¹ United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, done at Vienna, Dec. 19, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the“Convention”), UN Doc. E/Conf.82/15, Dec. 19, 1988.

² The process leading to the Convention's adoption began with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 39/41 in Dec. 1984, which requested the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs to initiate the preparation of a draft convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. This draft is contained in UN Doc. DND/DCIT/WP.i, Apr. 6, 1987. Successive convention drafts include UN Doc. E/CN.7/1988/2 (Part II), Oct 23,1987, UN Doc. DND/DCIT/9, Mar. 3, 1988, and UN Doc. E/CONF.82/3, July 20, 1988.

³ Bassiouni, M. Cherif ed., International Criminal Law: Vol.1 — Crimes 507 (1986).Google Scholar

⁴ Barnett, J. Richard, “Extradition Treaty Improvements,” (1985) 15 Georgia J. Int’l & Comp. L., 290–92 Google Scholar and “Colombia: Accepting Drug Cartels as a Permanent Fixture,” Ottawa Citizen, Jan. 22, 1989, at E4.

⁵ Bin, Rachelle Marie, “Drug Lords and the Colombian Judiciary: A Story of Threats, Bribes and Bullets,” (1986) 5 UCLA Pacific Basin L.J., 178–82.Google Scholar

⁶ “Hour by Hour Crack: The Drug Crisis,” Time, Nov. 28, 1988, at 64–79.

⁷ Ibid., 64–75.

⁸ Bagley, Bruce M., “Colombia and the War on Drugs,” (1968) 67 Foreign Aff., 70–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹ Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 (hereinafter referred as the“Single Convention”), done at New York, Mar. 30, 1961, entered into force for Canada Dec. 13, 1964, [1964] C.T.S. No. 30.

¹⁰ The 1972 Protocol Amending the 1961 Single Convention made several improvements to the control scheme established in the Single Convention, including improvements in the implementing and monitoring mechanisms, extradition provisions, technical assistance, and treatment and preventative measures.

¹¹ The Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the“Psychotropic Convention”), done at New York, Feb. 21, 1971, entered into force for Canada Dec. 9, 1988. The Psychotropic Convention brought psychotropic substances and many of their preparations under the control scheme set down in the Single Convention. For a comparison of the Single Convention and the Psychotropic Convention, see Chatterjee, S. K., A Guide to the International Drug Conventions 19–26 (London: Commonwealth Secretariat Publications, 1988).Google Scholar

¹² For a useful summary of the weaknesses of the Single Convention as amended, which is equally valid for the Psychotropic Convention, see Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 515.

¹³ CND Resolution 1 (S-IX)“Guidance on the Drafting of an International Convention to Combat Drug Trafficking,” Feb. 14, 1986, and UN Doc. DND/DCIT/WP.i, Apr. 6, 1987, at 3–4.

¹⁴ Resolution 1 (S-IX) appears to have assumed that jurisdiction provisions would form part of an extradition article. Instead, they were coalesced into a separate article in the second experts’ meeting in Oct. 1987. See UN Docs. DND/DCIT/WP.i, Apr. 6, 1987, at 51 and DND/DCIT/9, Mar. 3, 1988, at 13.

¹⁵ Other articles in the Convention include : ( 1 ) Definitions ; ( 2 ) Scope of the Convention; (8) Transfer of Proceedings; (9) Other Forms of Cooperation and Training; (10) International Cooperation and Assistance for Transit States; (13) Materials and Equipment; (15) Commercial Carriers; (16) Commercial Documents and Labelling of Exports ; ( 17 ) Illicit Traffic by Sea; (18) Free Trade Zones and Free Ports; (19) The Use of the Mails; (20-25) Implementation clauses; and (26-34) Final clauses.

¹⁶ The Single and Psychotropic Conventions were aimed at limiting the supply of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances to medical and scientific pur-poses and did not focus on law enforcement and legal co-operation per se.

¹⁷ Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, each suggested independently to Mexico that a separate convention might later be elaborated that would focus specifically on the problem of drug abuse.

¹⁸ The definition of illicit traffic became a lightning rod for the debate between consumer and producer states. Mexico sought an expansive definition of illicit trafficking that would include, among other things, the possession and purchase of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. Canada, the United States, and most western European states took the position that while these activities are a serious problem, they fall outside the purview of the Convention.

To further balance a perceived uneven distribution of obligations between consumer and producer states, hortatory provisions on the reduction of illicit demand were added to Art. 14, which had primarily previously addressed the question of measures to eradicate the illicit cultivation of narcotic plants.

The potentially most divisive issue between consumer and producer states arose over Art. 3, entitled“Scope of the Convention.” This article, which is designed to safeguard national sovereignty, stemmed from Mexico’s determination that the Convention not be used by states to interfere in the domestic affairs of other states. The compromise text of Art. 2, which includes wording from Art. 2 of the UN Charter and wording from the United States/Mexico mutual legal assistance treaty, reassured the Mexican and like-minded delegations that the Convention would not be used by one state as an instrument to interfere in the domestic affairs of another.

Recognizing that provisions such as Art. 2 are often politically necessary in a multilateral forum in order to achieve consensus, they are nevertheless of dubious legal value. Such provisions are at best unnecessary, and at worst have the effect of altering existing international law in ways unforeseen at the time of their adoption.

Making the Mexican proposal particularly difficult to accept for many delegations were other of its amendment proposals which raised concerns that Mexico would only become party to the Convention if obligations were weak and non-binding. The amendment proposals that more than any other fuelled this suspicion were those that the Mexican delegation submitted to the fourth experts’ meeting in the summer of 1988. These proposals would have altered several key Convention obligations by replacing the operative word“shall” with the phrase“undertakes to propose … to its competent legislative authorities.” Had amendments of this nature been accepted, they would have, of course, run counter to one of the main purposes of treaty-making, namely to obligate states to actually change their laws and not merely to consider their change.

¹⁹ In response to this plea, the Conference adopted Art. 10, entitled“International Cooperation and Assistance to Transit States.” The essentially hortatory provisions found in this article contemplate financial assistance to transit states for programs of technical co-operation and for the strengthening of the latter’s anti-narcotics infrastructure. With the adoption of Art. 10, transit states, unable to secure commitments of an obligatory nature, were at least reassured that the special problems they faced had been acknowledged in the Convention.

²⁰ Notwithstanding that the economic and political institutions in certain producer and transit states were under threat because of the international traffic in narcotic drugs, many producer and transit state delegations tended to view the developed consumer countries of North America and West Europe as the demandeurs in Convention negotiations. Consequently, in their view, these countries should bear the greater proportion of the financial burden associated with Convention co-operation. On a more practical level, producer and transit countries quite legitimately argued that without assistance from developed countries, they lacked the financial resources to carry out Convention obligations. Developed countries, while sympathetic to the need to assist producer and transit states financially, did not support obligatory financial provisions, preferring instead to use bilateral assistance as an incentive to encourage the co-operation of recalcitrant states.

²¹ Disputes between common and civil law countries most often arose over issues that had a heavy domestic law component. The most obvious non-domestic dispute was based on their differing approaches to extradition. The civil law countries made every effort to ensure that nothing in the Convention would detract from their right to refuse the extradition of their nationals. On the other hand, the common law countries (particularly Canada), which unlike civil law countries do extradite their nationals, were reluctant to abandon their right to insist that a primia facie case be made against the accused before permitting extradition.

²² Indeed, it was obvious that many of the common law/civil law disputes were carryovers from disputes that had taken place in separate bilateral negotia-tions among the same states.

²³ Laws addressing the problem of money laundering are a relatively recent development in most countries. For example, Canada has only recently amended its law to create an offence of laundering property derived from the commission of an offence. See S.C. 1988, ch. 51.

²⁴ Supra note 13.

²⁵ Supra note 9, Art. 36, subpara. i(a).

²⁶ UN Doc. E/CONF.82/3, July ao, 1988, at 13, para. 40 and UN Doc. E/ CONF.82/C.1/SR.24, at 4.

²⁷ UN Doc. E/CONF.82/C.1/SR.24, at 4.

²⁸ Ibid. Notwithstanding this decision, the Drafting Committee decided not to change the term“illicit traffic” when it received from one of the two main committees draft Arts. 17 (Illicit Traffic by Sea), 18 (Free Trade Zones and Free Ports), and 19 (Use of the Mails). With respect to Art. 17, the Committee felt that it would be risky to tamper with the delicately reached compromise wording and, in any case, the danger of one party seeking permission to board and eventually confiscate a vessel on the basis of simple possession was minimal, particularly when the flag state could refuse boarding on such grounds in the first place. As well, the words of para. 3 were altered to clarify that the ship itself had to be engaged in“illicit traffic,” thereby logically excluding any possibility that this term could encompass possession or consumption. In the case of Arts. 18 and 19, the Drafting Committee decided that the use of a broad definition of illicit traffic (including para. 3 offences) would not subvert the intent of the articles.

²⁹ Clauses making obligations subject to constitutional principles or basic concepts of parties’ legal systems are hereinafter referred to as“constitutional safeguard clauses.”

³⁰ Clauses containing a reference to domestic law are hereinafter referred to as “domestic law safeguard clauses,” notwithstanding that they may also contain a reference to other types of laws, concepts, or principles.

³¹ Art. 3, para. 4. There were clear divisions among delegations on the question of appropriate sanctions. Generally, Nordic countries and European civil law countries argued for flexibility to allow the imposition of measures such as treatment, aftercare, and rehabilitation. Other countries such as Mexico ex-pressed concern that this approach would send an unwanted message that demand-oriented offences such as possession, purchase, and consumption were not serious components of the drug trafficking problem. The compromise contained in subparagraphs (b) and (c) that would in the former allow such measures only“in addition” to conviction and punishment and in the latter would allow such measure in the case of“minor offences,” seems, however, to have been nullified in subpara, (d), which permits parties to provide such measures as“an alternative to conviction or punishment.”

³² Art. 3, para. 5. This paragraph suffers from a failure to specify for what purpose courts or other competent authorities should take factual circumstances into account. Presumably it is in respect of sentencing. The omission likely stems from an overriding concern on the part of many delegations that there be no implication that their courts’ freedom of action is to be circumscribed.

³³ Art. 3, para. 6. This paragraph was first proposed by Mexico. Mexico complained that soft treatment, often in the form of“plea bargaining” in consumer countries, undermined international efforts to reduce the demand for illicit drugs. Common law states such as Canada and the United States countered that, apart from being fundamental to their legal systems, prosecutorial discretion provides an inducement for the“little fish” offender who is prepared to co-operate in the ensnarement of the“big fish” trafficker only if promised concessions such as the reduction of his sentence. In the end, a compromise was reached whereby the paragraph was made hortatory.

³⁴ Art. 3, para. 7.

³⁵ Art. 3, para. 8, provides inter alia, that parties shall, where appropriate, provide for a longer statute of limitations period where the offender has“evaded the administration of justice.” Most delegations were able to accept this provision with the inclusion of the words“where appropriate.”

³⁶ UN Doc. E/GN.7/1988/2 (Part II), Oct. 23, 1987, at 20, para. 126.

Not surprisingly, the primary difficulty with the political offence exception is to determine what exactly constitutes a political offence. For a useful summary of the evolution of the concept and its inherent difficulties see Duane K. Thompson,“The Evolution of the Political Offence Exception in an Age of Modern Political Violence,” 9 Yale J. of World Public Order, 315–41.

Bassiouni enumerates the purposes and policies of the political offence exception as follows

• (I)

  (I) political neutrality in foreign internal conflicts ; ( 2 ) the individual and collective right of resistance, including armed resistance under certain conditions and subject to certain rules; (3) the application of internationally recognized norms of human rights with respect to the rendition of a requested person; and (4) an international duty to cooperate in the prevention and suppression of international criminality as a means of preserving world order.

See “The ‘Political Offence Exception’ Revisited: Extradition between the US and the UK — A Choice between Friendly Cooperation among Allies and Sound Law and Policy,” (1986-87) 15 D. J. Int’l L. 266.

³⁷ The anti-terrorism conventions do not attempt to exclude the political offence exception. However, their co-operation provisions primarily relate to extra-dition. See Murphy, John F., “The Future of Multilateralism and Efforts to Combat International Terrorism,” (1986–87) 25 Col. J. Transnat’l L. 64.Google Scholar Several conventions, while not expressly excluding the political offence exception, do limit the political offences exception in the form of the duty to extradite or prosecute. See the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (hereinafter referred to as the“Hague Convention”), done at The Hague, Dec. 16, 1970, entered into force for Canada July 24, 1972, [1972] C.T.S. No. 23, Art. 7; the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (hereinafter referred to as the “Montreal Convention”), done at Montreal, Sept. 23, 1971, entered into force for Canada Jan. 26, 1973, [r973] C.T.S. No. 6, Art. 7; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents (hereinafter referred to as the “New York Convention”), done at New York, Dec. 14, 1973, entered into force for Canada Feb. 20, 1977, [1977] C.T.S. No. 43, Art. 7; and the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (hereinafter referred to as the“Hostage-Taking Convention”), done at New York, Dec. 18, 1979, entered into force for Canada Jan. 3, 1986, British Treaty Series 1983 No. 81, annexed to United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Res. A/34/46 134 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 46) 245, UN Doc. A/34/46 (1979), 34 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 39), Art. 8. See also Kulman, Bradley G., “Eliminating the Political Offence Exception for Violent Crimes: The Proposed United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty,” (1985–86) 26 Virginia J. Int’l L. 762–65.Google Scholar

³⁸ For a useful discussion of various approaches of countries to the political offence exception see Geoffrey Gilbert, D., “Terrorism and the Political Offence Exemption Reappraised,” (1985) 34 Int. & Comp. L.Q. 695–723.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁹ Art. 6, para. 5. Provisions in Arts. 5 (Confiscation), 7 (Mutual Legal Assistance), and 9 (Other Forms of Cooperation and Training) that could similarly be utilized by the requested party to refuse co-operation are contained in paras. 9, 15, and 1, respectively.

⁴⁰ This wording is similar to that contained in the Hostage-Taking Convention, Art. 9.

⁴¹ This article’s use of the short form expression“Convention offences,” while somewhat misleading in that it includes only Art. 3, para. 1 offences and not Art. 3, para. 2 offences, is for ease of reference.

⁴² Mandatory grounds and discretionary grounds in earlier conventions tended not to be as clearly separated as compared to more recent conventions. For example, compare the Hostage-Taking Convention, Art. 5, with the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (hereinafter referred to as the“IMO Convention”), done at Rome, Mar. 10, 1988, Art. 6.

⁴³ IMO Convention, Art. 6, para. 1.

⁴⁴ UN Doc. E/CONF.82/C.1/SR.18, at 7–12.

⁴⁵ Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (hereinafter referred to as the“Tokyo Convention”) done at Tokyo, Sept. 14, 1963, entered into force for Canada Feb. 5, 1970, [1970] C.T.S. No. 5, Art. 4.

⁴⁶ However, it should be noted that the concept of habitual residence was included in the IMO Convention, but specifically with respect to stateless persons.

⁴⁷ Blakesley, Christopher L. ,“Traditional Bases of Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crime and a Hybrid Approach,” in Bassiouni, ed., International Criminal Law: Vol.2 — Procedure, (1986) at 7.Google Scholar Blakesley (p. 5) also provides useful definitions of each of the theoretical bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction. He states:

The “territorial theory” allows for jurisdiction over conduct that takes place within the territorial boundaries of the state. The“nationality theory” bases jurisdiction on the allegiance or nationality of the perpetrator of the offences as prescribed by the state of his allegiance, no matter where the offences take place. The “protective principle” or“injured forum theory” emphasizes the effect or possible effect of the offence and provides for jurisdiction over conduct deemed harmful to specific national interests of the forum state. The“passive personality principle” extends jurisdiction over offences where the victims are nationals of the forum state. The “universal theory” allows jurisdiction in any forum that obtains jurisdiction over the person or the perpetrator of certain offences considered particularly heinous or harmful to mankind generally.

Blakesley also notes a sixth theory that is gaining acceptance. This is the“floating territorial principle” by which the state is recognized as having jurisdiction over offences committed on its vessels. In the Convention, this principle was incorporated as a mandatory ground.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 53.

⁴⁹ Art. 6, para. 9.

⁵⁰ For example, the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention.

⁵¹ For example, see the Hague Convention, Art. 8; Montreal Convention, Art. 8; and Hostage-Taking Convention, Art. 10.

⁵² Art. 6, para. 2.

⁵³ Art. 6, para. 3. Generally, most common law states do not grant extradition in the absence of a treaty. As for Canada, subs. 35(1) of the Extradition Act, R.S.C. (1985), ch. E-23 permits extradition in regard to particular foreign states, irrespective of the existence of a treaty where so declared by proclamation. Given the existence of this provision and Canada’s general policy of selectivity about which states it wishes to establish extradition relations with, the Canadian delegation supported the view that this provision should be optional rather than mandatory.

⁵⁴ Art 6, para. 4.

⁵⁵ Art 6, para. 9. The principle of aut dedere aut judicare is primarily a crime prevention tool that implicitly recognizes that, for criminal sanctions to be effective, there must be a high probability of punishment.

⁵⁶ The rule against double jeopardy or non bis in idem is based on the notion that offenders should not be punished more than once for the same crime. Possible attempts to circumvent this rule by characterizing the transport of drugs through several countries as separate offences in each country are unlikely to be successful given the interpretation of earlier drug conventions. See Extradition for Drug Related Offences 54 (New York: United Nations Publications, 1965).

⁵⁷ Art. 6, paras. 5 and 9.

⁵⁸ At preparatory meetings and at the Conference, western European delegations, in particular, were anxious to follow precedents contained in the 1957 European Convention on Extradition and its 1975 and 1978 Protocols. Indicative of this approach, was the Federal Republic of Germany’s insistence at the fourth experts’ meeting that the jurisdiction article specifically acknowledge the right of parties to refuse to extradite where the offender would, if convicted, be subject to the death penalty in the requesting state (UN Doc. E/CONF.82/3, July 20, 1988 para. 2, clause 2 (iii)), at 55. This provision was deleted finally at the Conference on the basis that it was inappropriate in an article on jurisdiction and moreover was not necessary given the wide domestic law safeguard clause contained in para. 5 of Art. 6. In fairness, western European delegations’ desire to rely on precedents contained in the European conventions also had, on occasion, the effect of adding more innovative provisions to the Convention. For example, their states’ positive experience with regard to the implementation of the 1983 European Convention on the Transfer of Offenders obviously contributed to their advocacy of para. 12 of Art. 6, which provides that states may consider upon mutual agreement the transfer of convicted offenders to other state parties to complete their sentences. Similarly, Art. 8, which obligates parties to give consideration, where appropriate, to transferring proceedings to other parties, was included at the instigation of The Netherlands delegation, which saw merit in co-operative measures such as those set down in the 1972 European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters.

⁵⁹ Civil law countries argued that their refusal to extradite their nationals is counterbalanced by their willingness to assert jurisdiction over their nationals wherever they are present. Moreover, they maintained that Art. 6 aut dedere aut judicare provisions would ensure that the offender would not be immune from prosecution.

⁶⁰ This principle requires that the offence for which extradition is being sought be an offence in both the requesting and requested states.

⁶¹ The rule of speciality restricts the requesting party from prosecuting for any offences other than those for which the request was made.

⁶² Art. 6, para. 5 makes extradition subject to the conditions provided for in the law of the requested party, including the grounds upon which extradition may be refused.

⁶³ See UN Doc. E/CONF.82/3, July 20, 1988 at 58, Art. 4, para. 6. It should be noted, however, that the provision urging states to minimize evidentiary requirements for the granting of extradition requests has been preserved in para. 7. This provision is aimed primarly at the prima facie rule, traditionally employed by common law countries, which requires sufficient evidence such as would justify the alleged offender to be committed for trial if the offence had been committed in the territory of the requested party. While some common law countries are gradually relaxing the prima facie rule, particularly in bi-lateral treaties, most have so far refrained from eliminating it.

⁶⁴ RCMP National Drug Intelligence Estimate 1984/1985, Public Relations Branch, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Ottawa, Canada.

⁶⁵ During the Conference, the terms “confiscation” and“forfeiture” were often used interchangeably. Unless otherwise indicated, the expression “confiscation” will have the same meaning as provided for in the Convention, namely the permanent deprivation of property by order of a court or other competent authority.

⁶⁶ In the case of Canada, see supra note 23.

⁶⁷ See UN Doc. DND/WP, 1983/23, Oct. 31, 1983 in which recommendations concerning the identification, tracing, freezing, seizure, and confiscation of the proceeds of drug crimes figure prominently. See also Res. 2 “Struggle against Illicit Drug Trafficking,” of the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held in Milan, Italy, 1985; supra note 13, CND Resolution 2 (S-IX) ; and Report of the First Interregional Meeting of Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies, Vienna, Austria, Aug. 1986, Recommendation 1, UN Doc. E.CN.7/1987/3, Aug. 18, 1986, at 4.

⁶⁸ Supra note 13, UN Doc. DND/DCIT/WP.i, at 38–39, Art. 3.

⁶⁹ The Mexican delegation did query whether or not a party would fail to meet its obligations if one of its judges were to refuse to issue a particular order lifting bank secrecy. In response, it was pointed out by a number of delegates that although the refusal to make financial records available could not be based on the ground of bank secrecy, there might exist other grounds to do so, such as the insufficiency of evidence. It remains to be seen whether this interpretation portends the utilization of inventive ways to refuse access to financial records. UN Doc. E/CONF.82/G.1/SR.6, at 6–8.

⁷⁰ The original text as presented to the first meeting of experts contained a domestic law safeguard clause. See supra note 13, UN Doc. DND/DCIT/ WP.ι, at 38; Art. 3, para. 3.

⁷¹ UN Doc. E/CONF.82/G.1/SR.7 at 5.

⁷² Common law states such as Canada, the United States, and Australia pushed for such a provision.

⁷³ Supra note 37, Hague Convention, Art. 8, Montreal Convention, Art. 8, New York Convention, Art. 8, and Hostage-Taking Convention, Art. 10.

⁷⁴ For example, see E/CN.7/1988/2 (Part II), at 17–18, para. 104.

⁷⁵ After one delegate’s repeated use of the hypothetical case of the elderly woman who unwittingly uses tainted money to plant her turnips, the problem of the bona fide third party became affectionately known as the“turnips problem.”

⁷⁶ Supra note 26, UN Doc. E/CONF.82/3, at 49; Art. 1.

⁷⁷ UN Doc. E/CONF.82/3, Annex IV, at 107–8.

⁷⁸ For example, Hague Convention, Art. 10, para. 1, Hostage Taking Convention, Art. 11, para. 1, and New York Convention, Art. 10, para. 1. These conventions stipulate that “parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings.…”

⁷⁹ Treaty between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, done at Quebec City, Mar. 18, 1985, Art. 2, para. 2.

⁸⁰ In the experts’ meetings there was considerable debate on whether such cooperation should be referred to as “mutual assistance,” “mutual legal as-sistance,” or“mutual judicial assistance.” The positions taken by various delegations were usually directly related to whether law enforcement officers (common law system) or judicial officers (civil law system) performed such functions in their countries.

⁸¹ On July 7, 1988, Canada passed Bill C-58 to provide for the implementation of treaties of mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. To preserve Can-ada’s general policy of limiting the rendering of mutual assistance to states with which it has a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty, while at the same time allowing for co-operation pursuant to multilateral treaties in subject areas of considerable importance to Canada (e.g., drug trafficking), the legislation defines “treaty” as a “convention or other international agreement that is in force and to which Canada is a party, the primary purpose or an important part of which is to provide for mutual legal assistance in criminal matters.” See S.C. 1988, ch. 37. This legislation came into force in Oct. 1988.

⁸² For example, at the third experts’ meeting the Italian delegation indicated that it was constitutionally locked into procedures it had put in place for its bilateral treaties and therefore needed the option of utilizing existing procedural arrangements.

⁸³ Art. H, definition (g).

⁸⁴ Supra note 36, at 24, para. 156. More specifically, these delegations indicated that their law enforcement officials, once aware of an illegal shipment, were under a legal obligation to intercept it, arrest the offenders, and take appropriate legal action. They could not permit the shipment to continue with a view to ascertaining other persons involved in the illegal activity.

⁸⁵ UN Doc. E/CONF.82/C.2/L.12, Dec. 1, 1988.

⁸⁶ UN Doc. E/CONF.82/C.2/L.I9, Dec. 5, 1988.

⁸⁷ UN Doc. E/CONF.82/C.2/L.38/Rev.i, L.39/Rev.i, L.4o/Rev.i and L.41/ Rev. ι, Dec. 15, 1988.

⁸⁸ Supra note 36, UN Doc. E/CONF.83/3, at 114.

⁸⁹ UN Doc. E/CONF.82/C.2/L.42, Dec. 13, 1988.

⁹⁰ Art. 21.

⁹¹ Art. 22, subpara. (i)(a).

⁹² Art. 21, subpara. (i)(b).

⁹³ Art. 22, para. 2.

⁹⁴ Supra note 9, Art. 14, para. 3 and supra note 11, Art. 19, para. 3.

⁹⁵ This is particularly so in the bilateral arms control field. However, this phenomenon is extending to the multilateral field, as well. For example, the chemical weapons convention currently being negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament is likely to have comprehensive and intrusive monitoring and verification provisions.

⁹⁶ A body commonly criticized for losing much of its effectiveness due to politicization is the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.

⁹⁷ Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done at Vienna, May 23, 1969, entered into force for Canada Jan. 27, 1980, [1980] C.T.S. No. 36, Arts. 19–23.

⁹⁸ The traditional argument in support of generous reservation provisions is that universality should be an overriding objective when elaborating multilateral treaties.

⁹⁹ For a useful comparison of penal measures imposed by states for drug-related offences and an examination of trends in this regard, see Dusan Cotic, Drugs and Punishment: An Up-to-Date Interregional Survey of Drug-Related Offences, United Nations Social Defence Research Institute, Publication No. 30 (Rome, 1988).