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An Unfinished Battle in China: The Leftist Criticism of the Reform and the Third Thought Emancipation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Extract

With the curtain of its 15th National Congress falling, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) completed the generational change in the leadership. Jiang Zemin claimed that the CCP would continue Deng Xiaoping's line of “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” The Party's consensus on upholding Deng's policy was reflected in its revised constitution that paralleled Deng's theory with Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought as the Party's guiding principle. However, the ongoing market reform has not proceeded without challenge, especially from the left. Between 1995 and 1997, four so-called wanyanshu (“ten-thousand-word” articles) circulated privately in Beijing, severely criticizing market reform for its deviation from socialism. On the eve of the 15th National Party Congress, the capital was stirred up again by a publicized counter-attack from reformers at the leftist criticisms, with Jiang Zemin's speech at the Central Party School on 29 May 1997 as a signal. Some even call this counter-criticism the “third thought emancipation.” Speculation arose of political rift in Beijing. These developments at least indicate that leftism represents a strong ideological force that the Party has to take seriously. Although the 15th National Congress ended up with a declaration of even bolder measures in economic reform, particularly in restructuring state-owned enterprises (SOEs), no one should expect that the leftist voice will easily fade away.

Type
Research Notes
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1999

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References

1. The first thought emancipation was symbolized by the debate on the “truth criteria” in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which set the stage for China's de-Mao-ization and justified Deng's economic reform. The second one took place in 1992 after Deng's southern tour inspection, in which he called for getting rid of the ideological entanglement with “isms” and accelerating the reform.

2. The post-Mao conservative leftism differs from the Maoist radical leftism in that the former aims to preserve traditional socialist institutions while the latter wanted to restructure them in a more revolutionary way.

3. On the ideological battle in the post-Mao era, see Brugger, Bill and Kelly, David, Chinese Marxism in Flux (California: Stanford University Press, 1991)Google Scholar; Chen, Feng, Economic Transition and Political Legitimacy in Post-Mao China: Ideology and Reform (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995)Google Scholar; Sun, Yan, The Chinese Reassessment of Socialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995)Google Scholar; and White, Gordon, Riding the Tiger: The Politics of Economic Reform in Post-Mao China (California: Stanford University Press, 1994).Google Scholar

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5. This point was emphasized by Deng Xiaoping on many occasions. At the CCP's 15th National Congress, Jiang Zemin made the same claim.

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19. Ibid. p. 132.

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31. This was Jiang Zemin's summary of Deng's ideas in his political report to the 15th National Party Congress.

32. In his inspection tour in 1992 Deng claimed that planning and market were not essential to distinguish socialism and capitalism. They were only certain economic means that could be practised by both socialist and capitalist systems. Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, p. 373.Google Scholar

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34. This is an excerpt of Jiang's speech on 3 March 1996 to the Party's leading cadres participating in both the National People's Congress and the Political Consultive Conference.

35. See, for example, wanyanshu no. 3, Ziliu, Shi, The Ten-thousand-word, p. 165.Google Scholar

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38. However, while there was no official response to the first wanyanshu, an individual took up the challenge and lauched a counter-attack on his own. In March 1997, Fan Liqin, who used to serve as a board member of the national association of disabled people led by Deng Pufang, the son of Deng Xiaoping, presented a 5,000-word counter-criticism article to the National People's Congress and Political Consultive Conference. Entitled “Reforms and openness cannot be shaken – comments on Deng Liqun's wanyanshu,” Fan's article was directly targeted at Deng Liqun. But it was far from a powerful counter-criticism, due to its poor organization, unclear logic, and worse, bad style (e.g., it was full of personal attacks, satires and even invectives).

39. However, according to some reports, Jiang's original speech was much longer than the one appearing in the newspapers. It was rumoured that some issues Jiang talked about were not made public. For example, he re-emphasized Deng's call for the prevention of leftism in his 1992 tour. In regard to the reform of SOEs, Jiang pointed out that public ownership did not equal state ownership. He proposed measures for furthering the reform of SOEs, including multiplying the forms of public ownership and reducing the scope of state economy. Kaifang (Openness), No. 129 (09 1997), p. 27.Google Scholar

40. Remin ribao (People's Daily), 30 05 1997.Google Scholar

41. Xin is the chief editor of Qiushi, the official periodical of the CCP, and the vice-president of the Central Party School.

42. Zhongguo jingji shibao, 29 07 1997.Google Scholar

43. Zhongguo jingji shibao, 5 08 1997.Google Scholar

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46. Ibid. pp. 360–67.

47. It is not until March 1998 that the wanyanshu incident was mentioned for the first time in an open publication – in Licheng, Ma and Zhijun, Ling, ConfrontationGoogle Scholar, which, strongly “anti-leftist,” narrates the major ideological debates since 1978. But it is reported that the Central Propaganda Department criticized its mention of this incident without an official permission.

48. Minbao, 4 09 1997.Google Scholar

49. For this subject, see Joseph, William, The Critique of Ultra-leftism in China, 1958–1982 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984).Google Scholar

50. A friend of mine working for the media in Shanghai once said to me that nowadays the Party no longer wanted people, especially workers, to learn Marxist political economy, which might turn out to be a weapon to criticize the economic reform. There is also evidence that many workers tend to criticize the reform from the perspective of traditional socialism. See Lee, Ching Kwan, “The labor politics of market socialism,” Modern China, Vol. 24, No. 1 (01 1998), pp. 333.Google Scholar

51. Gongqin, Xiao, “Contradictions, crisis, and the possibility of political conflict,” p. 67.Google Scholar

52. Fan, Yang, “Shengzhou xinxing sichao poxi” (“An analysis of the currents of new thought in China”), Minbao yuekan (Minbao Monthly), No. 1 (1996), p. 27.Google Scholar

53. Ibid.