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The Economics and Politics of Welfare in the Third Reich

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 December 2008

Extract

The function and importance of welfare in the industrial state is usually inversely proportional to the degree of commitment to progressive social reform. The greater the concern of government with solving the problems of economic dislocation and endemic poverty, the less the need for welfare as an economic equalizer. Conversely, an unwillingness to redress the socioeconomic consequences of industrialization—by allocating an increasing share of the national income to social services—forces a heavy dependence on relief and related financial support systems, if only to avoid the political repercussions of poverty. Welfare policies therefore deserve closer attention as useful barometers of national priorities. An analysis of the economic and political implications of Nazi welfare will not shake the consensus that labor was low on the regime's list of priorities, but it will shed light on its handling of the sensitive issue of labor relations within a command economy. For a state attempting to achieve a political basis for an expansionist foreign policy, the implications of welfare posed a particular problem: how to reap the political benefits of progressive social services—which could justify the necessary labor regimentation—without a heavy commitment of public revenues; that is, how to shift the financial burden of an embattled welfare system not easily dismantled during the economic crisis of the thirties.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical Association 1978

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References

1. Schoenbaum, David, Hitler's Social Revolution: Class and Status in Nazi Germany 1933–1939 (New York, 1966), p. 239.Google Scholar

2. Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft: Dokumente und Materialien zur deutschen Arbeiterpolitik 1936–1939 (Opladen, 1975).Google Scholar

3. Mason argues convincingly that the German economy was neither a “war economy in peacetime” nor a “peace economy in wartime” for the period from 1937 to 1941, but an attempt to pursue both policies simultaneously with limited success. Ibid., p. 118.

4. For budget statistics, see the appendix, tables 37 and 38 in Newcomer, Mabel, Central and Local Finance in Germany and England (New York, 1937), pp. 358–59.Google Scholar

5. For municipal finances, see Ziebill, Otto, Geschichte des Deutschen Städtetages (Stuttgart, 1955), pp. 146–47, 240, 244Google Scholar; and Spiewok, Karl E., Der Aufbau des Wohlfahrtswesen im nationalsozialistischen Staat (Berlin, n.d.), 2: 3940.Google Scholar Local welfare expenditures rose from 16.1 percent of the total budget in prewar years to 35.0 percent in 1930–31; on a per capita basis, total welfare expenditures by public agencies spiraled from 20.2 marks in 1927–28 to 42.0 marks in 1932, and these figures exclude the additional subsidies of voluntary charities. See Newcomer, op. cit.; and Statistisches Jahrbuch (1931), pp. 418–22; (1932), pp. 412–17; (1937), pp. 557–58: total expenditures for public agencies were 1463.0 million marks in 1927/28, 1724.1 million in 1928/29, 1867.0 million in 1929/30, 2204.6 million in 1930/31, 2534.5 million in 1931/32, and 2992.4 million in 1932/33.

6. Syrup, Friedrich, Der Arbeitseinsatz und die Arbeitslosenhilfe in Deutschland (Berlin, 1936), p. 144.Google Scholar

7. The number of permanent welfare cases had grown from 1,683,345 in March 1928 (2.7 percent of the population) to 4,602,671 (7.38 percent) by the end of 1932. Cf. Vierteljahreshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen Reiches 45, no. 4 (1936): 80. Additional millions received occasional assistance as the average income of the working family declined by one-third. See Bry, Gerhard, Wages in Germany 1871–1945 (Princeton, 1960), pp. 8, 16, 25Google Scholar; Kuczynski, Jürgen, Germany: Economic and Labour Conditions under Fascism (New York, 1945), pp. 108–13Google Scholar; and Grunberger, Richard, The 12-Year Reich (New York, 1971), p. 204.Google Scholar

8. Syrup, Friedrich and Neuloh, Otto, Hundert Jahre Staatliche Sozialpolitik 1839–1939 (Stuttgart, 1957), pp. 384–86Google Scholar; Weigert, Oskar, “The Development of Unemployment Relief in Germany,” International Labour Review 27, no. 2 (08 1933): 181–88Google Scholar; and Bäumer, Gertrud, Familienpolitik (Berlin, 1933), pp. 1868.Google Scholar

9. Spiewok, op. cit., 2: 42–44.

10. For a fuller discussion of Nazi welfare theory, see the unpublished Ph.D. diss. (University of Virginia), “The Nazi Party and Social Welfare, 1919–1939,” by de Witt, Thomas E. J. (University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, 1972), pp. 113–28.Google Scholar

11. Mein Kampf (Boston, 1943), pp. 2930.Google Scholar

12. Cf. Reher, Werner, Social Welfare in Germany (Berlin, 1938)Google Scholar; Doerner, Hans, Das Fürsorge-ABC (Leipzig, 1941)Google Scholar; and Hilgenfeldt, Erich, Aufgaben der nationalsozialistischen Wohlfahrtspflege (Munich, 1937), passim.Google Scholar

13. Cf. Hilgenfeldt, “Vom Wesen nationalsozialistischer Volkspflege,” an unpublished typed ms. in the Himmler Files, Library of Congress, container 400, presumably sent to Himmler for comment. This policy of service first to the state was consistent with the general attitude toward labor. Special vacation and recreation programs were offered in order to strengthen and revitalize mind and body for greater efforts on behalf of the Reich. See Mason, T. W., “Labour in the Third Reich, 1933–1939,” Past and Present 33 (04 1966): 122.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14. Frick, however, also argued that it would be necessary to “achieve substantial savings in unemployment relief” after the election. Minutes of the ministerial meeting of Mar. 2, 1933, in the Bundesarchiv, Koblenz (hereafter BA), R43II, folder 561.

15. BA, R53, folders 9 and 16. One example of pressure was a letter of protest sent to Hitler by the General Association of Christian Trade Unions, dated Feb. 15, complaining about the misuse of unemployment insurance funds for poor relief. See BA, R43II, folder 561.

16. Nationalsozialistische Partei-Korrespondenz (hereafter NSK), no. 362 (Apr. 4, 1933): 5. National Archives, Washington (cited as NA), microfilm T-71, roll 142, frames 658167–91; BA, R36, folder 1019, Jahresbericht Stiftung für die Opfer der Arbeit, 1934.

17. The most popular foundations were the Erich-Koch-Stiftung in East Prussia, the Josef-Bürckel-Stiftung in the Saar-Palatinate, and the Sauckel-Marschler-Stiftung in Thuringia. Cf. Hüttenberger, Peter, Die Gauleiter (Stuttgart, 1969), pp. 126–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

18. On the NSV, see de Witt, “The Nazi Party and Social Welfare,” pp. 145–83. Cf. also Partei-Statistik (Berlin, 1935), 2: 24–42, 120–33, and 3: 14–15, 22–23, 48–51, 58–61.

19. On WHW, see de Witt, , “‘The Struggle against Hunger and Cold’: Nazi Winter Relief, 1933–39,” Canadian Journal of History 12, no. 3 (02 1978): 361–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

20. There are numerous reported cases of intimidation, job termination, detention, and public indignation against tightfisted Germans; see the reports of the exiled Social Democratic Party, Deutschland-Berichte der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (SOPADE), which tended, however, to be negative about all Nazi measures: 2, no. 12 (Dec. 1935): A40–41; 4, no. 1 (Jan. 1937): A46, A62–63, A73. Cf. also The Times (London), Dec. 18, 1934, p. 13, and Heyen, Franz, Nationalsozialismus im Alltag (Boppard am Rhein, 1967), pp. 192–95.Google Scholar

21. NA, T-81, roll 181, frame 331181c.

22. Totals for the winter 1934/35 were 360.5 million marks, 372 million in 1935/36, 408.3 million in 1936/37, and 417.2 million in 1937/38. Donations equaled 2.88 percent of the average worker's annual income in 1933/34, slipped to 1.99 percent by 1937/38 as wages rose along with the number of employed, and then soared to 2.66 percent in 1938/39, peaking at 4.68 percent in 1941/42. Sources for the statistics: Statistisches Jahrbuch des deutschen Reiches (1934), pp. 525–26; (1935), pp. 511–12; (1936), pp. 533–34; (1937), pp. 569–70; (1938), pp. 596–97; Hoover Institution, NSDAP Hauptarchiv, roll 14, folder 261, Aufkommen und Verwendung der Mittel im WHW, pp. 5–8 (hereafter Hauptarchiv).

23. Guillebaud, C. W., The Social Policy of Nazi Germany (Cambridge, 1941), p. 99Google Scholar, places the relief figure between 30 and 40 marks per winter, while Zimmermann, Josef F., Die NS.-Volkswohlfahrt und das Winterhilfswerk des deutschen Volkes (Ph.D. diss., Würzburg, 1938), p. 147Google Scholar, claims that a family of three received about 100 marks; Hilgenfeldt, head of the NSV, estimated the amount at about 15 to 20 percent of a family's income.

24. In 1934, only 218.6 million marks were allocated to the Reichswohlfahrtshilfe, a decrease of 69 percent compared with a decline in unemployment of only 39 percent. In 1935 aid totalled 72.9 million marks while unemployment still averaged 2.1 million—nearly one-third of the 1933 record when Reich aid was tenfold. See Spiewok, op. cit., p. 41; Mason, Arbeiterklasse, p. 47; Syrup, Arbeitseinsatz, pp. 144–48; Stolper, Gustav, Häuser, Karl, and Borchardt, Kurt, The German Economy 1870 to the Present (New York, 1967), p. 133Google Scholar; Vierteljahreshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen Reiches 45, no. 4 (1936): 83; and a letter of the president of the Reichsanstalt für Arbeitslosenvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung to the Reichshauptkasse, Apr. 19, 1937, in BA, R2, folder 11242.

25. Some 2.8 billion marks were spent in 1933, but only 1.8 billion in 1936; this compares unfavorably with the 1.9 billion spent during far more prosperous 1929. See Zöllner, Detlef, Öffentliche Sozialleistungen und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung (Berlin, 1963), p. 18Google Scholar; and Statistisches Jahrbuch (1937), p. 558, which uses figures for the fiscal year Apr. 1 to Mar. 31, and gives only 1.7 billion marks for 1936.

26. There were 1.78 million permanent welfare cases registered in 1929, 4.67 million in 1933, and still 2.48 million in 1936. See Statistisches Jahrbuch (1937), p. 556.

27. Cf. Mason, Arbeiterklasse, pp. 62–64.

28. Ibid., pp. 61 and 65.

29. Statistisches Jahrbuch (1936), p. 529; (1938), p. 592. The rate comparisons are for the years 1935 and 1936, apparently the first years for such statistics, but the inflation also hit hardest during this period.

30. Germans assisted by WHW were as follows: 16.6 million in 1933/34, 13.9 million in 1934/35, 12.9 million in 1935/36, and around 8 million thereafter until the war. These figures represent from 40 to 60 percent more individuals than were eligible for public assistance. A fluctuating ratio of 3.5 to 2.5 dependents per family was used to calculate the totals; the actual number of families dropped from 4.3 million in 1934/35 to 3.2 million in 1938/39. Cf. Handwörterbuch der Wohlfahrtspflege, ed. Althaus, Hermann (a key figure in the NSV) and Betcke, Werner, 3rd ed. (19371939), p. 1200Google Scholar; Statistisches Jahrbuch (1936), p. 636; NA, T-120, roll 4642, frame K329709. For the impact on living standards, see Guillebaud, op. cit., pp. 98–99.

31. Cf. Führer-Reden zum WHW 1933–36 (Berlin, 1937), pp. 811, 2429Google Scholar; and Führer-Reden zum WHW 1937–39 (Berlin, 1939), pp. 38.Google Scholar

32. BA, R43II, folder 564a, Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro, no. 1990; and NA, T-81, roll 53, frame 156672.

33. Führer-Reden zum WHW 1933–36, pp. 15–16.

34. For changing priorities, see Hilgenfeldt, “Aufgaben der NS.-Wohlfahrtspflege,” Nationalsozialistischer Volksdienst, the official organ of the NSV, a) 1, no. 1 (Oct. 1933): 1–6; b) 5, no. 3 (Dec. 1937): 65–68; c) 5, no. 7 (Apr. 1938): 218–20. On Mutter und Kind, the racially oriented NSV summer relief program, see Betcke, Werner, “The Care of the Family as the Foundation of the National Community,” in Althaus, Hermann, ed., Social Work and the Community (Karlsruhe, 1936), pp. 168–82Google Scholar; and Hilfswerk Mutter und Kind 1934/35, passim. On the struggle with the church charities, see Archiv der Inneren Mission, Berlin, folder 1195, the minutes of the meetings with the NSV; for the state-NSV conflict, see BA, R36 (Deutscher Gemeindetag), folders 928–30, and NS22, folder 747, NSV Rundschreiben V1/36 (Jan. 10, 1936).

35. NA, T-580, roll 53, folder 288, Erste Arbeitsanweisungen, p. 59; and Caritas 39, no. 12 (Dec. 1934). Gerhardt, Martin, Ein Hundert Jahre Innere Mission (Gütersloh, 1948), pp. 379–81.Google Scholar Cf. also BA, R43II, folder 559, for the rejection of summer collection applications.

36. Reichsgesetzblatt (1934), pp. 1086, 1250. For its impact and implications, see Hauptarchiv, roll 14, folder 262, pp. 380–88; and BA, NS1, folder 556, as well as the letter by Goebbels to Frick, July 12, 1933, in R43II, folder 561. More effective measures were later adopted, including an intensification of the campaign against beggars. Cf. BA, R36, folder 1034.

37. Cf. Hilgenfeldt's letter to the labor ministry of June 4, 1934, and the later acrimonious exchanges of 1935 and 1936, in BA, R2, folder 19197.

38. President of the Rechnungshof des Deutschen Reiches to the finance minister, Sept. 6, 1934; also Reich interior minister to the Reich labor minister, Mar. 25, 1935: ibid.

39. Pastor Frick to the Reich finance ministry, Bremen, Jan. 1936: a memorandum at the request of the ministry, entitled “Zur Finanzierung der freien Wohlfahrtspflege.” BA, R2, folder 19197. On financial aid to the NSV from public welfare, see ministerial decree of May 22, 1934, in Ministerialblatt für die Preussische innere Verwaltung 90 (1934): 752, and the individual reports by municipalities in BA, R36, folders 962–64.

40. Memorandum by the Reich accounting office, Nov. 30, 1937; letter from the Reich labor ministry to the finance ministry, Mar. 22, 1938; Reich labor ministry to voluntary agencies, Mar. 22 and Dec. 23, 1938: BA, R2, folder 19198.

41. WHW subventions to NSV were as follows: 7.3 million marks in 1935/36, 79.0 million in 1936/37, 113.7 million in 1937/38, and 261.8 million in 1938/39. Cf. Statistisches Jahrbuch (1941/42): 630; and NA, T-81, roll 191, frames 0341910–11; Statistik der Nationalsozialistischen Volkswohlfahrt und des Winterhilfswerkes (n.d.).

42. For rumors, see the provincial and presidential reports in Vollmer, Bernhard, ed., Volksopposition im Polizeistaat: Gestapo- und Regierungsberichte 1934–1936 (Stuttgart, 1957), pp. 115, 136, 178, 210Google Scholar; SOPADE 5, no. 1 (1938): A54, A58; Haffher, Sebastian, Germany: Jekyll and Hyde (New York, 1941), pp. 4749.Google Scholar

43. BA, NS1, folder 2259, Schwarz to Hess, Sept. 16, 1936. In 1941, Schwarz complained about being passed over in the decision to siphon off large amounts of NSV/ WHW funds. Bormann replied that Hitler alone controlled and allocated this money. See Schwarz to Bormann, July 10, 1941, and Bormann's reply of July 15, 1941.

44. Statistik der Nationalsozialistischen Volkswohlfahrt und des Winterhilfswerkes, NA, T- 81, roll 191, frame 341911; and Handwörterbuch der Wohlfahrtspflege, pp. 1191, 1195.

45. Schoenbaum, p. 99; Bry, pp. 8, 16, 25; Kuczynski, pp. 108–13. During this period, national income rose faster than personal income: Stolper et al., pp. 150–51. For consumption patterns, see Grunberger, chap. 14. Mason estimates that about 65 percent of the work force suffered from Nazi economic policies: “Labour in the Third Reich,” p. 135.

46. Mason, Arbeiterklasse, p. 114.

47. These figures are based on the estimates of Bry, p. 58, and Mason, Arbeiterklasse, pp. 61–64, who argues for the higher figure.

48. Kuczynski, p. 108; cf. also the wage and salary tables provided by Sweezy, Maxine Y., The Structure of the Nazi Economy (Cambridge, 1941), pp. 212, 216CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Schoenbaum, pp. 290–94. For food prices, see Sweezy, pp. 220–22, and Nathan, Otto, The Nazi Economic System (Durham, 1944), p. 356.Google Scholar

49. For couples the increments were only slightly higher, from 40.11 marks per month in 1936 to 40.38 in 1939, with an additional 8.29 marks per child (up from 8.10 in 1936). Statistisches Jahrbuch (1939/40), p. 604.

50. Ibid. (1937), p. 556; (1941/42), p. 618. In 1936, the number of welfare unemployed was 518,000.

51. Zöllner, Öffentliche Sozialleistungen, p. 18.

52. NA, T-81, roll 191, frame 341831; Reher, p. 16; Handwörterbuch, pp. 1203–4. According to Mason, 45–55 percent of working-class income went for food: Arbeiterklasse, p. 63.

53. Hauptarchiv, roll 14, folder 261, Rundschreiben no. 88 (Dec. 28, 1933).

54. Himmler Files, container 400, Library of Congress: Himmler to Hilgenfeldt, Jan. 18, 1938. Schweitzer, Arthur, Big Business in the Third Reich (Bloomington, 1964), p. 386.Google Scholar

55. Cf. Ministry of the Interior, decree of August 30, 1934, in BA, Nationalsozialistischer Volksdienst 2, no. 3 (Dec. 1934): 94. Because of the labor shortage, the interior ministry on Mar. 14, 1938, secretly issued the order to all welfare institutions that they supply lists of all fit welfare unemployed to local Gestapo offices for possible transfer of these individuals to other areas; the only exemption was for workers in rural areas. Cf. BA, R36, folder 1860.

56. Zimmermann, pp. 149–51. Werner, Kurt, “Zur volkswirtschaftlichen Bedeutung des WHW,” Nationalsozialistischer Volksdienst, no. 4 (01 1934): 96106.Google ScholarGerhardt, J., Deutsche Arbeits- und Sozialpolitik (Berlin, 1939), p. 265.Google Scholar

57. BA, R53, folder 90, Seidler, “Die unerhörte Leistungen des WHW.” In the Eifel, handicraft workers were able to earn an extra 65 to 70 marks per month during the winter making badges for WHW. WHW lotteries employed some 15,000 fathers for three months annually. Cf. also Völkischer Beobachter (Apr. 1, 1936) in NA, T-71, roll 142, frame 658062, and Ewiges Deutschland 2 (Apr. 1937): 6. For Gauleiter efforts to obtain contracts, see the 1937 correspondence of state secretary Lammers concerning aid to Gau Koblenz through WHW contracts: BA, R43II, folder 559, RK5040A and RK6352A.

58. NA, T-580, roll 996, folder 173, Carl Bauriedel, “Denkschrift über wirtschaftliche Hilfsmöglichkeiten für die Bayerische Ostmark” (Aug. 1934). On the Emährungshilfswerk, see Hauptarchiv, roll 13, folder 258, NSV Artikeldienst (1940/42); and NA, T-81, roll 88, frames 101075–81: 4th Reichsschulungstagung der Gausacharbeiter EHW (Weimar, Nov. 5–6, 1937). Göring issued the order on Nov. 10, 1936.

59. The order was originally issued by Göring (Dec. 1937), but after a survey of communities over 500,000 produced such a negative response from welfare bureaus, Bormann secretly gave the NSV responsibility for the operation on Feb. 8, 1938. BA, R36, folder 881; and NA, T-580, roll 13, folder 173.

60. This argument is convincingly made by Mason, in “The Primacy of Politics—Politics and Economics in National Socialist Germany,” in Nazism and the Third Reich, ed. Turner, H. A. Jr. (New York, 1972), pp. 186–88Google Scholar, and elaborated in Arbeiterklasse, pp. 101–68.

61. Stolper, p. 145.

62. Mason, Arbeiterklasse, documents no. 160–63, pp. 981ff.

63. For the Nazi tax system, see Nathan, pp. 302–21. Reich tax receipts trebled in the period 1933 to 1939 from 5 to 15 billion marks, while federal states and municipalities received 5 and 7 billion marks respectively in 1939. Cf. Stolper, p. 149.

64. Nathan, pp. 328–29.

65. Cf. Stolper, pp. 149, 152, 155; Mason, Arbeiterklasse, p. 64; Syrup and Neuloh, pp. 407, 460.

66. Bry estimates deductions at between 1 and 3 percent, Mason at 2 to 4 percent: Bry, pp. 57–58; Mason, Arbeiterklasse, p. 64; Kuczynski claims that with taxes, social insurance contributions and other dues and donations amounted to one-quarter of the worker's wage. Others place the figure between 18.5 and 22.6 percent. Accurate statistics are impossible to compile, but in total exactions the latter figures seem most realistic.

67. Cf. Stolper, p. 152.

68. BA, R53, folder 90, Rundschreiben no. 54 (Nov. 9, 1933); R2, folder 4866, finance minister to Hilgenfeldt, Dec. 20, 1938. The delay in promulgating the WHW law was partially due to a power struggle within the government between Goebbels and the ministries of labor and finance, which argued that they had jurisdictional preeminence since the WHW had taken the form of a compulsory state levy. See BA, R2, folder 4866, Vermerk by the RFM, June 1936; R22, folder 1912, Hilgenfeldt to the RJM, Oct. 5, 1935; R43II, folder 564, RK10698, and NS1, folder 2259.

69. Syrup and Neuloh, p. 405.

70. Winterstein, Helmut, Sozialpolitik mit anderen Vorzeichen (Berlin, 1969), table 5, pp. 288–90.Google Scholar

71. Cf. Mason, Arbeiterklasse, passim, on the fiscal conservatism of Nazi economic policy.