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Big Business and the Kapp Putsch

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 December 2008

Gerald D. Feldman
Gerald D. Feldman
Affiliation:
University of California., Berkeley
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Extract

The Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch, hastily begun on March 13, 1920, and ingloriusly ended with the resignation of Dr. Wolfgang Kapp on March 17, has already been the subject of significant study. The details of the putsch itself, the character of the conspirators, and their motives, the positions taken by the political parties and leaders, and the reasons for its failure are fairly Well known. It is generally agreed that the circle of conspirators had too narrow a social base and was too divided in its purposes to be successful. In essence, it was a revolt of unemployed reactionary East Elbian officials like Kapp himself and his “Minister of the Interior,” Traugott von Jagow, disgruntled conservative military officers, the most important of whom was Freiherr von Lüttwitz, and military adventurers like Colonel Max Bauer, Major Pabst, and Captain Ehrhardt. Where Kapp sought far-reaching constitutional and political changes, Lüttwitz strove for more short-term goals, i.e., reconstruction of the cabinet to give it an “expert” character, new elections, and a larger army. The Kapp regime was doomed because of the refusal of the government bureaucracy to serve it and because of the general strike called by the trade unions on March 14.

Type
Articles
Information
Central European History , Volume 4 , Issue 2 , June 1971 , pp. 99 - 130
Copyright
Copyright © Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical Association 1971

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References

1. The most important study of the putsch, which also contains a comprehensive bibliography, is Erger, Johannes, Der Kapp-Lüttwitz-Putsch. Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Innenpolitik 1919/20 (“Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien,” XXXV, Düsseldorf, 1967). This study, which underestimates the political and psychological significance of the general strike in defeating the putsch, concentrates solely on events in Berlin. A study investigating the Kapp Putsch throughout Germany is now being prepared by a Berlin scholar, Hans Biegert.Google Scholar

2. On the origins of the Reichsuerband and the ZAG, see Feldman, Gerald D., “German Business Between War and Revolution: The Origins of the Stinnes-Legien Agreement,” in Ritter, Gerhard A., ed., Entstehung und Wandel der modernen Gesellschaft. Festschrift für Hans Rosenberg zum 65. Geburtstag (Berlin, 1970), pp. 312–41.Google Scholar The term Arbeitsgemeinschaft is not easily translated into English because it connotes an “organic” “social partnership” or “working community” and thus goes beyond the type of labour-management negotiations and collective bargaining familiar to Anglo-Saxon experience. In addition to the ZAG, which was meant to deal with national socio-economic problems, separate Arbeitsgemeinschaften were set up for the various branches of industry. The only complete study of the ZAG is Kaun, Heinrich, Die Geschichte der Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft der industriellen und gewerblichen Arbeitgeber und Arbeitnehmer Deutschlands (Jena, 1938).Google Scholar

3. The term used in the protocols of the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks—A.G.'s Board of Directors, GBAG Archiv, Essen, Hauptgruppe 1, Aktenzeichen 120.

4. Duisberg, Carl to Dr. H. T. von Böttinger, Mar. 15, 1920Google Scholar, “Autographen-Sammlung von Dr. Carl Duisberg,” Werksarchiv, Farbenfabrik Bayer, Leverkusen. On the support given to the Nationale Vereinigung, see Erger, , Der Kapp-Lüttwitz-Putsch, p. 97.Google Scholar

5. Semer to Fritz Thyssen, Apr. 2, 1920, Fritz Thyssen Papers, Werksarchiv, August Thyseen-Hütte, Duisburg-Hamborn.

6. The Socialist trade unions left the ZAG in January 1924 because of industry's unilateral increase of the working day. On the intentions of the industrialists in 1920, see the remarks of Director von Bülow at the Executive Board Meeting of the Verein Deutscher Eisen- und Stahlindustrieller (VDESI) of June 22, 1920, Bundesarchiv (BA) Koblenz, R 13 1/158.

7. Hugenberg to the Vereinigung von Handelskammern des Industriebezirks Essen, Feb. 29, 1920, Werksarchiv der Firma, Fr. Krupp (Krupp Archiv), Essen, WA IV 2561. Also see Feldman, Gerald D., “The Social and Economic Policies of German Big Business, 1918–1929”, American Historical Review, LXXV, No. 1 (10 1969), 47–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8. On the conflicts within the Reichsverband, see Feldman, , Entstehung und Wandel, pp. 336–41.Google Scholar

9. The most important source in information on the activities of the Reichsverband leaders is an Aktennotiz prepared by Dr. Sorge for the Krupp director Wiedfeldt on Mar. 19, 1920. This was supplemented by another letter of Mar. 27, 1920. Both documents are to be found in the Krupp Archiv, WA III 227. The missing presidial members were Abraham Frowein, C. F. von Siemens, Robert Bosch, Carl Duisberg, Max Fischer, Hans Kraemer, Otto Moras, and Hugo Stinnes.

10. Sorge to Wiedfeldt, Mar. 27, 1920, ibid.

11. Geschäftliche Mitteilungen für die Mitglieder des Reichsverbandes der Deutschen Industrie, II, No. 10 (04 1. 1920).Google Scholar

12. See his remarks at the ZAG directors' meeting of Mar. 17, 1920, Deutsches Zentralarchiv Potsdam (DZA Potsdam), ZAG, Bd. 29, Bl. 121.

13. On the conversations with Legien, see the Sorge Aktennotiz of Mar. 19, 1920, Krupp Archiv, WA III 227. The feeling that industrial money was behind the putsch was not limited to labor circles. The future Defense Minister, Dr. Gessler, a Democrat, believed this as well, as the South German industrialist Dr. Guggenheimer noted in a letter to Anton von Rieppel of the Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nürnberg of Mar. 26, 1920, M.A.N. Werksarchiv, Augsburg, Nachlass Guggenheimer, K 75, Nr. 83. It is remarkable that Guggenheimer had no knowledge of M.A.N. contributions to the Nationale Vereinigung (Erger, , Der Kapp-Lüttwitz-Putsch, p. 97Google Scholar) despite his important position in the firm. Although industry gave money to many dubious and even sinister persons and organizations, one gets the impression that this was done in a confused fashion and that businessmen either received far less or, as in this case, far more than they paid for.

14. von Kessel, Hans, Handgranaten und rote Fahnen (Berlin, 1933), pp. 295–96. Erwin Könnemann makes much of this statement, reported by the police officerGoogle Scholarvon Kessel, , in “Dokumente zur Haltung der Monopolisten im Kapp-Putsch,” Beiträge zur Geschichte der Deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, IX, No. 6 (1967), 1003–23, at p. 1007Google Scholar. It is possible that Stinnes was enthused by the Kapp Putsch at the very beginning, but as what follows will show, he had become quite cautious by the time he reached Essen on Mar. 14.

15. “Akten-Notiz. Sitzung des Vorstandes des Reichsverbandes der Deutschen Industrie, 13.IV.20,” M.A.N. Werksarchiv Augsburg, Nachlass Guggenheimer, K 75, Nr. 83.

16. The text is reprinted in Spethmann, Hans, Zwölf Jahre Ruhrbergbau, II, Aufstand und Ausstand vor and nach dem Kapp-Putsch bis zur Ruhrbesetzung (Berlin, 1928), pp. 100–102, 343–44.Google Scholar

17. Ibid., p. 102.

18. “Verhandlung der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kohlenbergbau Essen,” Mar. 14, 1920, Phoenix-Rheinrohr Archiv, Düsseldorf, P 1/25/39. I am grateful to Professor Henry Turner for bringing this document to my attention.

19. Spethmann, , Zwölf Jahre, II, 343.Google Scholar

20. Ibid., pp. 101, 343–44. The Reich Commissioner for the Rhenish-Westphalian Region, Carl Severing, was involved in the negotiations on Mar. 15. It should be noted that the text was changed slightly between Mar. 15 and Mar. 16. On the 15th, the reference was to the “Kapp government,” while the term used on the 16th was “Herr Kapp.” In the Reichsverband's Geschäftliche Mitteilungen for Apr. 1, 1920, the resolution of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Bergbau is falsely dated Mar. 14, 1920. There is every reason to believe that this false dating was intentional.

21. In their resolution, the chemical industry employers declared their solidarity with the workers “unconditionally and without reservation,” because “What is at stake today goes far beyond every political strike.” The strike summons was openly declared to be “justified.” For the text, see Könnemann, , Beiträge (1967), p. 1017.Google Scholar

22. Geschäftliche Mitteilungen (Apr. 1, 1920).

23. Sorge Aktennotiz, Mar. 19, 1920, Krupp Archiv, WA III 227.

24. Ibid., for the contacts between presidium members and the putschists. On Stauss's role, see Erger, , Der Kapp-Lüttwitz-Putsch, p. 230.Google Scholar

25. Schiffer to State Secretary Albert, Apr. 8, 1920, in Nachlass Eugen Schiffer, Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, Nr. 16.

26. Sorge Aktennotiz, Mar. 19, 1920, Krupp Archiv, WA III 227, and Erger, , Der Kapp-Lüttwitz-Putsch, pp. 205–206.Google Scholar On the evening of Mar. 16, Kapp tried to play upon employer fears of a left-wing uprising once more to use the Berlin industrialists as intermediaries with Schiffer. This time, Walther Rathenau, as well as Borsig, Pfeil, and other Berlin industrialists were sent to Schiffer. Rathenau's effort to bring Schiffer into contact with Kapp that evening failed because of misinformation that Kapp had already resigned and a breakdown in telephone communications. See von Strandmann, Hartmut Pogge, ed., Walther Rathenau. Tagebuch 1907–1922 (Düsseldorf, 1967), pp. 231–34.Google Scholar

27. Sorge Aktennotiz, Mar. 19, 1920, Krupp Archiv, WA III 227.

28. Ibid., for information supplementing the actual protocol, which is to be found in DZA Potsdam, ZAG, Nr. 29, B1. 117–28, and which is reprinted in Könneman, , Beiträge (1967), PP. 1010–15.Google Scholar

29. There is no reason to presume any collusion between the employers and Baltrusch. The Sorge Aktennotiz would certainly have indicated this. Instead, Sorge regarded the Christian trade unionist program as a possible solution worth being considered.

30. See n. 28.

31. Sorge Aktennotiz, Mar. 19, 1920, Krupp Archiv, WA III 227.

32. Drde Haen, W. to Carl Duisberg, 04 1, 1920Google Scholar, “Autographen-Sammlung von Dr. Carl Duisberg,” Werksarchiv, Farbenfabrik Bayer, Leverkusen. Important indirect evidence supporting de Haen's remarks about the role played by anxiety concerning anti-Semitism is to be found in the correspondence between the Jewish chemical industrialist from Berlin, General Director Berckemeyer, and Gustav Stresemann during the early days of April 1920. Berckemeyer asked that the DVP do something to combat anti-Semitism, and Stresemann replied that he understood the problem but felt that some of this feeling was justified by the role played by Galician and other eastern Jews in the radical agitation during the general strike. This interesting correspondence, which certainly does nothing to suggest that Stresemann was able to rise above the peculiar brand of anti-Semitism so rife in “respectable” bourgeois circles, is to be found in the Nachlass Gustav Stresemann (Microfilm by the U. S. National Archives), Roll 3089, Serial 6928H, Frames H138807–10, H138836–37, H138849–51.

33. Sorge, Aktennotiz, 03 19, 1920, Krupp Archiv, WA III 227.Google Scholar

34. Ibid, and Geschäftliche Mitteilungen (Apr. 1, 1920).

35. Erger, , Der Kapp-Lüttwitz-Putsch, pp. 279ff.Google Scholar, and Varain, Heinz Josef, Freie Gewerkschaften, Sozialdemokratie und Staat. Die Politik der Generalkommission unter der Führung Carl Legiens (1890–1920) (“Beitrage zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien,” IX, Düsseldorf, 1956), pp. 172ff.Google Scholar

36. Beschlüsse der 1. bis 12. Sitzung des Ausschusses des Allgemeinen Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes. Auszug aus den ungedruckten Protokollen der Ausschussitzungen vom Juli 1919 bis März 1921 (Berlin, 1928), 03 27, 1920.Google Scholar

37. Geschäftliche Mitteilungen (Apr. 1, 1920).

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid. The protocol of the meeting in the Labor Ministry is to be found in DZA Potsdam, Reichsarbeitsministerium, Nr. 2065, Bl. 5–10. The tone of Schlicke's remarks at this meeting suggests that he may have been trying to undercut Legien's attempts to use the political strick to make demands for political changes. This certainly would have elicited sympathy from the industrialists.

40. Paul Rohde to Schiffer, Mar. 20, 1920, Nachlass Schiffer, Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, Nr. 16, and Geschäftliche Mitteilungen (Apr. 1, 1920).

41. Sorge to Wiedfeldt, Mar. 27, 1920, Krupp Archiv, WA III, 227.

42. Verhandlungen der verfassunggebenden Deutschen Nationalversammlung, vol. 332, Stenographische Berichte (Berlin, 1920), 03 29, 1920, col. 4957.Google Scholar

43. Ibid., cols. 4966–68.

44. DZA Potsdam, ZAG, Nr. 29, B1. 129–40, and Könnemann, Beiträge (1967), pp. 1018–23 for the text of the protocol.

45. This internal maneuvering was described by Sorge at the Executive Board meeting of the VDESI of June 22, 1920, BA Koblenz, R 13 1/158.

46. DZA Potsdam, ZAG, Nr. 29, B1. 139–40, and Könnemann, , Beiträge (1967), p. 1023.Google Scholar

47. Ibid. It would seem that the original version of the third paragraph was slightly different from that which was sent out to the ZAG members on Mar. 31, 1920. The initial version contained mention of “payment for the strike days,” and this was left out, probably to avoid offense to employers. Included in the revised version was the term “Public funds,” probably for purposes of clarity. See DZA Potsdam, ZAG, Nr. 8, Bl. 1167.

48. The employer association of the Northwest Group of the VDESI claimed a loss of 15,000,000 marks, while the mining association of Zwickau and Lugau-Oeslitz in Saxony expected a reimbursement of 3,000,000 marks and the firm of J. E. Reinecker, a machinetool manufacture in Chemnitz, expected 323,600 marks. See the correspondence Ibid., Nr. 49, B1. 118, 136–37, 355–56.

49. In a meeting between trade union leaders and representatives of the Reich ministries on Apr. 12, 1920, Dr. Löwe of the Economics Ministry mentioned the price increase in the coal industry and suggested that this solution might be used elsewhere. The labor leader and ZAG executive member Grassmann was most energetic in arguing that “not only commerce and industry should be burdened [for the costs of the general strike], but rather the entire people.” See Ibid., Reichsarbeitsministerium, Nr. 2065, B1. 92–99.

50. For the discussion at the trade union congress, see the Protokoll der Verhandlungen des elften Kongresses der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands. Leipzig 1922 (Berlin, 1922), pp. 478ff.Google Scholar For the letter of protest of the Zentralausschuss Leipziger Arbeitgeberverbände of Apr. 13, 1920, see DZA Potsdam, ZAG, Nr. 49, B1. 92–92a.

51. Allgemeiner Industrie-Verband, Sitz Hamburg, to the Labor Ministry, May 5, 1920, DZA Potsdam, Reichsarbeitsministerium, Nr. 2066, B1. 57–58.

52. VDESI meeting, June 22, 1920, BA Koblenz, R 13 1/158.

53. Ibid. When Gröbler discovered these facts the meeting on June 22, he immediately forgot all about the “Berliners” and attacked Vögler. The discussion was very bitter and suggests how strong were the feelings aroused by the strike-payment quesion.

54. Richard Merton to Wichard von Moellendorff, APr. 8, 1920, BA Koblenz, Nachalss Wichard von Moellendorff, Nr. 123. A similar view of Sorge appears in the correspondence of other industrialists, and there can be no question about the fact that Sorge had been chosen to head the Reichsverband because of his acceptability to a variety of business interests rather than because of his leadership qualities. Furthermore, he was not in particularly good health at this time.

55. This portion of the discussion was too delicate to be placed in the regular protocol, but Dr. Guggenheimer of the M.A.N. did take some personal notes (see n. 15). Further information on the debate may be garnered from remarks made at the June 22 meeting of the VDESI (see n. 6).

56. See their remarks alluding to the previous day's debate in “Bericht über die erste ordentliche Mitgliederversammlung des Reichsverbandes der Deutschen Industrie (14. April 1920),” Veröffentlichungen des Reichsverbandes der Deutschen Industrie, No. 13 (Berlin, 05 1920), pp. 3–4, 17.Google Scholar

57. It must also be recognized that there were industrialists who took a different view, supported the Weimar Republic and were anxious to defend it. In this connection, the correspondence between the very conservative Ruhr industrialist, General Director Paul Reusch of the Gutehoffnungshütte, at this time a member of the DVP, and Director Philipp Wieland, a Württemberg metal industrialist and DDP deputy, is very revealing of how differently businessmen could view the situation. Reusch had no use for the Kappists, but he was most enraged by the Sparatacists in the Ruhr and had been outraged by the November 1918 revolution. He accused the government of granting amnesty to the Spartacists while persecuting the followers of Kapp—hardly an accurate appraisal of what actually happened. Wieland, in contrast, blamed the entire situation on nationalist agitation against the Republic and felt that rigorous prosecution of the Kappists was necessary, although he was no less insistent upon punishment of the Spartacists. The correspondence is to be found in the Historisches Archiv der Gutehoffnungshütte in Oberhausen (Rheinland), Nr. 30019390/29.

58. It was Reusch who wanted the funeral, while Borsig, Sorge, and Vögler insisted on the importance of the break coming, if it had to come, from the trade union side; VDESI meeting, June 22, 1920, BA Koblenz, R 13 1/158.

59. Comment by Deputy Cremer, Nachlass Stresmann, Roll 3090, Serial 6932H, Frames H139558–59.

60. VDESI meeting, June 22, 1920, BA Koblenz, R 13 1/158.

61. Professor Rausenberger of Krupp to Max Bauer, Feb. 27, 1921, Nachlass Max Bauer, BA Koblenz, Nr. 74.

62. Director Beukenberg of Phoenix to von Schaewen, Mar. 20, 1920, Phoenix-Rheinrohr Archiv, Düsseldorf, P 1/25/39.

63. VDESI meeting, June 22, 1920, BA Koblenz, R 13 1/158.