1. von der Goltz, Baron Colmar, The Nation in Arms, trans. Ashworth, Philip A. (London, 1887), pp. 36–41.Google Scholar

2. “Old-Prussian” as normally used signifies men whose fathers had been officers, high civil servants, or landowners. See, for example, the formulation of the concept by von Roon, War Minister Albrecht in Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem Leben des General-Feldmarschalls Kriegsministers Grafen von Roon, ed. von Roon, Count Waldemar, 3 vols. (Breslau, 1897), 2: 542Google Scholar; and von der Osten-Sacken, Baron Ottomar und von Rhein, , Preussens Heer von seinen Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1914), 2: 7.Google Scholar

3. By 1806 more than 90% of the officer corps consisted of nobles, primarily from the eastern provinces. See Shanahan, William O., Prussian Military Reforms 1786–1813 (1944; reprint ed., New York, 1966), p. 29.Google Scholar

4. These new officers included, it should be noted, many of the army's best minds and strengest opponents of the old System.

5. Messerschmidt, Manfred, ‘Die preussische Armee,’ in Handbuch zur deutschen Militärgeschichte 1648—1939, ed. Forschungsamt, Militärgeschichtliches, 5 vols. (Munich, 1966–1975), vol. 4, pt. 2, pp. 11–12Google Scholar. On the reformers, see Simon, Walter, The Failure of the Prussian Reform Movement 1807–1819 (Ithaca, 1955)Google Scholar; Shanahan, , Prussian Military ReformsGoogle Scholar; and Paret, Peter, Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform 1807–1815 (Princeton, 1966)Google Scholar. Höhn, Reinhard, Scharnhorsts Vermächtnis (Frankfurt, 1972)Google Scholar, is very good on military reformers and their enemies.

6. William I to General von Natzmer, Mar. 21, 1857, in Werner, Ernst, ed., Kaiser Wilhelms des Grossen Briefe, Reden und Schriften, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1906), 1: 408.Google Scholar

7. General von Kameke's memorandum, ‘Denkschrift über Luxus in der Armee und die damit verbunden Gefahren,’ is quoted in Demeter, Karl, Das deutsche Offizierkorps in Gesellschaft und Staat 1650–1945 (1930; reprint ed., Frankfurt, 1965), p. 332.Google Scholar

8. von Bernhardi, Friedrich, Denkwürdigkeiten aus meinem Leben (Berlin, 1927), p. 263.Google Scholar

9. In 1860 fully 65% of the officer corps consisted of nobles. By 1913 the aristocracy occupied only about 30% of the officer positions at all levels. See Demeter, Offizierkorps, p. 29.

10. Ibid., p. 19.

11. Ibid., p. 23. The study providing this information was completed by the Military Cabinet on Feb. 15, 1902.

12. Berghahn, Volker R., Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (New York, 1973), pp. 15–23Google Scholar, summarizes the evidence.

13. The Prussian rank was Generalmajor, which has been translated as brigadier general to avoid confusion with the American rank of major general. Excluded from consideration are promotions to brigadier general upon retirement and honorary promotions given princes and other dignitaries. There exists no official roster of Prussia's generals, since all personnel records were destroyed in 1945. The author's list of 2,443 generals has been obtained from the official published army lists, which give each officer's last name under his unit of assignment. No biographical information is given. See Kriegsministerium, Prussia, Rang und Quartierliste der königlich preussischen Armee, 42 vols. (Berlin, 1870/1871–1914)Google Scholar. The title varies and the series includes the Württemberg army in later years. The years 1870–71 and 1876–77 are covered by a single volume each. Biographical information is drawn from a variety of sources too numerous to list.

14. None of the Standard studies of the army has attempted a precise Statement on the occupational background of any level of the officer corps. Nevertheless, a few contain some estimates for selected groups among the lower-ranking officers. Above all one should consult Demeter, Offizierkorps, the best social study of the officer corps. Endres, Franz Karl, The Social Structure and Corresponding Ideologies of the German Officer Corps before the World War, trans. Ellison, S. (New York, 1937)Google Scholar, is the suggestive but biased view of a disgruntled former Bavarian officer. Kitchen, Martin, The German Officer Corps 1890–1918 (Oxford, 1968)Google Scholar, relies on Demeter for most social issues, as does Craig, Gordon, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640–1945 (New York, 1956)Google Scholar. Martin, Günther, ‘Gruppenschicksal und Herkunftschicksal, zur Soziologie der preussische Generalität 1812–1918’ (Ph.D. diss., Saarbrücken, 1970)Google Scholar, is limited in scope and by methodological shortcomings. Breit, Gotthard, Das Staats- und Gesellschaftsbild deutscher Generale beider Weltkriege im Spiegel ihre Memoiren (Boppard am Rhein, 1973)Google Scholar, is so limited in its perspective as to be quite misleading.

15. For purposes of convenience, chronological divisions are based on four eleven-year ‘decades.’ Generals who were promoted prior to 1871 and who remained on active duty are classified separately. In many respects their personal characteristics differed considerably from those of the generals promoted during the Empire.

16. In all discussions of the generals the reader must bear in mind the lengthy time lag between commissioning and promotion to brigadier general. A typical general promoted in 1910, for example, had entered the army prior to 1880.

17. It might also be noted that only about 70% of this land was in the eastern provinces and that not all of it was owned by nobles.

18. Fathers who served in the army for only a short period of time or who were reserve or Landwehr officers have not been counted as officers by occupation. The vast majority of the officer-fathers served for fifteen years or more and attained the rank of captain or higher. Most were at least majors. Fathers who served in the position of Landrat have been included among the civil servants.

19. This was Goltz's line of reasoning in The Nation in Arms when he argued that even sons of landowners were inferior officer material when compared to sons of officers.

20. Vogt, Hermann, Das Buch vom deutschen Heer (Leipzig, 1886), pp. 147–49.Google Scholar

21. On William's role in important military questions see the perceptive essay by Howard, Michael, ‘William I and the Reform of the Prussian Army,’ in Essays for A. J. P. Taylor, ed. Gilbert, Martin (London, 1966), pp. 91–103Google Scholar. Kriegsministerium, Prussia, ed., Militärische Schriften weiland Kaiser Wilhelms des Grossen Majestät, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1897)Google Scholar, contains numerous examples of William's considerable expertise in military matters.

22. William I, Militärische Schriften, 1: 58–59Google Scholar. See also Höhn, Reinhard, Die Armee als Erziehungsschule der Nation: Das Ende einer Idee (Bad Harzburg, 1963), p. 98.Google Scholar

23. In this respect the old king was similar to William II, who apparently chose Helmuth von Moltke to succeed Schlieffen as chief of the general staff primarily because his name had a glorious reputation.

24. von Einem, Karl, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten 1853–1933 (Leipzig, 1933), p. 36.Google Scholar

25. William's Statement is recorded by Messerschmidt, Manfred, “Die Armee in Staat und Gesellschaft, Die Bismarckzeit,” in Das kaiserliche Deutschland, ed. Stürmer, Michael (Düsseldorf, 1970), p. 106.Google Scholar

26. von Rabenau, Kurt, Die deutsche Land- und Seemacht und die Berufspflichten des Offiziers, 4th ed. (Berlin, 1914), p. 341.Google Scholar

27. von Schulte, Friedrich, ‘Adel im deutschen Offizier- und Beamtenstand,’ Deutsche Revue 21 (04–06 1896): 185–86.Google Scholar

28. There were some spectacular examples of this. Between 1800 and 1900 fifteen members of the von Borcke family served in the Second Guard Grenadier Regiment—seven between 1861 and 1886. See von Goertzke, Joachim, ed., Offizier Stammliste des königlich preussischen Kaiser Franz Garde-Grenadier Regiments Nr. 2 1814–1914 (Berlin, 1914)Google Scholar. Many sons of the Count von Schleinitz family served in the Second Garde Regiment zu Fuss. See von Bock, Count, ed., Stammliste des Offizierkorps des 2. Garde-Regiments zu Fuss 19.6.1813–15.5.1913 (Berlin, 1913).Google Scholar

29. William's success in this matter has never been established with certainty. He was at least partially successful. In 1888–89, for example, there were more changes among the regimental command assignments than in any other similar period between 1871 and 1914. This increased turnover probably meant increased retirements and accelerated promotions.

30. On William's partially successful but offensive efforts, see von Freytag-Loringhoven, Baron Hugo, Menschen und Dinge wie ich sie in meinem Leben sah (Berlin, 1923), p. 46Google Scholar; Einem, Erinnerungen, p. 39; Groener, Wilhelm, Lebenserinnerungen, Generalstab, Weltkrieg, ed. von Gaertringen, Baron Friedrich Hiller (Göttingen, 1957), p. 62Google Scholar; and Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg, Nachlass Chales de Beaulieu, N 187/1, p. 56.

31. Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow has recorded a conversation with the Chief of the Military Cabinet Count von Hülsen-Haeseler, who stated that William routinely approved nearly all promotions and officer assignments. See von Bülow, Bernhard, Denkwürdigkeiten, 4 vols. (Berlin, 1930), 2: 183–84Google Scholar; and von Hutten-Czapski, Count Bogdan, Sechzig Jahre Politik und Gesellschaft, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1936), 2: 410.Google Scholar

32. It should be noted, however, that shortly after his accession Wiliam's famous decree of Mär. 29, 1890, publicly admitted that the army had been forced to rely on bourgeois men to fill its lower officer ranks. The edict thus made official a development that had been in process for decades. It is possible that after 1890 there were some important changes in the social and occupational origins among the new lieutenants. There is as of yet no comprehensive evidence on this point. William's proclamation is partially published in Meier-Welcker, Hans, ed., Offiziere im Bild von Dokumente aus drei Jahrhunderten (Stuttgart, 1964), p. 197.Google Scholar

33. Private income requirements varied substantially according to branch of service, individual regiments, and over the years. This complex issue, basic to an understanding of the inner structure of the officer corps and to the image of the officer corps in Prussian and German society, has received scant attention from historians.

34. Prior to 1909 Prussian officers were notoriously poorly paid in the lower ranks, though generals received very respectable compensation for their services.

35. Muncy, Lysbeth Walker, The Junker in the Prussian Administration under William II, 1888–1914 (Providence, 1944), pp. 77, 117.Google Scholar

36. An exception is von der Gablentz, Friedrich, “Das preussisch-deutsche Offizierkorps,” in Schicksalsfragen der Gegenwart, ed. Verteidigung, Bundesministerium für, 7 vols. (Tübingen, 1958), 3: 47, 71Google Scholar. Paret, Peter, Clausewitz and the State (Oxford, 1976), p. 14Google Scholar, also comments on the point, in this case with reference to Clausewitz's father.

37. Most officers were reluctant to criticize the army's procedures, since they were subject to military courts even after retirement. Two exceptions were G. (anonymous), Das Ende der Offizierslaufbahn (Berlin, 1902), pp. 32–33Google Scholar; and, later (anonymous), Das alte Heer, von einem Stabsoffizier (Charlottenburg, 1920), p. 27.Google Scholar

38. Adolf Keim's dismissal was the occasion for an extensive press commentary. Apparently he was retired because of disfavor over a book on infantry tactics and because he was too close to Caprivi and Walther Bronsart von Schellendorff. See Keim, Adolf, Erlebtes und Erstrebtes: Lebenserinnerungen (Hanover, 1925), pp. 94–95.Google Scholar

39. Gablentz, Von der, “Offizierkorps,” p. 53.Google Scholar

40. A few examples should suffice. Emil Priwe, the son of a tax collector, became brigadier general of artillery in 1891. His grandfather, wife's father, and maternal grandfather were all civil servants of higher position than his father. Ferdinand Bliedung, son of a prison inspector, became brigadier general of infantry in 1900. Other details of his family are obscure. Max Gallwitz (ennobled in 1913) became brigadier general of artillery in 1902. His father had also been a tax collector. His maternal grandfather was also a minor civil servant, but his wife was the daughter of a bourgeois Silesian landowner. He reached the generalcy after extensive General Staff service.

41. Schack's letter to Manteuffel, May 19, 1862, is quoted in Demeter, Offizierkorps, pp. 18–19.

42. This is especially true when one considers that fathers who had been only lieutenants in the active army or who had held reserve or Landwehr commissions are not counted as officers. Only about 10% of the fathers were landowners purely and simply.

43. Rosenberg, Hans, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, Autocracy: The Prussian Experience 1660–1815 (Boston, 1958).Google Scholar

44. Röhl, John C. G., Germany without Bismarck: The Crisis of Government in the Second Reich, 1890–1900 (Los Angeles, 1967), p. 147.Google Scholar

45. Muncy, Junker in Administration, pp. 39, 224.

46. Rosenberg, Hans, “Die Pseudo-Demokratisierung der Rittergutsbesitzerklasse,” in Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte, ed. Wehler, Hans-Ulrich (Berlin, 1968), pp. 290–91Google Scholar; Puhle, Hans-Jürgen, Agrarische Interessenpolitik und preussischer Konservatismus im wilhelminischen Reich 1893–1914 (Hanover, 1966), p. 18Google Scholar. By 1900 probably fewer than half the Rittergüter in the eastern provinces were still in noble hands.

47. Ludendorff's father had also been an active officer. His mother was from a very respectable noble family. Their style of living was as aristocratic as that of a typical landowning noble family. In fact they were nobles in all but name. See von Templehoff, Henny, Mein Glück im Hause Ludendorff (Berlin, 1915), passim.Google Scholar

48. They may have left the army after a short time, as did their noble counterparts in numerous cases. It is also possible that many noble commanders regarded these bourgeois landowners as peasants. Such an attitude would have seriously compromised their careers. There is little if any reliable information available on this point. A total of 225 sons of bourgeois landowners were raised to the rank of knight during the empire. Many and probably most of these men remained on the land, however, and few seem to have been career officers. See Cecil, Lamar, “The Creation of Nobles in Prussia, 1871–1918,” American Historical Review 50, no. 3 (02 1970): 765–66, 770–71.Google Scholar

49. Sons of bourgeois landowners and officers might be exceptions, if their fathers were not of the undesirable elements accepted only because of the necessities of the Napoleonic wars. In such individual cases the grandfathers' occupations would have been decisive in the determination.

50. Wheeler-Bennett, John W., “Men of Tragic Destiny: Ludendorff and Groener,” in Essays Presented to Sir Lewis Namier, ed. Pares, Richard and Taylor, A. J. P. (London, 1956), pp. 510–11.Google Scholar

51. There was a sharp increase in the incidence of businessmen among the grandfathers of generals promoted after 1892 and then again for those promoted after 1903.

52. Gillis, John R., The Prussian Bureaucracy in Crisis 1840–1860: Origins of an Administrative Ethos (Stanford, 1971), pp 209–10.Google Scholar

53. Muncy, Junker in Administration, pp. 14, 19, 121–22, treats this important issue.

54. Two possible exceptions would be the office of Landrat and, if one considers it as part of the bureaucracy, the Diplomatic Service.

55. Demeter, Offizierkorps, pp. 27–28.

56. See n. 46, above.

57. The relevant research on the agricultural depression is reviewed most recently by Cecil, Lamar, The German Diplomatie Service 1871–1914 (Princeton, 1976), pp. 176–84.Google Scholar

58. For a contemporary officer's comments on this see Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Nachlass Otto von Below, N 87/41, p. 396.

59. Cavalry regiments never had any problems in finding officer replacements and could thus afford to be more exclusive than most other regiments. Even during the years of substantial officer shortages between 1900 and 1914 the cavalry as a branch had a large surplus of lieutenants and officer candidates.

60. Kehr, Eckart, “Klassenkampf und Rüstungspolitik im kaiserlichen Deutschland,” in Der Primat der Innenpolitik, ed. Wehler, Hans-Ulrich (Berlin, 1965), pp. 87–110CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Later extensions of Kehr's argument may be found in Wehler, Hans-Ulrich, Das deutsche Kaiserreich 1871–1918 (Göttingen, 1972), p. 162Google Scholar; and Berghahn, Volker R., Der Tirpitz-Plan: Genesis und Verfall einer innenpolitischen Krisenstrategie unter Wilhelms II (Düsseldorf, 1971), p. 134Google Scholar. But compare the comments by Messerschmidt, Manfred, Militär und Politik in der Bismarckzeit und im wilhelminischen Deutschland (Darmstadt, 1975), pp. 90–91.Google Scholar