1. The “self-reliance” policies of Maoist China, while partly based on expediency born of China's isolation from both the Soviet Union and the United States, were viewed as an alternative to the Stalinist and capitalist approaches to economic growth. See generally Eckstein, Alexander, China's Economic Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) pp. 123ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar And while the “open door policy” established in 1978 expressed the Chinese leadership's recognition of the failures of self reliance and its commitment to harnessing foreign investment in pursuit of economic growth, the new policies also express the view that China can find an alternative route. See generally, Dernberger, Robert F., “The Chinese search for the path of self-sustained growth in the 1980s,” in Joint Economic Committee of U.S. Congress, China Under the Four Modernizations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), pp. 19–76Google Scholar; Harding, Harry, “The problematic future of China's economic reforms,” in Joint Economic Committee of U.S. Congress, China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s: The Problems of Reforms, Modernization, and Interdependence (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 78–88.Google Scholar

2. For a discussion of the contrast between neoclassical and dependency approaches to economic development in East Asia, see Haggard, Stephen, Pathways From the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrialized Countries (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1990)Google Scholar; Chowdhury, Anis and Islam, Iyanatul, The Newly Industrializing Economies of East Asia (London & New York: Routledge, 1993).Google Scholar

3. The content of the legal regime governing foreign investment in China is identified by reference to the texts of applicable laws and regulations, as well as formal interpretations of law, official policy statements and other less formal rules. These materials were taken from a variety of Chinese and English language sources. Chinese language sources include Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo fagui huibian (Compilation of Current Laws and Regulations of the PRC) (Beijing: Law Publishers, yearly); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo xin fagui huibian (Compilation of New Laws and Regulations of the PRC) (Beijing: Legal system publishers, periodical); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo duiwai jingji fagui huibian: 1945–1985 (Compilation of Economic Laws and Regulations Pertaining to Foreign Matters) (Beijing: People's Press, 1986); Zhongguo jingji tequ kaifaqu falu fagui xuanbian (Compilation of Laws and Regulations for China's Special Economic Zones and Open Areas) (Beijing, 1987); Renmin ribao (People's Daily); Fazhi ribao (Legal System Daily); and Guoji shang bao (Journal of International Commerce). English language sources include China's Foreign Economic Legislation (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press); China Laws for Foreign Business (CCH Australia Ltd.); Victor, Nee (ed.), China Commercial Laws and Regulations (New York: Oceana)Google Scholar;China Economic News; China Law and Practice; The China Business Review and East Asian Executive Reports.

4. The fundamental role of the state in Chinese society and economy is articulated in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (1982). See particularly, Art. 18 on foreign investment. Revisions to the Constitution in 1993, while expressing greater support for replacing the state planned economy with a socialist market economy, do not dilute the centrality of the state's role as the agent for development. See “Amendments to the PRC Constitution,” Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, 29 March 1993, in FBIS Daily Report-China, 30 March 1993, pp. 42–3.

5. See e.g. Chen, E. and Hamilton, G., “Business groups and economic development,” in Gary, Hamilton (ed.), Business Networks and Economic Development in East and Southeast Asia (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1991). p. 3.Google Scholar Also see Redding, Gordon S., The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990).CrossRefGoogle Scholar The importance of regional business networks is also seen as crucial in one interpretation of Japan's economic development experience. See Freidman, David, The Misunderstood Miracle: Industrial Development and Political Change in Japan (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1988)Google Scholar , esp. ch. 5.

6. See e.g. Vogel, Ezra, The Four Little Dragons (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).Google Scholar

7. See generally, Scalapino, Robert A., Seizaburo, Sato and Jusuf, Wanandi (eds.), Asian Economic Development: Past and Future (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1985)Google Scholar, esp. Chalmers Johnson, “Political institutions and economic performance: the government-business relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan,” pp. 63–89, and Edward K.Y. Chen, “The newly industrialized countries in Asia: growth experience and prospects,” pp. 131–160. Also see United States International Trade Commission, East Asia: Regional Economic Integration and Implications for the United States (Washington, D.C.: USITC, 1993), pp. 12ff. and 19ff.; and Economist Intelligence Unit, China, Japan, and the Asian NICs: Economic Structure and Analysis (London: The Economist, 1988).

8. See Haggard, Pathways From the Periphery, esp. ch. 2.

9. See e.g. Johnson, Chalmers, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Japanese Industrial Policy 1925–1975 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982).Google Scholar For an analysis questioning the effectiveness of state management of economic growth, see Friedman, The Misunderstood Miracle.

10. See Woo, Jung-En, Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).Google Scholar While she suggests that recent efforts at financial liberalization signal the end of an era of state patronage of heavy industry, the author provides considerable evidence of the central role of the state in developing South Korea's industrialized economy.

11. See Gold, Thomas B., “Entrepreneurs, multinationals and the state,” in Winckler, Edwin A. and Susan, Greenhalgh (eds.), Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1990), pp. 175–205Google Scholar and State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1986).

12. See e.g. Regnier, Phillipe, Singapore: City-State in South-East Asia (trans. Christopher, Hurst) (Kuala Lumpur: S. Abdul Majeed & Co., 1993)Google Scholar; Ann, Lee Soo, Industrialization in Singapore (Melbourne: Longman's 1973)Google Scholar; Yah, Lim Chong, Economic Restructuring in Singapore (Singapore: Federal Publications, 1984).Google Scholar

13. There is a rich and wide-ranging literature on the problems of dependency. Among the most useful works are Baran, Paul A., The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968)Google Scholar; Frank, Andre Gundar, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967)Google Scholar; Furtado, Celso, Development and Underdevelopment: A Structural View of the Problems of Developed and Underdeveloped Countries (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964)Google Scholar; Galtung, Johann, “An economic theory of imperialism,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 2 (1971), pp. 81–117CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Portes, Alexandra, “The sociology of national development,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 82, No. 1 (1976), pp. 55–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wallerstein, Immanuel, “The rise and future demise of the world capitalist system: concepts for comparative analysis,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 14, No. 4 (1974), pp. 1–26Google Scholar; and Wilber, Charles K. (ed.), The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment (2nd ed.) (New York: Random House, 1979).Google Scholar For a not uncritical survey of the dependency literature, see Packenham, Robert A., The Dependency Movement: Scholarship and Politics in Development Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).Google Scholar

14. See Haggard, Pathways From the Periphery, at pp. 19–22.

15. See Packenham, The Dependency Movement, esp. p. 315.

16. Rather than indulge in what one observer terms “an academic industry of the worst sort” (see Haggard, Pathways From the Periphery, p. 19) and dismiss dependency perspectives outright, I prefer to draw upon those aspects of dependency perspectives concerning the relationships between the state, law, and foreign investment in the dynamic of economic development that are useful to assist our assessment of China's foreign investment regime.

17. See generally, Cardoso, Fernando H. and Faletto, Enzo, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).Google Scholar For a critique, see Packenham, The Dependency Movement, pp. 93–94.

18. See Baran, Paul, “On the political economy of backwardness,” in Wilber, Charles K. (ed.), The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment (2nd ed.) (New York: Random House, 1979), pp. 91–113.Google Scholar Also see Charles K. Wilber and James H. Weaver, “Patterns of dependency: income distribution and the history of underdevelopment,” in ibid. pp. 114–129.

19. See generally, Singer, Mark, Weak States in a World of Power: The Dynamics of International Relationships (New York: Free Press, 1972) and Ronald Muller, “The multinational corporation and the underdevelopment of the Third World,” in Wilber, The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment, pp. 151–178.Google Scholar

20. See Gardner, James A., Legal Imperialism: American Lawyers and Foreign Aid in Latin America (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), pp. 187ff.Google Scholar

21. See generally, Packenham, Robert A., Liberal America and the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973)Google Scholar; esp. pp. 112–129; Gardner, Legal Imperialism.

22. For a particularly useful critical survey, see e.g. Snyder, Francis G., “Law and development in the light of dependency theory,” Law and Society Review, Vol. 14 (1980), p. 722.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

23. See generally, Keohane, Robert O. and Ooms, Van Doom, “The multinational firm and international regulation,” International Organization, Vol. 29, No. 1 (1975), pp. 186–206.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Also see Yash, Ghai, Robin, Luckham, and Francis, Snyder (eds.), The Political Economy of Law: A Third World Reader (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987)Google Scholar; Francisco Orrego Vicun, “The control of multinational enterprises” and Weinstein, Franklin B., “Underdevelopment and efforts to control multinational corporations,” both in George, Modelski (ed.), Transnational Corporations and World Order: Readings in International Political Economy (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman & Co., 1979), at pp. 296–308 and pp. 338–346Google Scholar; Muller, Ronald, “Poverty is the product,” Foreign Policy, Vol. 13 (Winter 1973–74), pp. 71–102CrossRefGoogle Scholar; United Nations, Multinational Corporations in World Development (New York: United Nations, 1973)Google Scholar; and Hymer, Stephen, “The multinational corporation and the law of uneven development,” in Bhagwati, Jadwish N. (ed.), Economics and World Order (New York: MacMillan, 1972), pp. 113–135.Google Scholar In the international trade context, see Kennedy, David, ‘Turning to market democracy: a tale of two architectures,” Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 32, No. 2 (1991), pp. 373–396.Google Scholar

24. See e.g. Richard W. Bauman, “Liberalism and Canadian corporate law,” William E. Conklin, “ A contract,” and Joel C. Bakan, “Constitutional interpretation and social change: you don't always get what you want (nor what you need),” all in Devlin, Richard F. (ed.), Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond Mongomery, 1991) at pp. 75–97, 207–222, and 445–66Google Scholar, respectively. Cf.Stone, Alan, “The place of law in the Marxian structure-superstructure archetype,” Law & Society Review, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1985), pp. 40–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kelman, Mark. A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987) pp. 249.Google Scholar

25. See Murphy, Alexander, “Western investment in East-Central Europe: emerging patterns and implications for state stability,” The Professional Geographer, Vol. 44, No. 3 (1992), pp. 249–259.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

26. For discussion of the difficulties facing China in replicating the East Asian development experience, see Friedman, Edward, “Theorizing the democratization of China's Leninist state,” in Arif, Dirlik and Maurice, Meisner (eds), Marxism and the Chinese Experience (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989), pp. 171–189, at p. 179.Google Scholar

27. While the Official Communiqué made scant referent to the “open door policy” directly, the Plenum has come to be seen as the watershed event giving rise to the introduction of foreign investment in China. See “Zhongguo gongchandang dishiyi jie zhongyang weiyuanhui disan ci quanti huiyi gongbao” (“Communiqué of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh CCP Central Committee”), Hongqi (Red Flag), No. 1 (1979), pp. 14–21; Zhen, Peng, “Explanation on the seven draft laws made at the second session of the fifth NPC on 26th June, 1979,” NCNA, in Selections From World Broadcasts, 4 July 1979Google Scholar, at p. FE/6158/C/1; Liu, Xiangdong (ed.), Liyong waizi zhishi shouce (Handbook of Knowledge on the Use of Foreign Capital) (Beijing: World Knowledge Publishing, 1989), pp. 2–3Google Scholar; Yu, Hansheng (ed.), Dui wai jing mao yufalu shiyong shouce (Practical Handbook on Finance and Law Related to Foreign Matters) (Beijing: Law Publishing, 1992), pp. 5–7.Google Scholar

28. See Law of the PRC on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment (1979, as amended 1990) (Joint Venture Law) and Regulations of the PRC on Labour Management in Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment (JV Labour Regulations), in CCH Australia, China Laws for Foreign Business, para. 6–500 and para. 6–522.

29. See Implementing Regulations for the Law of the PRC on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment (1983, as amended 1986) (Joint Venture Implementing Regulations), in CCH Australia, China Laws for Foreign Business, para. 6–550.

30. See Economic Contract Law of the PRC (1981) (ECL) and Foreign Economic Contract Law of the PRC (1985) (FECL), in CCH Australia, China Laws for Foreign Business, paras. 5–500 and 5–550.

31. See e.g. Income Tax Law of the PRC Concerning Joint Ventures With Chinese and Foreign Investment (1980) (Joint Venture Income Tax Law); Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Income Tax Law of the PRC for Joint Ventures With Chinese and Foreign Investment (1980) (JVITL Implementing Regulations); and Foreign Enterprise Income Tax Law of the PRC (1981), all in China's Foreign Economic Legislation Vol. I (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1982), pp. 36–44, pp. 45–55, pp. 55–63, respectively; Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Foreign Enterprise Income Tax Law of the PRC (Foreign Enterprise Income Tax Implementing Regulations) (1982), Art. 24, in China's Foreign Economic Legislation Vol. II (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1982), pp. 64–74; and Income Tax Law of the PRC for Foreign Investment Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises (1991) (Unified Foreign Enterprise Income Tax Law, or UEFTL); in CCH Australia, China Laws for Foreign Business, para. 32–505.

32. See e.g., Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China Governing Foreign Exchange Control (1980) (1980 Provisional Forex Regulations) and Rules for the Implementation of Foreign Exchange Controls Relating to Enterprises with Overseas Chinese Capital, Enterprises with Foreign Capital, and Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (1983), in CCH Australia, China Laws for Foreign Business, paras. 8–550 and 8–670, respectively. Also see McKenzie, Paul D., “Foreign exchange and joint ventures with China: short-term strategies and long-term prospects,” Canadian Business Law Journal, Vol. 17 (1990), pp. 114–149.Google Scholar

33. See Law of the PRC on Sino-Foreign Co-operative Enterprises (1988) (Co-operative Enterprise Law) and the Law of the PRC on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises (1986) (WFOE Law), in CCH Australia, China Laws for Foreign Business, paras. 6–100, 13–506, respectively.

34. The emphasis on location was evident in the establishment of Special Economic Zones. See “Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dabui Changwu Weiyuanhui guanyu shouquan Guangdong sheng, Fujian sheng renmin daibiao hui ji qita changwu weiyuanhui zhiding suo shujingji tequ de ge xiang danxing jingji fagui de jueyi” (“Decision of the standing committee of the National People's Congress authorizing the people's congresses of Guangdong and Fujian provinces and their standing committees to enact various specific laws and regulations for the special economic zones under their jurisdiction”) (1981); “Guangdong sheng jingji tequ tiaoli” (“Regulations of Guangdong province for special economic zones”) (1985), both in Zhongguo jingji tequ kaifa qu falu fagui xuanbian (Selection of Laws and Regulations for China's Special Economic Zones and Development Zones) (Beijing: Zhanlan publishing, 1987), pp. 1 and 2. Also see generally, Falkenheim, Victor C., “China's Special Economic Zones,” in Joint Economic Committee of U.S. Congress, China's Economy Looks Toward the Year 2000 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), pp. 348–370.Google Scholar In addition to matters of location, special preferences were given to enterprises denoted as “export oriented enterprises” and “advanced technology enterprises.” See “Provisions of the State Council of the People's Republic of China for the encouragement of foreign investment” (1986), China Business Review, January-February 1987, pp. 14–15.

35. China's Individual Income Tax Law has recently been amended to bring within its scope Chinese taxpayers who had been effectively excluded previously. See Individual Income Tax Law of the PRC (1980, as amended 1993) in CCH Australia, China Laws for Foreign Business, para. 30–500(4); Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Individual Income Tax Law of the PRC (1980) in CCH Australia, China Laws for Foreign Business, para. 300–520(4); also Pitman B. Potter, “Taxation of foreign individuals” in Streng and Wilcox, Doing Business in China, ch. 19.

36. While the Unified Foreign Enterprise Tax Law continues to tax the income of foreign businesses differently from that of Chinese businesses, other taxes have recently been enacted which strive to tax foreign and Chinese businesses alike on turnover proceeds. See “Decision on the use of interim regulations concerning value-added taxes, consumption taxes and business taxes on FFEs and foreign enterprises” (1993), in China Economic News, 31 January 1994, p. 7. One recent report suggests that foreign investment incentives themselves will be ie abolished in favour of an incentive system applicable to both Chinese and foreign investors. See “Foreigners may lose investment privileges,” Hong Kong Standard, 6 June 1994.

37. See “Announcement of the People's Bank of China on further reforming the foreign exchange management system” (28 December 1993), China Economic News, 10 January 1994, p. 9.

38. See “Company law of the PRC” (1993), China Economic News, Supplement No. 2, 7 March 1994.

39. See Endean, Erin McGuire, “China's foreign commercial relations,” in Congress, Joint Economic Committee Of U.S. (ed.), China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s: The Problems of Reforms, Modernization, and Interdependence (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 761.Google Scholar

40. See “China data,” China Business Review, May-June, 1992, p. 19.

41. See “China data,” China Business Review, May-June, 1993, p. 57.

42. See “Statistical Communiqué of the State Statistical Bureau of the PRC on the 1993 National Economic and Social Development,” China Economic News, Supplement No. 3,14 March 1994, p. 5.

43. “Analysis of China's use of foreign funds for 1992,” China Economic News, 24 May 1993, p. 11.

44. See 1993 Statistical Communique, p. 5.

45. See Blejer, Marioetal., China: Economic Reform and Macroeconomic Management (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1991), pp. 8ffGoogle Scholar; PRC State Statistical Bureau, China Statistics Yearbook 1993.

46. See e.g., “MOFTEC spokesman's news conference,” in FBIS Daily Report-China, 27 July 1993, p. 26.

47. The intensity with which the United States Commerce Department negotiated the 1989 and 1992 intellectual property agreements and the 1992 market access agreement shows the extent of the business interests at stake in foreign efforts to bring about reform of China's foreign economic law regime. Indeed, the content of these agreements reflects closely the policy proposals forwarded by American business executives with activities in China. Compare content of 1989 IP agreement (in Potter, Pitman B., “Bettering protection for intellectual property,” China Business Review, July-August, 1989, pp. 27–29Google Scholar, and “Memorandum of Understanding between the government of the People's Republic of China and the government of the United States of America on the protection of intellectual property” (1992, author's copy)) with U.S.-China Business Council, “Recommendations on amendment of the China patent law” (1988). Also compare “People's Republic of China-United States Memorandum of Understanding concerning market access,” International Legal Materials, Vol. 31 (1992), p. 1274 with statements of concerns of executives in “The Council's investment initiative,” China Business Review, September-October 1992, pp. 6–8.

48. A working definition of foreign investment enterprises, which distinguishes them from other foreign business forms, emerged belatedly and was formalized only in 1986 with the 22 Articles on encouraging foreign investment. See “Provisions of the State Council of the PRC for the encouragement of foreign investment”; and “Implementing rules for examination and confirmation of export enterprises and technologically advanced enterprises with foreign investment” (1987), China Economic News, No. 7 (1987), p. 9. See “Supplement to implementary rules of MOFERT for examination and confirmation of export enterprises and technologically advanced enterprises with foreign investment” (1992), China Economic News, No. 19 (1992), p. 7. Also see Potter, Pitman B., “Seeking special status,” China Business Review, March-April 1988, pp. 36–39.Google Scholar “Foreign investment enterprises” means equity and contractual joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises. “Foreign enterprises” means foreign companies, enterprises and other economic organizations either having establishments or sites in China engaged in production or business operations, or deriving income from other sources in China. Foreign representative offices fall within the definition of foreign enterprises.

49. The basic provisions governing equity joint ventures are set out in the Joint Venture Law and the Joint Venture Implementing Regulations. Also see generally Liu Chu and Clark T. Randt, Jr., “Foreign investment vehicles,” in Streng and Wilcox, Doing Business in China,

50. See Co-operative Enterprise Law. For discussion of strategic partnerships generally, see Freeman, Louis S. and Stephens, Thomas M., “Using a partnership when a corporation won't do: the strategic use and effects of partnerships to conduct joint ventures and other major corporate business activities,” Taxes, December 1990, pp. 962–1002.Google Scholar

51. See Timothy Gelatt and Mao Rong, “Taxation of business enterprises,” in Streng ; and Wilcox, Doing Business in China, pp. 17–1–17–39.

52. See Pomfret, Richard, Investing in China: Ten Years of the Open Door Policy (Ames, IA: Iowa University Press, 1991), p. 26.Google Scholar

53. See generally, Moser, Michael J., “Legal aspects of offshore oil and gas exploration and development in China,” in Moser, Michael J. (ed.), Foreign Trade, Investment, and the Law in the People's Republic of China (2nd ed.) (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 270.Google Scholar

54. See WFOE Law; and Implementing Rules for China's Law on Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises (1990) (WFOE Implementing Regulations), in East Asian Executive Reports, February 1991, p. 25. ‘

55. See Pomfret, Investing in China, p. 65.

56. See Interim Regulations Concerning the Control of Resident Offices of Foreign Enterprises (1980), in CCH Australia, China Laws for Foreign Business, para 7–500(4). Also see Price Waterhouse, Doing Business in the People's Republic of China (1988), pp. 20,48.

57. See Procedures of the People's Bank of China for the Establishment of Representative Offices in China by Overseas and Foreign Financial Institutions (1983) (PBOC Procedures on Establishment of Foreign Financial Rep. Offices), in CCH Australia, China Laws for Foreign Business, para. 7–540(4).

58. See Administrative Measures of the People's Bank of China on Establishment in China of Resident Representative Offices by Foreign Financial Institutions (1991), in CCH Australia, China Laws for Foreign Business, para. 7–542.

59. See “Regulations of the PRC on the management of foreign funded financial institutions” (1994), China Economic News, 18 April 1994, p. 6.

60. See Pitman B. Potter, “Foreign participation in Chinese securities markets,” in Streng and Wilcox, Doing Business in China, pp. 7–1—7–26.

61. The regulations for the Shanghai Securities Exchange are set out in “Shanghai zhengquan jiaoyi suo jiaoyi shichang yewu shixing guize” ('Trial regulations of the Shanghai Securities Exchange on the activities of the exchange market”) (hereafter, Shanghai exchange rules) (26 November 1990) (Shanghai: Shanghai Securities Exchange Board of Directors, 1990) and “Shanghai shi zhengquan jiaoyi guanli banfa” (“Measures of Shanghai Municipality for administration of securities transactions”) (hereafter, Shanghai securities transaction measures), in Jiefang ribao (Liberation Daily), 12 December 1990, p. 3. An English translation appears as “Shanghai securities transaction regulations,” in FBIS Daily Report-China, 20 December 1990, p. 46.

62. The regulations for the Shenzhen exchange are contained in “Shenzhen zhengquan jiaoyi suo zhangcheng” (“Articles of Association for the Shenzhen Securities Exchange”) and “Shenzhen shi gupiao faxing yu jiaoyi guanli zanxing banfa” (“Provisional measures of Shenzhen Municipality for the issue and transferring of shares”) (15 May 1991). Also see “Guanyu [Shenzhen shi gupiao faxing yu jiaoyi guanli zanxing banfa] he [Shenzhen zhengquan jiaoyi suo zhangcheng] de pifu” (“Official reply concerning the provisional methods of Shenzhen Municipality for the issue and transferring of shares and the Articles of Association for the Shenzhen Securities Exchange”), Document Yin Fu [1991] No. 154, 11 April 1991, addressed for PBOC Shenzhen Branch. Also see “Shenzhen shi fagui jin chutai” (“Statutes and regulations of Shenzhen Municipality are tabled today”), Wenhui bao (Literary Daily), 15 May 1991.

63. See Measures of Shanghai Municipality for Administration of Special Renminbi- Denominated Shares (Shanghai Administrative Measures), issued by the People's Bank of China and the Shanghai Municipal People's Government, 22 November 1991; and Detailed Implementing Rules for the Measures of Shanghai Municipality for Administration of Special Renminbi-Denominated Shares (Shanghai Implementing Rules), issued by the Shanghai Branch of the People's Bank of China, 25 November 1991. Also see “Interim procedures on control of Shenzhen special (B-type) RMB stocks,” China Economic News, 27 January 1992. p. 7, and “Rules for the implementation of the interim procedures for the administration of special stocks in RMB (B-type stocks) in Shenzhen city,” China Economic News, 3 February 1992, p. 7.

64. See generally, Ho, Samuel P.S. and Huenemann, Ralph W.. China's Open Door Policy: The Quest for Foreign Technology and Capital (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1984).Google Scholar For a discussion of how these elements contribute to various strategies of import substitution industrialization (ISI), export led growth, and entrepot growth, see Haggard, Pathways From the Periphery, ch. 2.

65. See Joint Venture Law, Arts. 5 and 9; Joint Venture Implementing Regulations, Arts. 4, 28 and 62. Also see Co-operative Enterprise Law, Art. 8.

66. Joint ventures were to receive tax holidays for the first two profit-making years and reductions in subsequent years. See Joint Venture Law, Art. 7; Joint Venture Income Tax Law, Art. 5.

67. See WFOE Law, Art. 3.

68. See Regulations on Special Economic Zones in Guangdong Province (1980), Art. 9 (in China's Foreign Economic Legislation Vol. I, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1982, p. 195), which required goods produced in the SEZs to be exported absent special permission. While subsequent analyses have suggested that the export goals of the SEZs went unrealized, there is little debate about the nature of the goals themselves. See Kleinberg, Robert, China's “Opening” to the Outside World: The Experiment With Foreign Capitalism (Boulder: Westview, 1990).Google Scholar Originally, there were four SEZs - Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen. In 1987 a fifth - Hainan Island - was added.

69. See generally, Henry R. Zheng, “The Special Economic Zones and coastal cities,” in Streng and Wilcox, Doing Business in China, ch. 20.

70. See Provisional Regulations on the Reduction and Exemption of Enterprise Income Tax and Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax in Special Economic Zones and 14 Coastal Cities (1984) (SEZ/ETDZ Tax Regulations), Arts. I(l)(a) and 11(1), in CCH ustralia, China Laws for Foreign Business, para. 70–845. Also see Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Concerning Revision of the Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures, in China's Foreign Economic Legislation. Vol. II (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1986), pp. 304–305.

71. See SEZ/ETDZ Tax Regulations, Arts. I (3, 4, and 5); II (3, 4, and 5).

72. See e.g. “Regulations on Special Economic Zones in Guangdong Province,” Arts. 12–18: Zheng, “The Special Economic Zones and coastal cities.”

73. See “Provisions of the State Council of the People's Republic of China for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment.”

74. See e.g. Zhen, Peng, “Guanyu ‘Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo waizi jingying qiye fa(cao'an)’” (“Explanation of the Draft Joint Venture Law of the PRC”), Peng Zhen wenxuan (Collected Works of Peng Zhen) (Beijing: People's Press, 1991), pp. 378–382.Google Scholar

75. See e.g. Foreign Economic Contract Law (FECL), Arts. 4 and 9 (in CCH Australia, China Laws for Foreign Business, para. 5–550) which prohibit formation processes and the contents of contacts with foreign entities from violating Chinese public and social interests.

76. See James V. Feinerman, “Chinese law relating to foreign investment and trade: the decade of reform in retrospect,” in Joint Economic Committee, China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s, p. 828.

77. See FECL. Also see Zheng, Henry R., “A comparative analysis of the Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China,” UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal, Vol. 4 (1985), pp. 30–62.Google Scholar

78. See FECL, Art. 7. This requirement formally applies to all investment contracts. See Xie Bangxu et al. (eds.), Shewai jingji fa yaojian (Required Readings in Foreign Economic Law) (Tianjin, 1988), p. 352. Also see “Zhongwai heying qiye wei huo pizhun, heying hetong ying shi wei wuxiao” (“The Sino-foreign joint venture enterprise did not receive approval, and the joint venture contract should be considered invalid”), in Qi, Tianchang (ed.), Hetong anlipingxi (Critical Analysis of Contract Cases) (Beijing: Chinese University of Politics and Law Press, 1991), p. 408.Google Scholar Also see “Mou gongsi yinggai rune tiqing shenpi?” (“How should a certain company seek review and approval?”), in Zhang, Huilonget al. (eds.), Shewai jingji fa anli jiexi (Analysis of Foreign Economic Law Cases) (Beijing, 1990), p. 230.Google Scholar

79. See “Zuigao Renmin Fayuan guanyu shiyong shewai jingji hetong fa ruogan wenti de jueda” (“Resolution of certain issues concerning the use of the Foreign Economic Contract Law”), in Zhang, Shouqiang (ed.), Hetong fagui yu hetong shiyang huibian (Compilation of Contract Laws and Regulations and Contract Forms) (Harbin, 1988), p. 960.Google Scholar

80. See General Principles of Civil Law (GPCL), in CCH Australia, China Laws for Foreign Business, para. 19–150. A useful annotated translation of the General Principles appears in Jones, William C. (ed.), The General Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989).Google Scholar Provisions extending the GPCL to foreign parties are contained in ch. 8.

81. See GPCL, Art. 145, which permits Chinese law to restrict parties to foreign business contracts from choosing the governing law, while GPCL Arts. 55 and 58 state that all civil acts must comply with the law of China. Taken together, these provisions have the effect of further entrenching the provisions of FECL Art. 5 that Chinese law governs foreign investment and resource development projects.

82. See GPCL, Arts, 6, 7, 41, 42, 55 and 58.

83. See GPCL, Art. 56, which provides that where a civil legal act is required by law to comply with a certain form, the legal form requirements must be followed. Art. 62 provides that a civil legal act made subject to a condition becomes valid upon removal of the condition. These tend to reinforce the provisions of FECL Art. 7 that contracts requiring state approval are valid only upon the grant of such approval.

84. See Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC (ALL), in CCH Australia, China Laws for Foreign Business, para. 19–558. Also see Pitman B. Potter, “The Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC,” Chinese Law and Government, Fall 1991.

85. See ALL, Art. 11.

86. See generally, Potter, Pitman B., “China's Administrative Litigation Law may offer some protection against abuse of power,” East Asian Executive Reports, Vol. 12, No. 11 (15 November 1990), p. 9.Google Scholar

87. See Potter, Pitman B., “The Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC: judicial review and bureaucratic reform,” in Potter, Pitman B. (ed.), Domestic Law Reform in Post-Mao China (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 270.Google Scholar

88. This generally occurs as a result of requirements that applicants exhaust the process of administrative reconsideration (fuyi) before filing for judicial review. See generally, Potter, “The Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC,” at pp. 86–96.

89. See Potter, “The Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC: Judicial review and bureaucratic reform.”

90. The procedures for obtaining state approval for joint venture enterprises are set forth generally in the Procedures of the PRC for the Registration and Administration of Chinese—Foreign Joint Ventures (Joint Venture Registration Procedures), in China's Foreign Economic Legislation Vol. I (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1982), pp. 13–16. Also see Joint Venture Implementing Regulations. Rules for WFOEs follow the joint venture procedures by analogy. Also see WFOE Implementing Regulations. Also see Liu Chu and Randt, “Foreign investment vehicles.” New rules for approval of contracts for foreign investment enterprises enacted in 1993 strengthen state control over these agreements. See “Principles for approval and essentials for examination of the MOFTEC to contracts and articles of association of foreign funded enterprises,” China Economic News, 7 February 1994, pp. 8–9.

91. Numerous cases have arisen where the failure to obtain ministerial approval for the joint venture contract and the articles of association have resulted in these documents being held invalid, even where the parties to the JV have already begun substantive performance. See e.g. “Anli liu” (Case No. 6), in Cunxue, Wang, Zhongguo jingji zhongcai he susong shiyong shouce (Practical Handbook on China's Economic Arbitration and Litigation) (Beijing: Development Publishers, 1993), pp. 348–49Google Scholar ; and “Zhongwai heying qiye wei huo pizhun heying hetong ying shi wei wuxiao,” pp. 408–411.

92. See Joint Venture Registration Procedures, Arts. 4, 5 and 7.

93. See JV Labour Regulations; Provisional Regulations on Environmental Control for Economic Zones Open to Foreigners, in CCH Australia. China Laws for Foreign Business, para. 14–700; PRC Environmental Protection Law, China Law and Practice, 26 February 1990, pp. 59–72.

94. See “Announcement of the People's Bank of China on further reforming the foreign exchange management system” (28 December 1993). in China Economic News, 10 January 1994, p. 9.

95. See the 1980 Provisional Forex Regulations. Also see generally, McKenzie, Paul D., “Foreign exchange and joint ventures with China: short-term strategies and long-term prospects,” Canadian Business Law Journal, Vol. 17 (1990), p. 114.Google Scholar

96. See State Council Provisions on Encouraging Foreign Investment. Also see Davis, Virginia and Yi, Carlos, “Balancing foreign exchange” China Business Review, March-April 1992, p. 14.Google Scholar

97. See generally, Mann, Jim, Beijing Jeep: The Short, Unhappy Romance of American Business in China (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989).Google Scholar

98. For discussion of future plans for forex reforms, see “Reform of forex control deep into the heart” and “Bank official on exchange settlement, sales and payment,” in China Economic News, 25 April 1994, pp. 1 and 5, respectively.

99. For an indicator of the reporting requirements, see “Provisional regulations on the management of settlement, sales and payment of foreign exchange,” in China Economic News, 25 April 1994, p. 6 and 2 May 1994, p.7, which requires compulsory sales of foreign exchange to state authorized banks, and regulatory approvals for subsequent withdrawals. While foreign investment enterprises are for the time being exempted from the compulsory sales requirements if, as is likely, they choose to convert Chinese and foreign currencies they must comply with the reporting requirements.

100. The world-wide income provision required the inclusion of all income from domestic and foreign branches. Tax credits for foreign taxes paid were available. Other income sources were defined to include dividends, interest, intellectual property royalties, rental income. See Joint Venture Income Tax Law, Art. 2.

101. See Unified Foreign Enterprise Income Tax Law, Art. 2.

102. See The Law of the PRC to Administer the Levying and Collection of Taxes (1992), and Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China to Administer the Levying and Collection of Taxes (1993), both in CCH Australia, China Laws for Foreign Business, pp. 38,051 and 38,091 respectively.

103. See Joint Venture Law, Art. 10; Joint Venture Implementing Regulations, Art. 87.

104. See Tax Administration Law and its Implementing Regulations.

105. See Implementing Rules for Examination and Confirmation of Export Enterprises and Technologically Advanced Enterprises With Foreign Investment, and Supplement to Implementary Rules of MOFERT for Examination and Confirmation of Export Enterprises and Technologically Advanced Enterprises With Foreign Investment.

106. See e.g.Lieberthal, Kenneth and Oksenberg, Michel, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1988).Google Scholar

107. See e.g.Pye, Lucian, The Mandarin and the Cadre (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1988).Google Scholar

108. See e.g.Shirk, Susan L., The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).Google Scholar

109. See generally, Jerome A. Cohen and Stuart J. Valentine, “China Business - Progress and Prospects,” in Streng and Wilcox, Doing Business in China, Introduction.

110. See e.g.Weil, Martin, “The business climate in China: half empty or half full?” in Joint Economic Committee, China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s, pp. 770–784.Google Scholar

111. See e.g.Worthy, Ford S., “Why there's still promise in China,” Fortune, 27 February 1989, pp. 95–100Google Scholar; Chu, Lynn, “The chimera of the China market,” The Atlantic Monthly, October 1990, pp. 56–68.Google Scholar

112. See “Special report: how business reacts,” China Business Review, July-August, 1989, pp. 14–16.

113. See e.g., “Final version of 14th CPC National Congress report,” in FBIS Daily Report-China, 21 October 1992, pp. 1–21, at p. 8 where the reference to macro-economic regulation and control is presented as an alternative to the conventional state planning systems of the past. This represented a marked albeit gradual departure from the emphasis placed on the planned socialist commodity economy at the Fourth Session of the Seventh NPC the previous year. See Li Peng, “Report on the outline of the Ten-Year Programme and of the Eighth Five-Year Plan for national economic and social development,” Beijing Review, 15–21 April 1991, pp. 1 -24. For a reiteration of the macro-management approach, see “Decision of the CPC Central Committee on issues concerning the establishment of a socialist market economic structure” (14 November 1993), China Economic News, Supplement No. 12, 29 November 1993, pp. 6–9.

114. Regulations on foreign investment in retailing enterprises will permit foreign capital to penetrate the critical consumer products market, one where de-centralized distribution systems make state control difficult. See “State Council investment in retailing provisions,” China Law and Practice, 25 March 1993, p. 43.

115. Regulations permitting foreign investment in mining activity raise the possibility of foreign control over extraction and distribution of resources. See China Daily, 21 February 1994. For discussion of the offshore petroleum regime, see Moser, “Legal aspects of offshore oil and gas.” For discussion of the potential effects of foreign control over domestic energy sources in developing countries, see Moran, Theodore H., Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974)Google Scholar. Also see Mikesell, Raymond F.et al., Foreign Investment in the Petroleum and Mineral Industries: Case Studies of Investor-Host Country Relations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971).Google Scholar

116. See Ch'en Chien-p'ing, “State Commission for restructuring the economy drafts an open policy to allow foreign businessmen to invest in infrastructure facilities,” Hong Kong Wenhiu bao, 5 March 1992, in FBIS Daily Report-China, 5 March 1992, p. 49.

117. See “China,” International Private Power Quarterly, First Quarter, 1994, pp. 26–39.

118. For discussion of the problems of uncertainty with government policies and directives in the domestic context, see James P. Stepanek, “Chinas enduring state factories: why ten years of reform has left China's big state factories unchanged,” in Joint Economic Committee of U.S. Congress, China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s, pp. 440–454. If Chinese managers with myriad informal links to the regulatory system are mystified by policy uncertainty, the problems for foreign managers must surely be more pronounced.

119. See “The Council's investment initiative,” China Business Review, September-October, 1992, pp. 6–10.

120. Compare PBOC Procedures on Establishment of Foreign Financial Rep Offices, Art. 8 with Foreign Enterprise Income Tax Implementing Regulations, Art. 24.

121. Compare State Council Measures For the Encouragement of Foreign Investment, with Shanghai Municipality, Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Labor Union Regulations (in China Law and Practice, 26 February 1990. p. 52), Arts. 6 and 8.

122. See e.g. “Zhuguan bumen neng shanzi huan heying qiye jingli ma?” (“Can the department in charge exceed its authority and replace the manager of a joint venture enterprise?”), in Huilong, Zhang, Shewai jingji fa anli jiexi (Analysis of Foreign Economic Law Cases) (Beijing: Youth Publishing, 1990), p. 245.Google Scholar

123. See “Yi qi hezuo jingying qiye hetong jiufen an” (“A case of a dispute over a co-operative joint venture contract”), in Qi Tianchang, Hetong anli pingxi, pp. 416–422.

124. See generally,Stanley B. Lubman, “Technology transfer to China: policies, law and practice,” in Moser, Foreign Trade, Investment and the Law in the People's Republic of China; Potter, Pitman B., “Technology transfers to China” in Zhang, Lixinget al. (eds.), Chinese Economic Law and Selected Comparisons From the Pacific Rim (Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia, 1988)Google Scholar; and Denis Fred Simon, “China's acquisition and assimilation of foreign technology: Beijing's search for excellence,” in Joint Economic Committee of U.S. Congress, China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s, p. 565.

125. See Regulations on the Administration of Technology Import Contracts of the People's Republic of China (1985); and Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Administrative Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Technology Import Contracts (1987), in CCH Australia, China Laws for Foreign Business, paras. 5–570 and 5–573, respectively. For discussion of these provisions, see Potter, “Technology transfers to China.”

126. See Implementing Rules for Examination and Confirmation of Export Enterprises and Technologically Advanced Enterprises, and Supplement to Implementary Rules.

127. See State Council Implementing Rules for the Confirmation and Examination of Export Oriented and Technologically Advanced Enterprises with Foreign Investment (1987), Art. 4.

128. The extent of U.S. dissatisfaction with China's intellectual property regime was indicated by repeated U.S. threats to impose special 301 trade sanctions against China in the late 1980s. In May 1989 the USTR and MOFERT entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) by which China agreed to strengthen its legal protections for foreign enterprises in China, while the U.S. agreed not to place China on the Section 301 priority list. See Potter “Bettering protection for intellectual property.” Continuing problems led to an additional MOU being signed in 1992. See Memorandum of Understanding between the government of the PRC and the government of the USA on the protection of intellectual property (1992). Yet a third round of disputes over intellectual property protection has emerged in 1994, with the threat of new U.S. Special 301 sanctions and a Chinese “White Paper” defending its behaviour.

129. See William A. Fischer, “China's potential for export-led growth,” in Joint Economic Committee, China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s, p. 785.

130. See “China,” International Private Power Quarterly.

131. See e.g. “Waishang touzizhe de fuyin - “ershi er tiao” you naxie guiding” (“Glad tidings for foreign business investors - the ‘22 Articles’ have those provisions”), in Zhang Huilong, Shewai jingji fa, p. 256, wherein an effort to trumpet the benefits of the 22 Articles reveals instead the extent to which they are replete with ambiguity and potential enforcement problems.

132. See generally, John L. Davie, “China's international trade and finance,” in Joint Economic Committee of U.S. Congress, China's Economy Looks Toward the Year 2000, p. 311; Albert Keidel, “The cyclical pattern of China's economic reforms,” in Joint Economic Committee of U.S. Congress, China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s, p. 119; and Ho and Huenemann, China's Open Door Policy.

133. See generally, Lee Zinzer, “The performance of China's economy,” in Joint Economic Committee, China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s, at p. 109ff.

134. See generally, Feinerman, “Economic and legal reform in China, 1978–91”; and Stanley B. Lubman, “Emerging functions of formal legal institutions in China's modernization,” in Joint Economic Committee of U.S. Congress (ed.), China Under the Four Modernizations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), p. 235.

135. See e.g. Mu, Rui, Chinese Foreign Economic Law: Analysis and Commentary (Washington, D.C.: International Law Institute, 1990).Google Scholar

136. Since 1990, many Chinese universities have been told to raise their own budgetary resources by establishing various business enterprises. Students are also being asked to pay higher tuition fees, thus imposing further barriers to education access. See “Commission implements new college tuition system,” Beijing Xinhua, 31 March 1994, reprinted in FBIS Daily Report-China, 31 March 1994, pp. 29–30. Also see generally, Hayhoe, Ruth, “China's universities since Tiananmen: a critical assessment,” The China Quarterly, No. 134 (June 1993), pp. 291–309CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Peterson, Glen, “State literacy ideologies and the transformation of rural China,” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 32 (July 1994), pp. 95–120CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. pp. 116 ff.; Ogden, Suzanne, China's Unresolved Issues: Politics, Development, and Culture (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1989), pp. 306–341.Google Scholar

137. See generally, CIDA Asia Branch, CIDA Programs in Asia: China (Ottawa: Canadian International Development Agency, 1992).Google Scholar

138. See Sen Lin, , “A new pattern of decentralization in China: the increase of provincial powers of economic legislation, China Information, Vol. VII (1992–93).Google Scholar

139. See David Denny, “Provincial economic differences diminished in the decade of reform,” in Joint Economic Committee, China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s, at pp. 186, 201.

140. See State Statistical Bureau, China Statistics Yearbook 1993. Also see Brudvig, Lee A., “The fifth dragon,” The China Business Review, July-August 1993, p. 114–123Google Scholar; and “Analysis of China's use of foreign funds for 1992, China Economic News, No. 19 (24 May 1993), p. 11.

141. See e.g. Johnson, Graham E., “Changing horizons for regional development: continuity and transformation in Hong Kong and its hinterland: 1950s to 1990s” (unpublished paper presented to Workshop on Hong Kong-Guangdong Integration, University of British Columbia, 1992).Google Scholar

142. See e.g. R. Yin-Wang Kwok and Alvin So, “Hong Kong Guangdong interaction: joint enterprise of market capitalism and state socialism” (unpublished paper presented to workshop on Hong Kong-Guangdong Integration, University of British Columbia, 1992).

143. See generally, Brudvig, “The fifth dragon.”

144. See “Zhu Rongji's crackdown on banks reportedly ‘failed',” Hong Kong Standard, 14 March 1994, reprinted in FBIS Daily Report-China, 17 March 1994, pp. 48–19.

145. See generally, Yang, Zixuan (ed.), Zhongguo shuizhi da bianhua (The Great Change in China's Tax System) (Beijing: China Commercial Press, 1993).Google Scholar

146. See Xinhua reporting on PRC Supreme People's Court President Ren Jianxin's reports to the First Session of the Eighth National People's Congress, 22 March 1993, in “Curt President Ren Jianxin reports to session,” FBIS Daily Report-China, 23 March 1993, pp. 40–42.

147. See “Li Peng government work report,” Beijing Central Television, 10 March 1994, reprinted in FBIS Daily Report-China, 10 March 1994, pp. 12–25, at p. 19. Also see Hu Angang and Kang Xiaoguang, “Creating new systems to eradicate corruption once and for all,” in Lienho boo (HK), 21,22 and 23 February 1994, reprinted in FBIS Daily Report-China, 2 March 1994, pp. 18–30.

148. The belated investigation of the scandal and the execution of alleged ringleaders of the Great Wall Scientific and Technological Industrial Corporation of Machinery and Electronic Products (see report of Ren Jianxin in “Reports on ‘major’ criminal cases,” FBIS Daily Report-China, 16 May 1994, pp. 24–25) did little to assuage popular concerns, since the government was seen as having lent its support to the formation and securities activities of the company.

149. See e.g. Chuan Hsun-che, “Secret report on ‘disturbances’ on Mainland last year,” in Zhengming (HK), reprinted in FBIS Daily Report-China, 31 March 1994, pp. 28–29.

150. See generally, Chen Feng, “Dalu [wu gua feng] meng gua buzhi” (“The wind of corrupt reporting in the Mainland is blowing unceasingly”), in Zhengming (HK), No. 198 (April 1994), p. 19.

151. See generally, Kohut, John, “Going to war on corruption,” South China Morning Post, 17 April 1994, p. 5.Google Scholar

152. See Third Plenum Communiqué, p. 21.

153. See e.g. Joint Venture Implementing Regulation, Art. 87 (concerning pre-profit payments to worker bonus and welfare funds) and Arts. 91 ff. (concerning maintenance of labour conditions and benefits). Also see JV Labour Regulations, and Provisions for the Implementation of the Regulations on Labour Management in Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment (1984) (JV Labour Implementing Rules), in CCH Australia, China Laws for Foreign Business, para. 6–5222.

154. See Joint Venture Implementing Regulations, Arts. 92–93.

155. See e.g.Bulman, Robin, “Beware the wage monster when investing in China,” Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News, 4 January 1994Google Scholar, in China News Digest (electronic medium), 4 January 1994.

156. See e.g.Purves, Bill, Barefoot in the Boardroom: Venture and Misadventure in the People's Republic of China (Toronto: NC Press, 1991), pp. 35–62.Google Scholar In the domestic economy, similar problems were seen to obstruct efforts aimed at allowing market forces a greater role in determining labour allocation. See e.g. Gordon White, “Restructuring the working class: labor reform in post-Mao China,” in Dirlik and Meisner, Marxism and the Chinese Experience, pp. 152–168.

157. See generally, Perry, Elizabeth J., “Casting a Chinese democracy movement: the roles of students, workers, and entrepreneurs,” in Wasserstrom, Jeffrey N. and Perry, Elizabeth J. (eds.), Popular Protest & Political Culture in Modern China: Learning From 1989 (Boulder: Westview, 1992), pp. 146–164Google Scholar, at pp. 154 ff.

158. See “Text of human rights White Paper,” FBIS Daily Report-China Supplement, 21 November 1991, at p. 2–4.

159. See generally, “Han Dongfang, labor situation profiled,” South China Morning Post, 13 March 1994, reprinted in FBIS Daily Report-China, 15 March) 1994, pp. 43–6. Also see Kent, Ann, Between Freedom and Subsistence: China and Human Rights (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 204Google Scholar; “China: new arrests linked to worker rights,” Human Rights Watch/Asia, 11 March 1994.

160. See e.g. China Daily, 26 November 1993.

161. See Gao, Mobo C.F., “On the sharp end of China's economic boom – migrant workers,” China Rights Forum, Spring 1994, pp. 12–13, 27.Google Scholar

162. See Stevenson-Yang, Anne, “Labor laments: Beijing has its eye on FIE labor practices,” China Business Review, May-June 1994, pp. 32–34Google Scholar; also “No workers’ paradise: labour activists make little headway in Shenzhen,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 June 1994, pp. 35–36. The conditions reported in the official media are generally seen as violations of provisions in central enactments such as the JV Labour Regulations and their Implementing Regulations, which are permitted to continue due to the intercession of local officials charged with enforcing the regulations.

163. See e.g. Parris, Kristen, “Local initiative and national reform: the Wenzhou model of development,” The China Quarterly, No. 134 (June 1993) pp. 242–263, at pp. 259 ff.Google Scholar

164. See n. 5 and accompanying text. For an in-depth analysis of capital flows from Taiwan to China, see You-Tien, Hsing, “Making capitalism in China: the Taiwan connection,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1994.Google Scholar

165. See e.g., Liu Jinghuai and Zeng Mingzi, “Rights, interests, and dignity brook no infringement – worries about protection in ‘foreign invested’ enterprises,” in Liaowang (Outlook), 31 January and 7 February 1994, reprinted in FBIS Daily Report-China, 3 March 1994, pp. 32–41.

166. For an optimistic appraisal of the potential consequences of increased regional autonomy, see Jenner, W. J. F., The Tyranny of History (London: Penguin, 1992), pp. 131 ff.Google Scholar For a discussion of China's experience with Western capital that adopts a localized dependency perspective, see generally, Moulder, Frances V., Japan, China and the Modern World Economy: Toward a Reinterpretation of East Asian Development ca. 1600 to ca. 1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).Google Scholar For an alternative view, see Cochran, Sherman, Big Business in China: Sino-Foreign Rivalry in the Cigarette Industry, 1890–1930 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980).Google Scholar Although Cochran's nuanced analysis of the ability of the Chinese-owned Nany ang Brothers Tobacco Company to compete effectively during the early 20th century with the multinational British-American Tobacco Company has been viewed as a repudiation of the dependency argument as applied to China, Cochran's work also supports a contrary conclusion: the economic imperialism of BAT distorted the Chinese market by retarded emergence of small local firms other than Nanyang and the presence of BAT in China was a positive barrier to local development and acquisition of technology as Nanyang itself was forced to go abroad for technical training and expertise.