1. In conversation with Hermann Graf Keyserling. Quoted in Kessler, Harry, In the Twenties. The Diaries of Harry Kessler (New York, 1971), 47.Google Scholar

2. One of the first to identify this pattern was Maier, Charles S., “Between Taylorism and Technocracy: European Ideologies and the Vision of Industrial Productivity in the 1920s,” Journal of Contemporary History 5 (1970): 27–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Maier argues, however, that the ameliorationist potential of industrial efficiency characterized the early years of the Weimarera, diminishing even before the end of the inflation. I would like to suggest in this essay that these expectations lasted much further into the later 1920s.

3. Maier, Charles S., Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade after World War I (Princeton, 1975),Google Scholar and James, Harold, The German Slump, Politics and Economics, 1924–1936 (Oxford, 1986).Google Scholar

4. Petzina, Dietmar, “Was There a Crisis Before the Crisis? The State of the German Economy in the 1920s,” in Economic Crisis and Political Collapse: The Weimar Republic 1924–1933, ed. von Kruedener, Jürgen (New York, 1990), 1–19.Google Scholar petzina declares explicitly, in contrast to Harold James, that, “In no other country, apart from the United States, were technical improvements in industry as far reaching as in Germany” (p. 16). Petzina identifies here mining, iron and steel, chemicals, and electrical engineering as industries which implemented extensive measures of rationalization.

5. The best overview of Weimar Germany's rationalization movement in any language is still Brady, Robert A., The Rationalization Movement in German Industry. A Study in the Evoluation of Economic Planning (Berkeley, 1933).Google Scholar More recently, see von Freyberg, Thomas, Industrielle Rationalisierung in der Weimarer Republik (Frankfurt and New York, 1989);Google ScholarHomburg, Heidrun, Rationalisierung und Industriearbeit: Arbeitsmarkt, Management, Arbeiterschaft im Siemens-Konzern, 1900–1939 (Berlin, 1991);Google ScholarSachse, Carola, Betriebspolitik als Familienpolitik in der Weimarer Republik und im Nationalsozialismus (Hamburg, 1987).Google Scholar Each of these authors has concentrated on the large metal and electrotechnical firms, especially the Siemens works in Berlin. On the iron and steel industry, see Kleinschmidt, Christian, Rationalisierung als Unternehmensstrategie: Die Eisen- und Stahlindustrie des Ruhrgebiets zwischen Jahrhundertwende und Weltwirtschaftskrise (Essen, 1993).Google Scholar See also, Shearer, John Ronald, “The Politics of Industrial Productivity in the Weimar Republic. Technological Innovation, Economic Efficiency, and their Social Consequences in the Ruhr Coal Mining Industry, 1918–1929” (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1989).Google Scholar

6. See Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe, 546; James, The German Slump, 148–49.Google Scholar A thorough overview of what the rationalization “wave” included by the early 1930s is contained in the more than 1200 pages of Reuter's, Fritz, Handbuch der Rationalisierung, 3rd ed. (Berlin, 1932),Google Scholar which he edited for the major Weimar rationalization agency, the Reichskuratorium für Wirtschaftlichkeit (RKW). Whether or not Harold James would consider these efforts important, it is clear that those involved in the project perceived at the time that they were engaged in a substanial effort.

7. James argues that, since there was no excessive new capital investment in the 1920s, there could not have been a phenomenon of rationalization. The German Slump, 149.Google Scholar

8. See James, The German Slump, 420.Google Scholar

9. Mary Nolan, in the most recent study of Weimar rationalization, asserts that Harold James is “wrong” in underestimating the extent of rationalization measures undertaken. See her Visions of Modernity. American Business and the Modernization of Germany (Oxford, 1994), 153,Google Scholar n. 152. She also concludes, however, that “actual deeds could not match the outpouring of words about rationalization” (p. 132).

10. On this nexus of problems, see most recently, Bessel, Richard, Germany after the First World War (Oxford, 1993);Google Scholar and for the specific industrial sector of Ruhr coal mining, Hartewig, Karin, Das unberechenbare Jahrzehnt. Bergarbeiter und ihre Familien im Ruhrgebiet 1914–1924 (Munich, 1993).Google Scholar

11. Industrial commentators such as the Bergbau Verein's (BBV) Business Manager, Adolf von Loewenstein, might have judged rationalization to be a buzzword as well. Still, Loewenstein also noted the difference, after the war, that Germany had lost the prestige of its military prowess. German Industry, he noted, was the only Eckpfeiler, or cornerstone of the German Reich that was left. German industry bore the burden not just of economic recovery, but of the weight of restoring the whole of German society. Loewenstein, “Geschäftsbericht,” 67. ordentliche General-Versammlung des Bergbau Vereins, 26 February 1925, 12; and “Geschäftsbericht,” 69. ordentliche General-Versammlung des BBV im Oberbergamtsbezirk Dortmund, 27 April 1927, 15.Google Scholar

12. For the typical formulation of the rationalization goals of a “Verbesserung und Verbilligung” in industrial production, see the report on the founding meeting of the RKW, “Bericht über die Gründungsversammlung des Reichskuratoriums für Wirtschaftlichkeit in Industrie und Handwerk am 10. Juni 1921 im Ingenieurhaus zu Berlin,” in the Siemens Akten-Archiv, Munich (hereafter SAA) 4/LF 668, p. 3. This typical formulation of the rationalization movement originated with Carl Friedrich von Siemens, founding Director of the RKW, as early as this meeting and was repeated throughout the 1920s.Google Scholar

13. Brady, Robert A. discussed various aspects and meanings of the term Rationalisierung in Germany in the Weimar years, See “The Meaning of Rationalization: An Analysis of the Literature,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 46 (1932): 526–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14. The designation of a rationalization “movement” emerged in the Weimar years. Mary Nolan attributes the origin of the term Bewegung to Herbert Hinnenthal, one of its participants, and to the American economist, Robert A. Brady, who incorporated the term into the title of his 1933 study, The Rationalization Movement in German Industry. A Study in the Evolution of Economic Planning, See Nolan, Visions of Modernity, 132.Google Scholar

15. On opposition to Taylorism in Germany before World War I, see Homburg, Heidrun, “Anfänge des Taylorsystems in Deutschland vor dem Ersten Weltkneg. Eine Problemskizze unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung der Arbeitskämpfe bei Bosch 1913,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 4 (1978): 170–94.Google Scholar

16. On the War Raw Materials Board (Kriegsrohstoff-Abteilung), see Feldman, Gerald D., Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany, 1914–1918 (Princeton, 1966)Google Scholar and Bowen, Ralph Henry, German Theories of the Corporative State with Special Reference to the Period 1870–1918, (New York, 1947), 160–209.Google Scholar See also Maier, “Between Taylorism and Technocracy.”

17. While there is no doubt in the evidence that the definition of rationalization originated with Siemen's speech at the founding of the premier rationalization agency in Weimar, the RKW, on 10 June, 1921, it is not clear who was the driving force behind this formulation and the ideas of rationalization embodied in the RKW. Judith Merkle, following L. Urwick, argues that it was Carl Köttgen, Siemens's deputy at the Siemens-Schukert Werke (SSW), and later Deputy Director of the RKW, who was the driving force behind its creation.Google Scholar See Merkle, , Management and Ideology. The Legacy of the International Scientific Management Movement, ch. 6, “Scientific Management and German Rationalization,” (Berkeley, 1980), 172–207,Google Scholar here 195. See also Urwick, Lyndall F., The Golden Book of Management, (London, 1956), 152–54.Google Scholar Both offer minimal documentation for their conclusions. Sources in the Köttgen and Siemens papers at the Siemens Archive in Munich do not allow for a definitive resolution of this question. See also Nolan, Visions of Modernity, 134–37.

18. See Brady, “The Meaning of Rationalization,” 527 for the RKW definition and 539–40, n. 8 for the description of components.Google Scholar

19. Most scholarship on the revolutionary drive for industrial socialization has concentrated on the political struggle for control of the mining industry. See Maier, Charles S., “Coal and Economic Power in the Weimar Republic: The Effects of the Coal Crisis of 1920,” in Industrielles System und politische Entwicklung, ed. Mommsen, H., Petzina, D., Weisbrod, B. (Düsseldorf, 1974), 530–42;Google Scholar and Wulf, Peter, “Die Auseinandersetzung um die Sozialisierung der Kohle in Deutschland 1920/21,” Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 25 (1977); 46–98.Google Scholar A good example of the large literature from the Left, with a comprehensive bibliography, is Novy, Klaus, Strategien der Sozialisierung. Die Diskussion der Wirtschaftsreform in der Weimarer Republik (Frankfurt and New York, 1978).Google Scholar

20. Vogelstein was director of the Berlin Kriegs-Metall-A.G. See, Verhandlungen der Sozialisierungs-Kommission über den Kohlenbergbau im Winter 1918/1919 (Berlin, 1921), 6.Google Scholar

21. Ibid., 7.

22. On the Verein für die bergbaulichen Interessen im Oberbergamtsbezirk Dortmund, see Meis, Hans, Der Ruhrbergbau im Wechsel der Zeiten. Festschrift zum 75-jährigen Bestehen des Vereins für die bergbaulichen Interessen Essen, (Essen, 1933).Google Scholar See the Bergbau Verein's Denkschrift, “Welche Vor-und Nachteile weist der Staatsbetrieb gegenüber dem Privatbetrieb auf?” in Verhandlungen der Sozialisierungs-Kommission, 439–41.

23. The Ausschuss zur Prüfung der Arbeitszeit im Bergbau des Ruhrgebiets was created by a Verordnung of 18 June, 1919. See its Verhandlungs-Berichte from 12–22 August 1919, the “Zusammenfassendes Ergebnis aus dem Schlussbericht,” and Niederschrift über die Verhandlungen from 8–10 December 1919. All are publications of the Reichsarbeitsministerium. Copies are accessible in the Bergbau-Bücherei, Essen.Google Scholar

24. Niederschrift über die Verhandlungen des Ausschusses zur Prüfung der Arbeitszeit im Bergbau des Ruhrgebiets, 11.Google Scholar

25. Ibid., 12.

26. Ibid., 12.

27. Ibid., 13–14. The Committee was composed of three groups: industry representatives, labor representatives, and expert/scientific analysts. Each group had six members. In the final vote on 10 December 1919, the six industrialists and four experts voted against the shorter shift, while labor's six voted for it. Two of the experts were not present for the vote.

28. For summaries and examples of the work of both these organizations, as well as the RKW, see Reuter, Handbuch der Rationalisierung: Brady, Rationalization Movement, 49–51, 422–23; and Nolan, Visions of Modernity, 134–37.Google Scholar

29. While Charles Maier notes that, after stabilization, rationalization essentially refurbished the image of the industrial entrepreneur, he does not probe deeply the process or institutions by which this occurred. See Maier, “Between Taylorism and Technocracy.”Google Scholar

30. See the correspondence between Carl Köttgen and Member of the Reichstag, Hans von Raumer, between 5 March and 20 April 1925, in SAA 11/LF 115.Google Scholar

31. The argument here, however, is not that heavy industry's antipathy toward Weimar's social and economic policies is solely explained by the degree of the sector's level of rationalization. Many other factors played crucial roles. Dick Geary has cogently argued that heavy industry especially suffered from severe downturn in demand for its products in the 1920s, endured relatively high costs of production, and consequently contemplated very thin profit margins. Rationalization measures helped counter these problems, but must be seen as only one source of heavy industry's aggravation with the Weimar Republic. See Geary, Dick, “The Industrial Bourgeoisie and Labour Relations in Germany, 1871–1933,” in The German Bourgeoisie. Essays on the Social History of the German Middle Class from the late Eighteenth–Century to the Early Twentieth Century (New York, 1991), ed. Blackbourn, David and Evans, Richard J., 140–61.Google Scholar

32. James, The German Slump, 153–54. Peukert, Detlev J. K. also singles out Ruhr coal as the best example of Weimar rationalization: Die Weimarer Republik. Krisenjahre der klassischen Moderne (Frankfurt, 1987), 120–22;Google Scholar For a dissenting opinion, based on the analysis of Ruhr coal's profitability by the Schmalenbach Commission, a study sponsored by the Reich Economic Ministry in 1928 under the leadership of the industrial economist Eugen Schmalenbach, see Warriner, Doreen, Combines and Rationalisation in Germany 1924–1928 (London, 1931), 32–34, 192–96.Google Scholar Warriner, however, does not contest that the industry implemented significant rationalization measures. She concedes (p. 192) that in terms of output per miner and the introduction of machinery, “efficiency is increasing.” Rather, she questions the effectiveness of these efforts in enhancing the industry's profitability.

33. Bentrop, Wilhelm, “Arbeitszeit und Produktion im rheinisch-westfälischen Steinkohlenbergbau,” Glückauf 58 (1922): 213–18.Google Scholar Bentrop demonstrates that even though rationalization did not emerge as an economic and industrial “movement” until after stabilization in 1924, some sectors such as Ruhr coal mining were pursuing and implementing many of the quintessential measures of rationalization such as mechanization and efficient product processing in the early years of the Weimar Republic. Efficiency and rationalization techniques were thus being used in Ruhr coal mining in the immediate postwar era as ways of “compensating for the revolution.”

34. Bentrop, “Arbeitszeit und Produktion,” 213. In 1913, 97 percent of Ruhr coal's output came from hand labor and explosive charges to loosen chunk coal from the seams. By 1929, the last year before the onset of the Depression, these techniques accounted for only 7 percent of the Ruhr mines' output. 93 percent of production came from the use of pneumatic pickhammers and undercutting machines to loosen the coal. See Meis, Hans, Der Ruhrbergbau im Wechsel der Zeiten (Essen, 1933), 366.Google Scholar

35. On rationalization in the Ruhr coal industry, see Wedekind, Erich, “Die Rationalisierung im Bergbau und ihre ökonomischen und sozialen Auswirkungen,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Cologne, 1930);Google ScholarMorguet, Reinhard Matthias, “Rationalisierung im deutschen Steinkohlenbergbau nach dem Kriege bis 1929 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Ruhrgebiets,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Freiburg, 1939).Google Scholar More recently, see Tschirbs, Rudolf, Tarifpolitik im Ruhrbergbau 1918–1933 (Berlin, 1986), 241–313, 339–56;CrossRefGoogle ScholarTrischler, Helmuth, Steiger im deutschen Bergbau. Zur Sozialgeschichte der technischen Angestellten 1815–1945 (Munich, 1988);Google Scholar and Shearer, “Politics of Industrial Efficiency.”

36. See Berger, Georg, “Die Arbeitslosigkeit im deutschen Steinkohlenbergbau,” in Die Arbeitslosigkeit der Gegenwart, vol. 2, ed. Saitzew, Manuel (Munich, 1932), 1–31.Google Scholar

37. Gropius, Walter, “Normung und Wohnungsnot,” Technik und Wirtschaft 20 (1927): 7–10.Google Scholar

38. On Frankfurt, see Lieberman, Ben, “Testing Peukert's Paradigm: the ‘Crisis of Classical Modernity’ in the ‘New Frankfurt,’ 1925–1930,” German Studies Review 17 (1994): 287–303.CrossRefGoogle Scholar On Stuttgart's Weissenhofsiedlung, see Willett, John, Art and Politics in the Weimar Period. The New Sobriety, 1917–1933 (New York, 1978), 127–29;Google Scholar and Lane, Barbara Miller, Architecture and Politics in Germany, 1918–1945 (Cambridge, MA, 1968), 119–23.Google Scholar On Hanover: von Saldern, Adelheid, Stadt und Moderne: Hannover in der Weimarer Republik (Hamburg, 1989).Google Scholar

39. See, for example, Wunderlich, Frieda, “Psychophysische Arbeitsforschung,” Soziale Praxis 34 (1925): columns 836–39;Google Scholaridem, “Der Einfluss der Rationalisierung auf die Arbeitnehmer nach den Berichten der Gewerbeaufsichtsbeamten für das Jahr 1927,” Soziale Praxis 37 (1928): columns 993–98 and 1029–32;Google ScholarAtzler, E., “Taylorsystem und Arbeitsphysiologie,” Reichsarbeitsblatt (1925, no. 24) inofficial part: 394–96;Google Scholaridem, “Arbeitsphysiologie und Rationalisierung,” Reichsarbeitsblatt 20 (1925) (Inofficial part): 343–47;Google ScholarRauecker, Bruno, “Die seelischen Wirkungen der Mechanisierung und Rationalisierung der Industriearbeit,” Soziale Praxis 34 (1925): columns 609–12 and 625–28;Google Scholaridem, “Die soziale Bedeutung der Rationalisierung,” Reichsarbeitsblatt 16 (1926) (inofficial part): 267–72.Google Scholar The last piece by Rauecker was the initial article in a series of five on the social and political impact of rationalization which the Reichsarbeitsblatt printed throughout 1926. See also Preller, Ludwig, “Fliessarbeit und Arbeiterschutz,” Die Arbeit (ADGB) 4 (1927): 65–75.Google Scholar

40. See Wunderlich, Frieda, “Das Kaufkraftargument,” Soziale Praxis 34 (1925): columns 1137–39;Google Scholar and Mendelsohn, Kurt, “Kaufkraftsteigerung und Kapitalbildung im Wachstumsprozess der deutschen Wirtschaft,” Gewerkschafts-Zeitung, 1 September 1928.Google Scholar

41. Henry Ford's industrial philosophy as well as his books, translated into German in the middle 1920s, became the focus of widespread discussion in the Weimar era. See, generally, von Gottl-Ottlilienfeld, Friedrich, Fordismus. Über Industrie und technische Vernunft, 3rd ed. (Jena, 1926).Google Scholar Ford's book My Life and Work was translated by Curt and Marguerite Thesing as Mein Leben und Werk and first published in Leipzig in 1923. For a positive Social Democratic trade union view of Ford's approach, see also Gewerkschaftsbund, Allgemeiner Deutscher, Amerikareise deutscher Gewerkschaftsführer (Berlin, 1926).Google Scholar

42. See here, Maier, “Between Taylorism and Technocracy.” Maier is surely right that, following the utopian vision of a technocratic socialism immediately following the war, German entrepreneurs and industry experienced a rehabilitation after stabilization. However, he fails to note that this latter attitude was much more in keeping with the traditional balance of concerns that had emerged in German political economy since the late Kaiserreich than the St. Simonian utopianism of the revolution. Further, Maier diminishes the fact that many in Germany continued to prize the potential of Taylorism and Fordism to expand the economic pie long past the demise of the technocratic moment associated with Walther Rathenau, Wichard von Moellendorf, and the Reich Economics Ministry in the period up to 1921.Google Scholar

43. See Hermberg's address to the 12th Kongress der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands, in Protokoll der Verhandlungen des 12. Kongresses der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands (2. Bundestag des Allgemeinen Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes (Berlin, 1925), 198.Google Scholar

44. See concerned references to the Vossische Zeitung's articles of 1923 in a letter of A. Heinrichsbauer, editor of the industry friendly Rheinisch-Westfälischer Wirtschaftsdienst to Bergrat Grave in Berlin, 13 July 1923, in files of the Deutsches Bergbau-Archiv (BBA) 16/569. The inflation, with its exploding commodity prices and comparatively low wage structure, had allowed the opening up of numerous mines and coal seams at artificial profitability. The mines followed a traditional pattern in a buoyant market of opening as many work points as possible. This system was very labor intensive because each work point required additional tunneling and support personnel to back up. Consequently, the size of the Ruhr mining labor force had ballooned enormously during the inflation years. See Shearer, “Politics of Industrial Productivity,” 125–61, 206–73, 300–20.Google Scholar

45. See Matthias, Bergassessor, “Der jetzige Stand der Technik im Ruhrbergbau und die noch möglichen Verbesserungen.” Wirtschaftliche Nachrichten aus dem Ruhrbezirk no. 15, 25 05 1924, 442–43;Google Scholar and the article, “Technische Rückständigkeit im Bergbau,” Westfälische Allgemeine Zeitung, 129, 10 06 1924, 1–2.Google Scholar Cuttings in BBA 16/569. See also Dick, S., “Henry Fords Buch Mein Leben und Werk und der Ruhrbergbau,” Der Bergbau (1925): 365–69, 381–83.Google Scholar Coal mining especially following World War I, was a process that took place over a wide expanse of territory underground and on many levels. Mining crews traditionally worked independently with little supervision. Consequently, it was difficult for mine management above ground to monitor the production process at any given moment. Matthias was especially concerned with management's meager overview of the underground operation and of any given work crew. He and others advocated the use of Taylorist studies of the underground labor process to gain a more accurate idea of tasks carried out and the amount of time needed for them. Rationalization advocates also urged greater mechanization of coal cutting and of the winding and transportation systems underground. These measures included the use of undercutting machines (Schrämmaschine) instead of explosive charges and vibrating metal chutes (Schuttelrütsche) to carry the cut coal away from the work face to a loading point. Concentration of the operation into more productive seams with fewer work points would also make the supervisory task easier.

46. Correspondence between Bergassessor Hölling, of the Fachgruppe Bergbau of the RDI and Bergrat Grave of 25 and 30 June 1924, BBA 16/569.Google Scholar

47. The postwar, revolutionary labor demand for the eight-hour day had translated into a seven-hour shift underground for Ruhr coal miners, with a further demand for a six-hour underground shift which was never realized. On the strike in May 1924, see Spethmann, Hans, Der Maistreik 1924 in Ruhrbergbau. Ein grundsätzlicher Arbeitskampf (Berlin, 1932).Google Scholar

48. On the successful campaign by big business to implement mandatory overtime shifts in the Ruhr coal industry in the early 1920s, see Feldman, Gerald D., “Arbeitskonflikt im Ruhrbergbau 1919–1922. Zur Politik von Zechenverband und Gewerkschaften in der Überschichtenfrage,” Vierteljahresschriften für Zeitgeschichte 28 (1980): 168–223.Google Scholar On the related issue of the rollback of the eight hour day, see Feldman, Gerald D. and Steinisch, Irmgard, “Die Weimarer Republik zwischen Sozial- und Wirtschaftsstaat: die Entscheidung gegen den Achtstundentag,” Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 18 (1978): 353–439.Google Scholar

49. On the complex nuances of these negotiations and their relation to the issues of rationalization, see Tschirbs, Rudolf, Tarifpolitik im Ruhrbergbau, 1918–1933 (Berlin, 1986): 241–313.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

50. Rocker, Rudolf, Die Rationalisierung der Wirtschaft und die Arbeiterklasse (Berlin: 1927): 15–17.Google ScholarLoewenstein, “Geschäftsbericht,” 70. ordentliche Generalversammlung des Vereins für die bergbaulichen Interessen, 31 May 1928, 16.Google Scholar

51. Berger, “Die Arbeitslosigkeit im deutschen Steinkohlenbergbau.” Even Heinrich Niebuhr, member of the Association of German Iron and Steel Industrialists (Verein Deutscher Eisenund Stahlindustrieller), conceded that rationalization was a contributing factor to the unemployment level in the iron manufacturing sector by the early 1930s. Nevertheless, he placed greater blame on war reparations and the shortage of investment capital it created and on overly high production costs due to high wages and taxes. See, Niebuhr, Heinrich, “Die Arbeitslosigkeit in der deutschen eisenschaffenden Industrie,” in Die Arbeitslosigkeit der Gegenwart, vol. 2, ed. Saitzew, Manuel (Munich, 1932), 33–80.Google Scholar

52. See, “Wo steckt der Fehler in der Rationalisierungsrechnung” Der Bergknappe 35, no. 40, (4 10 1930): 2;Google Scholar and “Rationalisierung—eine Gefahr für die Wirtschaft”; “Arbeitslosigkeit und Rationalisierung,” and “Warum haben die Unternehmer rationalisiert?” Der Bergknappe 35, no. 41 (11 10. 1930): 1–2.Google Scholar

53. Weisbrod, Bernd, Schwerindustrie in der Weimarer Republik: Interessenpolitik zwischen Stabilisierung und Krise (Wuppertal, 1978);Google ScholarKleinschmidt, Rationalisierung als Untemehmensstrategie.Google Scholar

54. See, for example, Homburg, Rationalisierung und Industriearbeit, 525–28.Google Scholar

55. Geschäftsbericht of the Vestag's Bergbau Abteilung for 1932/1933, BBA 55/578, 3.Google Scholar

56. Director Winkhaus, opening address to the General Assembly, in 69. Generalversammlung des Bergbau-Vereins, 27 April 1927, 10.Google Scholar

57. Poensgen, Ernst, “Diskussions-Aussprache,” Mitgliederversammlung of the Langnamverein, 19 June 1928;Google Scholar in Mittheilungen des Langnamverein, 6, no. 1/2 (1928): 51.Google Scholar

58. Ibid., 45.

59. Schlenker, Max, “Vorwort,” Mittheilungen des Langnamvereins 6, no. 1/2 (1928): 1.Google Scholar

60. Poensgen, Ernst, “Diskussions-Aussprache,” 49–50. The formulation of “optimum output” for the smallest input of resources was a typical expression of Taylorism.Google Scholar

61. Bergassessor Loewenstein, “Geschäftsbericht,” in 73. Generalversammlung des Bergbauvereins, 9 May 1931, 9: “Nicht die Weltwirtschaftskrise ist die Ursache unserer Schwierigkeiten, sondern unsere eigenen seit Jahren verfahrenen Verhältnisse.” Loewenstein was willing to admit, however, that the world recession had at least sharpened Germany's economic problems: “Dass der Konjunkturniedergang der Weltwirtschaft unsere sonderbedingte Krise indessen stark verschärft hat, kann natürlich nicht geleugnet werden.” Ibid. On the general timing of Germany's economic recession in the interwar era, and its inception before the onset of downturn in the early 1930s, see James, The German Slump.

62. On the 1928 steel industry conflict, see Weisbrod, Schwerindustrie in der Weimarer Republik, 415–56.Google Scholar

63. See Childers, , “The Social Language of Politics in Germany: the Sociology of Political Discourse in the Weimar Republic,” American Historical Review 95, no. 2 (1990): 331–58;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and his “Political Sociology and the Linguistic Turn,” Central European History 22 (1989): 381–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

64. This view has been shaped by the literature on the “linguistic turn” in historical studies. While the relevant literature by now is rather large, see, most usefully, the articles by Childers, cited in note 63 as well as Caplan, Jane, “Postmodernism, Poststructuralism, and Deconstruction: Notes for Historians,” Central European History 22 (1989): 260–78;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and idem, “Speaking the Right Language: the Nazi Parry and the Civil Service Vote in the Weimar Republic,” in The Formation of the Nazi Constituency 1919–1933, ed. Caplan, Jane and Childers, Thomas (London, 1986), 182–201.Google Scholar

65. See Nolan, Visions of Modernity.Google Scholar