* This article has benefited from comments provided by Patrick Maddox, Andrew Nathan, Michel Oksenberg and C. Martin Wilbur. Research support was provided by the Smith College Committee on Aid to Faculty Scholarship and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute, Hebrew University. The aid provided by the above persons and institutions is gratefully acknowledged.

1. This is a central theme of my “Chinese Communist perspectives on international affairs, 1937–1941” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1972). For another discussion of foreign affairs during the Yenan period see John, Gittings, The World and China 1922–1972 (New York: Harper and Row, 1974).Google Scholar

2. These distinctions were, for example, implicit during the Sino-Soviet rift concerning the nature of the Chinese model which developed in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Philip, Bridgham, Arthur, Cohen and Leonard, Jaffe, “Mao's road and Sino-Soviet relations: a view from Washington, 1953,” The China Quarterly (CQ), No. 52 (October–December 1972), pp. 670–98.Google Scholar

3. This approximates the Soviet view in the early years of the People's Republic of China.Google ScholarIbid.

4. The discussion here and in this entire section has been deeply influenced by Franz Schurman, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966),Google ScholarCh. 1; and Benjamin, Schwartz, Communism and China: Ideology in Flux (New York: Atheneum, 1970). Of course, it is possible to suggest, as Schurman does, that the Chinese model consists not of revolutionary prescriptions but of methods of formulating revolutionary theory. The relationship of this view to the one found in the present paper is discussed below.Google Scholar

5. See James, Chieh Hsiung, Ideology and Practice: The Evolution of Chinese Communism (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970) pp. 158–65, for another view of the different conceptions of the relationship between the Chinese Revolution and other areas.Google Scholar

6. Hélène, Carrère d'Encausse and Stuart, Schram, Marxism and Asia (London: The Penguin Press, 1969), p. 260.Google Scholar

7. Cited in Zagoria, Donald S., The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8. Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), p. 217.Google Scholar

9. This is a central theme of d'Encausse and Schram, Marxism and Asia.Google Scholar

10. See below, p. 609.Google Scholar

11. Manuilsky paraphrased in North, Robert C., “The Chinese Revolution and Asia,” International Journal, Vol. VI, No. 1 (Winter 1950–51), p. 20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

12. McKenzie, Kermit E, Comintern and World Revolution, 1928–1943: The Shaping of Doctrine (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 137. It should be noted that this occurred after the debacle in China and at a time when the Comintern was arguing for the “hegemony” of the Communist Party in revolutions in the colonial and semi-colonial areas.Google Scholar

13. “Ma-ch'i-a-erh fa-yen” (“Remarks of Madyar”) in Hsiao Tso-liang, Power Relations Within the Chinese Communist Movement, 1930–1934, Vol. II (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967), p. 19.Google Scholar

14. “Ma-nu-li-szu-ch'i fa-yen” (“Remarks of Manuilski”)Google Scholar in Ibid. p. 228.

15. Ibid. p. 225.

16. Most prominently in Mao Tse-tung “Lun hsin chieh-tuan” (“On the new stage”), in Chung kuo kung-ch'an-tang ti liu-chung ch'üan-hui wen-chien (Documents of the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist +Party) (Chungking: Hsin-hua jih-pao, 1939).Google Scholar

17. For example, Ch'en, Chang-huo, Chin-tai shih-chieh ko-ming shih (History of World Revolution in Modern Times) (Yenan: Chieh-fang she, 1939), Vol. IGoogle Scholar, Introduction and [P'an] Tzu-nien, “Hsüeh-hsi shen-ma? Tsen-yang hsüeh-hsi?” (“What to study? How to study?”), Ch'ün-chung, Vol. IV No. 14 (20 05 1940), p. 386.Google Scholar

18. See for example, Stuart, Schram (ed.), The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 116 and Rue, John E., Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 1927–1935 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966).Google Scholar

19. Warren Kuo is one of the few who has mentioned the nature of Comintern statements on ideology during this period. See Kuo Hua-lun, Chung-kung shih-lun (History of the Chinese Communists), Vol. III (Taipei: Chung-hua min-kuo kuo-chi kuan-hsi yen-chiu so, 1969), pp. 65–68Google Scholar. The discussion below should be seen as supplementing Schram's demonstration of the strong Soviet influence on Mao's writings on dialectics. Stuart Schram, “Mao Tse-tung and the theory of permanent revolution, 1958–1969,” CQ, No. 46 (04–06 1971), pp. 221–44.Google Scholar

20. This theme can be found in “Report of Peick,” International Press Correspondence, Vol. 5, No. 35 (15 08 1935), p. 909.Google Scholar

21. Georgi, Dimitroff, “Unity of the working class against fascism,” in Georgi, Dimitroff, The United Front: The Struggle Against Fascism and War (New York: International Publishers, 1938), p. 92.Google Scholar

22. Ibid. p. 125–26.

23. Ibid. pp. 124–25.

24. Instances of Comintern influence can be found in Yü-chang, Wu, “Yen-chiu Chung-kuo li-shih ti i-i” (“Research the significance of Chinese history”), Chieh-fang, No. 52 (18 09 1938), pp. 7–9Google Scholar and Feng, K'ai, “Su-kung (pu) tang shih chien-ming chiao-tu ti li-shih i-i ho kuo-chi i-i” (“The historical and international significance of The History of the C.P.S.U. (Bolshevik) Short Course”) Ch'ün-chung, Vol. II, No. 16 (28 02 1939), p. 672Google Scholar. Sections of The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were included in materials used in the cheng-feng movement. See Compton, Boyd (ed.), Mao's China: Party Reform Documents, 1942–1944 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1952).Google Scholar

25. For example, compare Ju-hsin, Chang, “Tsai Mao Tse-tung t'ung-chih ti ch'i-chih hsia ch'ien-chin” (“Forward under the banner of comrade Mao Tse-tung”), Chieh-fang, No. 127 (30 04 1941), p. 21Google Scholar, with History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) (New York: International Publishers, 1939), pp. 356–57.Google Scholar

26. A more detailed discussion of this view can be found in Goldstein, “Chinese Communist perspectives,” Ch. 2.Google Scholar

27. Ibid. Ch. 5, develops these themes.

28. Ku, Po, “Kuo-chi chu-i ho ko-ming ti min-tsu chu-i” (“Internationalism and revolutionary nationalism”) in K'ang-Jih min-tsu t'ung-i chan-hsien chih-nan (Guide to the Anti-Japanese National United Front), Vol. 4 (Yenan: Chieh-fang she, 1939), pp. 64–67.Google Scholar

29. Quoted in Schram, , The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, p. 374.Google Scholar

30. For example, see Yang, Sung, “Lun ti-kuo-chu-i shih-tai min-tsu yün-tung yü min-tsu wen-t'i” (“On the nationalist movement and the national question during the age of imperialism”), Chieh-fang, No. 52 (18 09 1938), p. 25Google Scholar; “Chung-Yin liang ta min-tsu lien-ho ch'i-lai” (“The two great nations, China and India, unite”), Hsin-hua jih-pao, 2 10 1938; “Huan-yin Ni-ho-lu hsien-sheng” (“Welcome Mr Nehru”), Ch'ün-chung, Vol. III, No. 10 (23 07 1939), p. 263Google Scholar; and Wei-mo, (pseud.), Liang-nien i-lai T'o-p'ai tsui-hsing ti tsung-chieh (The Criminal Activities of the Trotskiites in the Last Two Years) (Kweilin: Hsin-chih, 1939), p. 21.Google Scholar

31. [Chang] Han-fu, , “Lun tzu-li keng-sheng yü cheng-ch'ü wai-yüan” (“On self-reliance and obtaining foreign aid”), Ch'ün-chung, Vol. III, No. 1 (21 05 1939), p. 838Google Scholar. This division of labour argument was to persist in Chinese statements after 1949. See for example, Ting-i, Lu, “Chung-kuo ko-ming ti shih-chieh i-i,” (“The world significance of the Chinese revolution”), Hsüeh-hsi, Vol. IV, No. 6–7 (1951), p. 27Google Scholar and Ta-nien, Liu, “How to appraise the history of Asia?” quoted in Van Ness, Peter, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 69.Google Scholar

32. “Chung-yin” and “Liang-nien i-lai.”

33. Wei-shih, Ch'en, Min-tsu ko-ming che-hsüeh (National Revolutionary Philosophy) (Shanghai: Chih-kuang, 1939), p. 8. For a further discussion of China's role as a model and a suggestion of a division of labour with the Soviet Union similar to Chang Han-fu's see pp. 137–38.Google Scholar

34. This discussion draws from the treatment of Mao's intellectual development at this time in Lowe, Donald M., The Function of “China” in Marx, Lenin and Mao (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).Google Scholar

35. The exception here is India whose movement to support China's war against Japan received some notice in the communist press. See “Chung-yin” and “Huan-yin Ni-ho-lu.”

36. See, for example, Sung, Yang, “Lun ti-kuo-chu-i shih-tai.” McKenzie, , The Comintern and World Revolution, pp. 159–65 gives the Comintern view.Google Scholar

37. Gregor, Benton, “The ‘Second Wang Ming Line,’ 1935–38,” CQ, No. 61 (03 1975), pp. 84– 85. Yang Sung while acknowledging that China's coming revolution would be a bourgeois-democratic one, does emphasiz that the workers and peasants will be the “basic political force” in the revolution. Still, I found no open assertion of Communist Party leadership (as the representative of the proletarian class) such as appeared after 1939 or before July 1937 in Mao's writings. Similarly in Min-tsu ko-ming, Ch'en speaks of the proletariat as representing the best interests of the Chinese Revolution but also emphasizes the need for CCP-KMT co-operation.Google Scholar

38. See his brief analysis in “Chung-kung ling-hsiu Mao Tse-tung lun mu-ch'ien kuo-chi hsing-shih yü Chung-kuo k'ang-chan” (“The communist leader Mao Tse-tung on the present international situation and China's resistance war”) in Mao Tse-tung chi (Collected Writings of Mao Tse-tung) (Tokyo: Hokubo-sha, 1970–1972), No. 7, pp. 9–16 and his more complete “Ti erh-tz'u ti-kuo chu-i chan-cheng chiang-yen t'i-kang” (“Important points in a lecture on the second imperialist war”)Google Scholar in Ibid. pp. 33–47.

39. Most prominently in “On new democracy,” but also see “Ti erh-tz'u ti-kuo chu-i.”Google Scholar

40. McKenzie suggests that it was Soviet concern for Berlin's sensitivities that caused a muting of revolutionary themes. Comintern and World Revolution, pp. 173–74.Google Scholar

41. “Decision on the current situation and tasks of the Party,” reprinted in Warren Kuo, “-The communist ‘anti-friction’ struggle, part II,” Issues and Studies, Vol. VI, No. 5 (02 1970), pp. 62–67. It should be noted that during the summer of 1940, although the CCP retained a revolutionary perspective on international affairs, the Party did counsel limited relationships with England and the United States due to their worsening relations with Japan. See Goldstein, “Chinese Communist perspectives,” Ch. 9.Google Scholar

42. Statements of these themes can be found in “Jih-k'ou ch'en-hou ta-chieh ti yin-mou” (“The schemes of the Japanese bandits to take advantage of the misfortunes of others”), Hsin-hua jih-pao, 3 July 1940 and “Yin-tu tsai tou-cheng chung” (“India in the midst of struggle”), Ibid. 4 September 1940.

43. In addition to the above, see P'eng Teh-huai, “Lun mu-ch'ien shih-chü ti k'ung-ch'ien wei-chi” (“On the unprecedented crisis in the present situation”) in Mu-ch'ien shih-chü chih-nan (A Guide to the Present Situation) (Yenan: Chieh-fang she, 1940), pp. 10–15.Google Scholar

44. Slyke, Lyman Van, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 112.Google Scholar

45. “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party,” Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), Vol. II, p. 330. As Schram notes, the public “On new democracy” retained the suggestion – although it is quite weak in comparison with 1938 – that the bourgeoisie might still be able to lead the revolution. However, at this time Schram feels that such statements were mere “verbal concessions.” Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, pp. 68–69, 204–205.Google Scholar

46. “On new democracy,” Selected Works, Vol. II, pp. 355–56.Google Scholar

47. “The Chinese Revolution,”Google ScholarIbid. pp. 326–27.

48. “On new democracy,”Google ScholarIbid. p. 350.

49. Richard Lowenthal, “Soviet and Chinese world views,” in Treadgold, Donald W. (ed.), Soviet and Chinese Communism: Similarities and Differences (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967), p. 382.Google Scholar

50. Conrad Brandt, , Benjamin Schwartz, and Fairbank, John K. (eds.), A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 260–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

51. For example, K'ai Feng, “Ssu-ta-lin t'ung-chih yü Chung-kuo ko-ming” (“Comrade Stalin and the Chinese Revolution”), Ch'ün-chung, Vol. III, No. 24 (12 12 1939), p. 574 andGoogle ScholarWu Ming, , “Lieh-ning yü pei ya-p'o min-tsu chieh-fang yün-tung” (“Lenin and the liberation movements of oppressed nations”), Hsin-hua jih-pao, 21 01 1940.Google Scholar

52. Schram, , Mao Tse-tung, p. 217.Google Scholar

53. Chih-min-ti ko-ming yün-tung (The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies) (Yenan: Ta-chung she, 1940).Google Scholar

54. “Yüeh-nan ti min-tsu tu-li yün-tung” (“The Vietnamese national independence movement”), Hsin-hua jih-pao, 7 12 1940 and “Yin-tu tsai tou-cheng chung.”Google Scholar

55. “Tung-fang shu-kuang” (“The dawn of hope in the orient”)Google Scholar, Ibid. 29 December 1940.

56. Hu Fu, , “Tso i-ko hao-ti tang-yüan chien-she i-ko hao tang,” (“Be a good Party member, found a good Party”) in Chung-kung shih chiu chou-nien (The Nineteenth Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party), (n.p.: K'ang-ti pao, 1940), p. 2. In December an editorial called for closer relations between “China's resistance war and oppressed nations.” In order to achieve this end it argued “[the Chinese] should generalize the experiences of the Chinese resistance war to the peoples of other countries. China's people and revolutionary party (ko-ming cheng-tang) should study the concrete conditions of the revolutionary movements in these countries and give these peoples political and other necessary aid.” “Chia-ch'iang Chung-kuo k'ang-chan yü pei ya-p'o min-tsu ti lien-hsi” (“Strengthen the ties between China's resistance war and oppressed nations”), Hsin-hua jih-pao, 25 December 1940. The reference to a “revolutionary party” is somewhat obscure. However, given the activities of the past year and the self-perception of the CCP, this editorial most probably had the Communist Party in mind.Google Scholar

57. Chang, “Tsai Mao Tse-tung,” p. 18.Google Scholar

58. Ibid. p. 20.

59. Ibid. p. 17.

60. Liang Jen, , “Lüeh-t'an hsüeh-hsi Ma-Lieh chu-i ti fang-fa” (“Chatting about ways of studying Marxism-Leninism”), Chieh-fang, No. 127 (30 04 1941), p. 37.Google Scholar

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63. Chong-sik Lee, , The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 216–20. For a discussion that refutes this position see Dai-sook Suh, The Korean Communist Movement (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 225.Google Scholar

64. Chen, King C., Vietnam and China, 1938–1954 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 41.Google Scholar

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68. Huang Huai-nan, “Tung-fang ko min-tsu t'ung-i chan-hsien chung ti Yüeh-nan min-tsu yü Chung-hua min-tsu” (“The Vietnamese and Chinese nations in the eastern national united front”)Google Scholar, Ibid. 4 10 1941.

69. Chu Teh, “Chien-li tung-fang ko min-tsu ti fan fa-hsi-szu t'ung-i chan-hsien” (“Establish an anti-fascist united front of the people of the east”)Google Scholar, Ibid. 21 11 1941.

70. “Tung-fang min-tsu.”

71. Selden, Mark, The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 188–207 discusses this complex movement.Google Scholar

72. Pinckney Harrison, James, The Long March to Power (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), Ch. 16.Google Scholar

73. For this interpretation see: Halpern, A. M., “The foreign policy uses of the Chinese revolutionary model,” CQ, No. 7 (1961), pp. 1–16 and Zagoria, Donald S., “Some comparisons between the Russian and Chinese modelsGoogle Scholar,” in Doak Barnett, A. (ed.), Communist Strategies in Asia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 11–33. The term “cutting edge” is from Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy.Google Scholar

74. Halpern, “The foreign policy uses.”

75. Liu Shao-ch'i used this expression in his 1949 speech to the World Federation of Trade Unions in Peking; quoted in d'Encausse and Schram, Marxism and Asia, p. 272.

76. Van Ness, , Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy, p. 237 and Bridgham, Philip L., “The international impact of Maoist ideology,” in Chalmers, Johnson (ed.), Ideology and Politics in Contemporary China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1973), p. 327.Google Scholar

77. This is a central thesis of Schwartz, Communism and China.

78. Goldstein, “Chinese Communist perspectives,” Ch. 2.

79. Harold, Hinton makes a similar point in his An Introduction to Chinese Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), pp. 103–104. Bridgham also discusses the relationship between the Chinese model and nationalism, “The international impact of Maoist ideology.”Google Scholar

80. For example, Hsü Teh-feng, “Ch'ing-chu Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang chien-tang san-shih chou-nien” (“Celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party”), Hsin-hua yüeh-pao, Vol. IV, No. 3 (1951), pp. 589–91 andGoogle ScholarYen Liang-mo, , “Yu hsi-t'ung ti hsüeh-hsi Mao Tse-tung szu-hsiang lai chin-i-pu kai-tsu szu-hsiang” (“Systematically study Mao Tse-tung thought to progressively reconstruct thought”), Hsin Chien-she, February 1952, pp. 8–12.Google Scholar

81. This seems to have been the central issue in the Chinese insistence regarding the distinctiveness of people's democracy in China. Schwartz, Communism and China, Ch. 1.Google Scholar

82. On the Chinese treatment of the Yugoslav question see Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. 63. For Japan compare Observer, “Concerning the situation in Japan,” For a Lasting Peace! For a People's Democracy!, No. 1 (61) 6 01 1950, p. 3, with “Jih-pen jen-min chieh-fang ti tao-lu” (“The road of the Japanese people's liberation”), Jen-min jih-pao, 17 01 1950.Google Scholar

83. Lu, , “Chung-kuo ko-ming,” p. 27.Google Scholar

84. See Ibid. and Liu Shao-ch'i's, WFTU speech in d'Encausse and Shram, Marxism and Asia, pp. 269–73.Google Scholar

85. Bridgham, , et al., “Mao's road.”Google Scholar

86. Ibid. p. 687.

87. Ibid. p. 688.

88. Ibid. p. 683.

89. d'Encausse and Schram, Marxism and Asia, p. 278.Google Scholar

90. “Compass for the victory of the revolutionary people of all countries,” Peking Review, Vol. 11, No. 38 (20 09 1968), p. 6.Google Scholar

91. “Integrating Mao Tse-tung's thought with revolutionary practice in Thailand is decisive factor for winning Thai revolution,”Google ScholarIbid. Vol. 11, No. 42 (18 10 1968), p. 20.

92. “Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought, is universal truth,”Google ScholarIbid. Vol. 11, No. 30 (26 07 1968), p. 11.

93. For example, Halpern, “The foreign policy uses” and Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy.Google Scholar

94. For example, Schurman, Ideology and Organization, Ch. 1 andGoogle ScholarHsiung, , Ideology and Practice.Google ScholarA recent study, while emphasizing the latter aspect, has recognised the existence of both elements: “Despite the strident calls at certain times by some Chinese to make Mao's thought into a doctrine or ‘recipe for revolution’ throughout the world, the primary emphasis in Mao Tse-tung Thought is on fundamental theory which is always rooted in specific situations.” Victor Nee, and James Peck, (eds.), China's Uninterrupted Revolution: From 1840 to The Present (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), p. 185.Google Scholar

95. For an analogous argument that sees a contradiction between the need to use the model concept to oppose the Soviet Union and bolster Mao's image, on the one hand and the respect of the nationalist sensitivities of other countries, on the other hand, see Bridgham, “The international impact.”Google Scholar