentially in opposition to that of the CCP leadership, expressing “cautious hope” that “a genuine basis for co-operation” could be worked out—while the Party chiefs in contrast only attacked the rebels. In light of the general substantive agreement between the 20 December telegram discussed above and the CCP's 5 December statement analysed previously, it would seem that Rue's interpretation is exceedingly strained and questionable. His contention that the Soviet Government and CCP failed to issue any joint statements on the revolt would appear at most irrelevant. Finally, his assertion that Mao turned to “denouncing the rebels” only after the opportunity to form a united front had passed is contradicted by the available evidence cited above. To the extent that any internal Communist division arose during the preliminary negotiations, it appears to have found Mao squarely on the side of those resisting co-operation.Google Scholar

¹² China Weekly Review, 67:5 (30 December 1933), p. 181.Google Scholar

¹³ Kung Ch'u, op. cit., p. 397.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Wan, Min (Wang Ming), “Discussion on the Report of Comrade Dimitrov,” Inprecor, 15:60 (11 November 1935), p. 1489.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Edgar, Snow, Random Notes on Red China, p. 28.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Kung Ch'u, op. cit., pp. 366, 398.Google Scholar

¹⁷ See the Mao-Chu, statement of 11 February 1934. Hung-se Chung-hua, No. 149 (14 February 1934), p. 3; also Sheng Lu, op. cit., p. 11.Google Scholar

¹⁸ “Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an-tang Chung-yang Wei-yüan-hui Wei Fu-chien Shih-pien Ti-erh-tz'u Hsüan-yen” (Second Statement of the CCP Central Committee on the Fukien Incident), Hung-se Chung-hua (Red China), Second National Soviet Congress Special Edition No. 4 (January 1934), p. 2; text also in Sheng Lu, op. cit., pp. 8–10.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Hung-se Chung-hua (Red China), 2nd Soviet Congress Special Edition, No. 3 (26 January 1934), p. 3.Google Scholar

²⁰ Hung-se Chung-hua, 2nd Soviet Congress Special Edition, No. 5 (31 January 1934), p. 1.Google Scholar As Professor Hsiao Tso-liang has pointed out (op. cit., p. 273), Mao's remarks on the Fukien Rebellion were omitted in the later Chinese and English editions of this speech. For example, see Mao, Tse-tung, Selected Works, I, pp. 147–152.Google Scholar

²¹ “Chung-hua Su-wei-ai Kung-ho-kuo Chung-yang Cheng-fu Wei Fu-chien Shih-pien Hsüan-yen” (Statement of the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic on the Fukien Incident), Hung-se Chung-hua (Red China), No. 149 (14 February 1934), p. 3; Sheng Lu, op. cit., pp. 10–12.Google Scholar

²² Wang, Ming, “The Struggle of the Chinese Red Army Against Chiang Kai-shek's 6th Drive,” Communist International, 12:1 (5 January 1935), pp. 17–18, 21–22. It should be noted that Wang's criticism was published before the Tsunyi Conference, when Mao is supposed to have rectified the previous “erroneous” Russian Returned Student leadership.Google Scholar

²³ Inprecor, 15:60 (11 November 1935), p. 1489Google Scholar; also Wang, Ming, “The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries and the Tactics of the Communist Parties,” Communist International, 12:8 (20 September 1935), p. 1326.Google Scholar

²⁴ See “Resolution of the 12th Plenum E.C.C.I. on the Report of Comrade Okano,” Inprecor, 12:46 (20 October 1932), pp. 1005–1006.Google Scholar

²⁵ See Wang, Ming and Kang, Sin [K'ang Sheng], Revolutionary China Today, Moscow: Co-operative Publishing of Workers in the USSR, 1934, pp. 106–107.Google Scholar

²⁶ Moreover, the earliest text of it which I have been able to locate was not published until 1938. “Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an-tang Chung-yang Kuan-yü Mu-ch'ien Cheng-chih Hsing-shih Yü Tang Ti Jen-wu Chüeh-i” (Resolution of the Chinese Communist Party Centre on the Present Political Situation and the Party's Tasks), published in Shih-nien Lai Ti Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an-tang (The Chinese Communist Party in the Last 10 Years), edited by Lo Fu and others, Hankow? : Chen-li Ch'u-pan She, 1938, pp. 27–51.Google ScholarAlthough the term “chung-yang” usually ref0ers to the entire Central Committee, a parenthetical note explains that this resolution was passed by the Politburo on December 25, 1935. The brief excerpts printed in the Selected Works, Vol. I, pp. 328–330, omit entirely the Politburo's remarks on the Fukien Rebellion.Google Scholar

²⁷ Pavel, Mif, Heroic China: Fifteen Years of the Communist Party of China, New York: Worker's Library Publishers, 1937, pp. 77, 88.Google Scholar

²⁸ Edgar, Snow, Red Star Over China, p. 186.Google Scholar

²⁹ Ibid. p. 418.

³⁰ Edgar, Snow, Random Notes on Red China, p. 60. It is a little difficult to believe the embattled Red Army in Kiangsi was taking tactical orders from an “advisory group in Shanghai.”Google Scholar

³¹ Mao, , Selected Works, I, p. 251Google Scholar; Mao Tse-tung Hsün-chi, I, p. 230.Google Scholar

³² Mao, , Selected Works, IV, pp. 192–193.Google Scholar

³³ For example, see Miao, Ch'u-huang, Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an-tang Chien-yao Li-shih (A Short History of the Chinese Communist Party), Peking: Hsüeh-hsi Tsa-chih She, 1956, p. 92Google Scholar; and Ho, Kan-chih, A History of the Modern Chinese Revolution, Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1960, pp. 264–265.Google Scholar

³⁴ Unless Juichin were prepared to violate the “United Front from below” tactics ordered by the Comintern in 1932 and unless it were willing to abandon the three basic conditions for support of anti-Japanese armed forces (adopted by the CCP in January 1933), no other policy alternative was open to it in view of rebel behaviour. The fact that United Front tactics were substantially modified later—first by the Comintern, then by the CCP—only served to confuse the story of the rebellion.Google Scholar