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China's Relations with Pakistan: Durability Amidst Discontinuity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

William J. Barnds
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Extract

One of the more intriguing features of Chinese foreign policy has been the continuity of Peking's effort to maintain good relations with Pakistan despite the periodic upheavals in Chinese domestic politics and the alterations between moderation and militancy in China's policies towards the outside world. Although the goals of China's foreign policy – the recovery of Taiwan, the elimination (or the neutralization) of hostile military power from nearby areas, and the enhancement of China's status and influence in the world – have remained the same since 1950, changing international conditions and evolving Chinese perceptions have led to dramatic shifts in Peking's policies and in its relations with other powers. Former friends have become enemies and former enemies have become, if not friends, at least less dangerous antagonists. Yet China's relations with Pakistan, while not always smooth, have evidenced a high degree of stability.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 63 , September 1975 , pp. 463 - 489
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1975

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References

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