1 Haibo, Wang, “Greater power for the enterprises,” in Lin, Wei and Arnold, Chao (eds.), China's Economic Reforms (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), p. 67.Google Scholar

2 Concerning overcentralization, see Hong, Ma, New Strategy for China's Economy (Beijing: New World, 1982), p. 124Google Scholar; and, for further elaboration, Lyons, Thomas P., Economic Integration and Planning in Maoist China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), pp. 226–39.Google Scholar Concerning China's “cellular” economy, see e.g. Donnithorne, Audrey, “China's cellular economy: some trends since the Cultural Revolution,” The China Quarterly, No. 52 (October/December 1972), pp. 605–619.Google Scholar Concerning decentralized investment prior to the reforms, see Naughton, Barry, “The decline of central control over investment in post-Mao China,” in Lampton, David M. (ed.), Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p. 56Google Scholar

3 As these comments suggest, “co-operation” pertains to the pattern of economic activity itself and, specifically, to interaction among agents; “co-ordination” pertains to the process of making mutually consistent decisions that accommodate co-operation. For elaboration, see Montias, John Michael, The Structure of Economic Systems (New Haven: Yale, 1976), pp. 85–86.Google Scholar

4 These difficulties are elaborated in e.g. Brown, Alan A., “Towards a theory of centrally planned foreign trade,” in Brown, Alan A. and Egon, Neuberger (eds.), International Trade and Central Planning (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 57–84Google Scholar (Many of the points raised in Brown's analysis do not require that the regions in question be nations.)

5 The major changes in China's planning regime (e.g. the reforms of 1958 and 1970) are well known. A detailed historical survey is available in Zhou, Taihe (ed), Dangdai zhongguo de jingji tizhi gaige (Economic Reform in Contemporary China) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1984), pp. 16–158Google Scholar. See also Guoguang, Liu and Ruisun, Wang, Zhongguo de jingji tizhi gaige (China's Economic Reforms) (Beijing: Renmin, 1982), pp. 1–10Google Scholar; and Hong, Ma, Xiandai zhongguo jingji shidian (A Guide to Modern China's Economy) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1982), pp. 308–12.Google Scholar

6 Of course, chains of interaction indirectly link provincial agents in one province with central agents in another, as when C_A (a central enterprise in province A) interacts directly with both P_A (a provincial enterprise in A) and C_B. Pure centralization of a few agents might effectively support large and complex chains of interaction-if there were no impediments to interactions of P_A with C_A, P_B with C_B and so on.

7 By the late 1970s, recovery from the disruptions of the Cultural Revolution and from a reorganization attempted in 1970 had been under way for several years, and the post-Mao reforms had not yet fundamentally changed Chinese planning. The following sections emphasize the observed structures and procedures of the late 1970s, since these can plausibly be interpreted as reflecting the “normal” or sustainable state of the prereform system.

8 Parts of this section build upon Christine Wong, P. W., “Ownership and control in Chinese industry: the Maoist legacy and prospects for the 1980s,” in U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee, China's Economy Looks Toward the Year 2000, Vol. 1, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986)Google Scholar; and Lyons, Economic Integration, pp. 205–216.

9 Hongqing, Zheng and Guoxiang, Zeng, “Chongfen fahui chengshi zuzhi jingji de zuoyong” (“Take full advantage of the role of cities in structuring the economy”), in Hongqi, Zazhi Bianjibu (ed.), Zhongguo shi de shehuizhuyi jingji tizhi (A Chinese-style Socialist Economic System) (Beijing: Hongqi, 1984), p. 98.Google Scholar

10 The following remarks are based upon Ma Hong, Guide to China's Economy, pp. 95 and 158–59; and Li, Tao, “Suoxiao zhilingxing jihua fanwei, jianli zhidaoxingjihua tixi” (“Reduce the scope of mandatory planning, and set up a system of guidance planning”), in Zhongguo, Jingji Tizhi Gaige Yanjiu Hui (ed.), Zhongguo jingji tizhi de xin moshi (A New Model for China's Economic System) (Beijing: Remin, 1984), pp. 199–201.Google Scholar For further comment concerning dual leadership, see Lyons, Economic Integration, pp. 223–25 and 254–55.

11 Over one half of the 8,000 or so enterprises decentralized in 1970 were being operated primarily by ministries in 1975. The rough figures in the text place most of these enterprises under dual leadership as of 1977–79, accommodate additional decentralized enterprises that may have come under dual leadership after 1975, and place most of the 1,000 enterprises recentralized during 1978 under direct ministerial control; State Statistical Bureau, Statistical Yearbook of China 1981 (Hong Kong: Economic Information and Agency, 1982), p. 207; Liu Guoguang and Wang Ruisun China's Economic Reforms, pp. 8–9 and Wang Haibo, “Greater power,” pp. 75–76.

12 Ma Hong Guide to China's Economy, pp. 98–99; and Min, Fan and Deqin, Tao, Jingji guanli zonglun (A Treatise on Economic Management) (Shanghai: Shanghai jiaotong daxue, 1985), p. 3.Google Scholar Other sources generally indicate that provincial bureaus do not receive plan targets from ministries; see e.g. the reports quoted in Lyons, Economic Integration, pp. 224–25. Zhou Taihe, Economic Reform, p. 309, however, shows subordination of corresponding provincial bureaux to a ministry (and “professional guidance” from central bureaux to provincial bureaux) as of 1982.

13 Ma Hong, Guide to China's Economy, p. 99; Shutang, Gu, Tianjinjingji gaikuang (A Survey ofTianjin's Economy) (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin, 1984), pp. 33–36Google Scholar; Ludlow, Nicholas H. and Stepanek, James B., “Hubei: anatomy of a province,” China Business Review, 7 (September-October 1980), pp. 41–44Google Scholar; and Penelope B. Prime, “Industrialization in Jiangsu province: the availability and limits of official provincial economic data,” paper prepared for the 1986 annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, pp. 17–18.

14 Ness, Andrew, “Provincial liaison offices in Beijing,” China Business Review, 13 (May-June 1986), p. 36.Google Scholar

15 This paragraph is based upon Ma Hong, Guide to China's Economy, pp. 98, 159, 312–13 and 404–406; and Fan Min and Tao Deqing, Economic Management, pp. 3, 9 and 24.

16 In 1981, goods subject to ministry allocation totalled 581, divided among 37 ministries. (In 1981, 256 goods were subject to SPC allocation.) Some of these goods, however, were not actually balanced and allocated individually. The number of specific commodities being allocated by ministries was probably somewhat larger during 1977–79. See Guiwu, Wang, “Gaige liutong tizhi, cujin shangpin jingji fazhan” (“Reform the system of circulation, promote development of a commodity economy”) in Hongqui, Zazhi Bianjibu (ed.), Zhongguo shi de shehuizhuyi jingji tizhi (A Chinesestyle Socialist Economic System) (Beijing: Hongqi, 1984), p. 213Google Scholar; Ma Hong, Guide to China's Economy, pp. 312–13; and Wong, “Ownership and control,” pp. 577 and 603.

17 About 50% of the project-design capacity and 30% of the construction capacity in the state sector is under ministerial control, with the provinces controlling the remainder; these shares probably pertain to 1980 or 1981. See Ma Hong, Guide to China's Economy, pp. 405–406; see also Ludlow and Stepanek, “Hubei,” p. 43.

18 For coal, see Compiling Committee of China Coal Industry Yearbook, China Coal Industry Yearbook 1982 (Hong Kong: Economic Information and Agency, 1983), p. 142; for machine building, see Zhou Taihe, Economic Reform, p. 309.

19 Oksenberg, Michel, “Economic policy-making in China: summer 1982,” The China Quarterly, No. 90 (June 1982), pp. 180–81.Google Scholar

20 This list excludes the “super ministries,” which were supposed to co-ordinate groups of related ministries. Several of these were established during the late 1970s, but they were soon disbanded. The evolution of the various commissions and ministries through 1981 is traced in “Changes in organization of the State Council,” JETRO China Newsletter, No. 38 (May-June 1982), pp. 10–11.

21 This paragraph and the next are based upon Ma Hong, Guide to China's Economy, pp. 97–98 and 403–404; and Fan Min and Tao Deqing, Jingji guanli, pp. 3 and 8.

22 Lieberthal, Kenneth and Oksenberg, Michel, “Understanding China's bureaucracy,” China Business Review, 13 (November-December 1986), p. 24;Google Scholar and Fan Min and Tao Deqing, Economic Management, pp. 2–3.

23 Liu Guoguang, “Zhongguo de jingji guanli tizhi gaige wenti,” in Shanghai Shehui Kexue Yuan Chubanshe Bianjibu (ed.), Zhongguo chengshi jingji tizhi gaige xuexi wenxuan (Readings on China's Urban Economic Reforms) (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexue yuan, 1984), p. 9; Ma Hong, Guide to China's Economy, pp. 88–89; and Hare, Paul, “China's system of industrial economic planning,” in Stephan, Feuchtwang and Athar, Hussain (eds.), The Chinese Economic Reforms (London: Croom Helm, 1983), p. 193.Google Scholar

24 Vetting of proposals occurs all year round; however, the ministries’ recommendations concerning the larger projects proposed by provinces are needed by the SPC for its preliminary balancing work.

25 Ma Hong, Guide to China's Economy, pp. 92 and 96; Ma Hong, New Strategy, p. 139; and Ludlow and Stepanek, “Hubei,” p. 41.

26 E.g. Naughton, , “Summary of findings,” in Cady, Janet A. (ed.), “Economic reform in China: report of the American economists study team to the People's Republic of China” (Washington, D.C.: National Committee on United States-China Relations, 1986), p. 9Google Scholar; and the Chinese statements (in 1977) quoted in Reynolds, Bruce, “Two models of agricultural development: a context for current Chinese policy,” The China Quarterly, No. 76 (December 1978), p. 871 fn. 72.Google Scholar

27 Naughton, “Summary,” p. 10; and Fan Min and Tao Deqing, Economic Management, p. 13.

28 Gengjin, Wang and Rongji, Zhu, “Shedui gongye xiang hechu qu?”, Economic Management (March 1979), p. 21.Google Scholar

29 Naughton, “Summary,” pp. 10–11; Gu Shutang, Tianjin, p. 270; and Ma Hong, Guide to China's Economy, pp. 313 and 317.

30 See e.g. Guoguang, Liu, “On reforming China's economic management system,” in China's Economy in the 1980's (Hong Kong: Economic Information and Agency, 1980), p. 241.Google Scholar

31 Zhenzhong, Li, Jihua jingji xue (The Planned Economy) (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue, 1985), p. 299Google Scholar; and Naughton, “Summary,” p. 11.

32 Xiaogu, Yu, “Shixing jihua tiaojie heshichangtiaojiexiangjiehe, ba wuziliutong gaohuo,” Economic Management (February 1980), p. 4Google Scholar; and Compiling Committee, Coal Industry Yearbook 1982, p. 25.

33 In addition, central allocations of certain materials with specialized uses are made directly to the relevant provincial bureaux, rather than being distributed through the provincial-level plan; see Gu Shutang, Tianjin, p. 247.

34 Wong, “Ownership and control,” p. 577.

35 Of course, financial plans (including budgets), labour-and-wage plans and other subsidiary plans are also approved and handed down. Ideally, these should interlock with the material balances and allocations (and with the underlying enterprise assignments); frequently, they do not.

36 For details concerning this work, see Ma Hong, Guide to China's Economy, pp. 315–18; Gu Shutang, Tianjin, pp. 246–49; Li Zhenzhong, Planned Economy, pp. 298– 301; and Hong, Ma and Shangqing, Sun, Jingji yu guanli da cidian (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1985), pp. 597–601.Google Scholar See also Koziara, Edward Clifford and Yan, Chiou-Shuang, “the Distribution System For Producers’ Goods In China,” The China Quarterly, No. 96 (December 1983), pp. 689–702.Google Scholar

37 E.g., Liu Guoguang and Wang Ruisun, Economic Reform, pp. 15–19.

38 E.g., Lie berthal and Oksenberg, “China's bureaucracy,” pp. 24–28.

39 Fan Min and Tao Deqing, Economic Management, p. 12; and Li Zhenzhong, Planned Economy, p. 52; see also Berger, Roland, “Economic planning in China,” in Neville, Maxwell (ed.), China's Road to Development, 2nd enlarged ed. (Oxford: Pergamon, 1979), pp. 184–86.Google Scholar

40 Berger, “Economic planning,” pp. 184–86.

41 “Gross output” (a vector) is the sum of all agent-level outputs (including outputs that do not leave the ministry in question).

42 Concerning the central role of steel in Chinese planning, see Suinian, Liu and Zhenqi, Huang. “iGenju shiji qingkuang jinxing zonghe pinghengi,” Renmin ribao (People's Daily), 6 April 1979, p. 3.Google Scholar Of course, the prioritization mentioned in the text is not absolute; specific provincial activities (e.g. production of steel) may enjoy higher priority than some ministerial activities.

43 Concerning independent provincial balances, see e.g. Xiaorong, Guan, “Guanyu shehuizhuyi shangpin jingji tiaojian xia zonghe pingheng de jige wenti,” in Jingji, Yanjiu Bianjibu (ed.), Guomin jingji tiaozheng yu jingji tizhi gaige (Readjusting the National Economy and Reforming the Economic System) (Jinan: Shandong renmin, 1981), pp. 178–83.Google Scholar

44 The SPC ensures, by applying norms, that the imports requested by a ministry are reasonable, given its production and investment assignments.

45 Hence, the centrally controlled portion of the economy is “self-serving”; Wensen, Liang, “Balanced development of industry and agriculture,” in Xu Dixin et al., China's Search for Economic Growth (Beijing: New World, 1982), p. 65.Google Scholar

46 In practice, balancing does not expand smoothly outward from ministerial activities of highest priority to provincial activities of lowest priority. There is some degree of simultaneity associated with the distribution of planning tasks across planning offices, none of which suspends its own work while another holds centre stage.

47 The form of this plan is strictly analogous to that shown in Figure 5.

48 Evidence relevant to this pattern is examined at length in Lyons, Economic Integration.