¹ In Airbus Industrie GIE v. Patel, [1998] 2 W.L.R. 686, [1988] 2 All E.R. 257 (HL), at para. 12 [hereinafter Airbus], Lord Goff described the common law world as “a jungle of separate, broadly based, jurisdictions” in which “potential excesses ... are generally curtailed by the adoption of the principle of forum non conveniens ... [which] cannot, and does not aim to, avoid all clashes ofjurisdiction.”

² It should be clarified at the outset that the situations of “parallel proceedings” considered in this article are not those in which a plaintiff commences claims against a defendant in the same matter in more than one forum or those in which more than one claimant seeks the same relief in a matter from one or more defendants (on which, see, for example, Sherman, E “Antisuit Injunction and Notice of Intervention and Preclusion: Compementary Devices to Prevent Duplicative Litigation” (1995) Brigham Young U. L. Rev. 925).Google Scholar Furthermore, the question of what constitutes the same matter so as to establish the existence of parallel proceedings is also not addressed.

³ Section 138 of the Courts ofJustice Act, RSO 1990, c.34.

⁴ Westec Aerospace Inc. v. Raytheon Aircraft Co. (1999), 84 A.C.W.S. (3d) 479, leave to appeal granted, 86 A.C.W.S. (3d) 697, reversed (1999), 173 D.L.R. (4th) 498 (CA), appeal dismissed without reasons, 2001, S.C.C. 26 [hereinafter Westec].

⁵ On the emergence of these issues in Canada, see Glenn, H. P., “The Supreme Court, Judicial Comity and Anti-suit Injunctions” (1994) 28 U. British Columbia L. Rev. 193.Google Scholar

⁶ That is, a forum to which the defendant either implicitly consented, as when the action was a counterclaim to an action begun by the defendant in that forum, or explicitly consented, as when the defendant had entered into an agreement to resolve disputes in that forum.

⁷ Article IV. 1 of the United States constitution provides in part that “[f]ull faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State.” US Constitution, Art. IV, para. 1 . A similar requirement to give full faith and credit is found in section 118 of the Commonwealth of Australian Constitution Act (Imp.), 1900, 63 and 64 Vict., c. 2, which provides, “[f]ull faith and credit shall be given, throughout the Commonwealth, to the laws, the public Acts and records, and the judicial proceedings of every State.”

⁸ It must be acknowledged that these rules have also been applied to foreign judgments in many American states under the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A. 263 (1962).

⁹ Article 220 of the 1957 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community states, in part, that “Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations with each other with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals ... the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals and of arbitration awards.” Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 1973, Gr. Brit. T. S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179 — II), art. 220.

¹⁰ Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Official Journal of the European Communities, O.J.N.L. 304, October 30, 1978 and Cmnd. 7395 [hereinafter Brussels Convention], modified in 1995 to incorporate a reference to the 1988 Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (1989), 28 I.L.M. 620 [hereinafter Lugano Convention], which is now EC Regulation No. 44/2001 of December 22, 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Official Journal L 12, 16/01/2001 p. 1 [hereinafter EC Regulation No. 44/2001 ].

¹¹ Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 [hereinafter Morguard].

¹² International Law Association [hereinafter ILA], Committee on International Civil and Commercial Litigation, Third Interim Report: Declining and Referring Jurisdiction in International Litigation, which includes the Leuven-London Principles and which is available online at <http://wvww.ila-hq.org>.

¹³ Which was prepared as part of the negotiations under the auspices of the Hague Conference for a Multilateral Judgments Convention, entitled Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, adopted by the Special Commission, October 30, 1999, available online at <www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html>.

¹⁴ Westec, supra note 4.

¹⁵ Although the precedent on which the British Columbia Court of Appeal relied — which was laid down in 472900 BC Ltd. v. Thrifty Canada (1998), 168 D.L.R. (4th) 602 (BCCA) [hereinafter Thrifty] — involved inter-provincial parallel litigation.

¹⁶ See generally, Teitz, L., “Parallel Proceedings and the Guiding Hand of Comity” (2000) 34 Int’l Lawyer 545.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Early on in the history of the law ofjurisdiction in the United States, the United States Supreme Court determined that full faith and credit could be a source of unfairness to defendants if there were not some restrictions placed on the choice of forum available to plaintiffs: Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). In time, these restrictions came to be associated with the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the US Constitution, which prohibited the deprivation of property without due process of law. Eventually, the due process requirements gave rise to the minimum contacts doctrine by which courts were constitutionally required to confine their exercise of jurisdiction in in personam claims to matters with “sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just according to our traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice to permit the state” to assume jurisdiction over the defendant. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 66 S. Ct. 154 (1945).

¹⁸ Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 730-31 ( 1996) [emphasis added].

¹⁹ Posner v. Essex Ins Co., 178 F 3d 1209, 1223 (11th Cir 1999); Goldhammer v. Dunkin’ Donuts, 59 F Supp 2d 248, 252 (D. Mass. 1999); Evergreen Marine Corp. v. WelgrowInt’ lInc., 954 F Supp 101, 104 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); EFCO Corp. v. Aluma Sys USA Inc., 983 F Supp 816, 824 (S.D. Iowa 1997); Abdullah Sayid Rajab Al-Rifai & Sons v. McDonnell Douglas Foreign Sales Corp, 988 F Supp 1285, 1291 (ED Mo. 1997).

²⁰ See American Cyanimid Co. v. Picaso-Anstalt, 741 F Supp 1150, 1154 (D. NJ 1990).

²¹ Ibid.

²² See, for example, Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F 2d 909, 926-27 (DC Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Laker]. This is the standard not only in the DC Circuit, as indicated in the Laker decision, but also in the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits as indicated in China Trade and Dev. Corp. v. Ssangyong Shipping Co., 837 F 2d 33, 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1987) [hereinafter China Trade]; Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinea v. Ins. Co. of N. America, 651 F 2d 877 (3d Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1105 (1982); and Gau Shan, Ltd. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F 2d 1349 (6^th Cir. 1992).

²³ China Trade, supra note 22.

²⁴ See, for example, Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F 3d 624 (5^th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Kaepa]. This case is the standard not only in the Fifth Circuit as indicated by the Kaepa decision but also in the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, as indicated in the Allendale Mutual case, infra note 25, and in the decisions in Cargill, Inc. v. Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co., 531 F Supp 710 (D. Minn. 1982) [hereinafter Cargill] and Seattle Totems Hockey Club v. The National Hockey League, 652 F 2d 852 (9^th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 457 US 1105 (1982) [hereinafter Seattle Totems].

²⁵ Kaepa, supra note 24. See also Allendale Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., 10 F 3d 425, 431 (7^th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Allendale Mutual], which indicates that the difference between the two standards was the desire to have evidence of an impairment to comity arising from an anti-suit injunction before refusing an injunction on that basis.

²⁶ See Seattle Totems, supra note 24; and Cargill, supra note 24.

²⁷ An interesting analogue to this exists in the “public interest factors,” which have been endorsed by the US Supreme Court as being relevant in deciding whether to grant a stay based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947). These factors included the need to manage court congestion, to prevent undue burden on the public for jury duty, to facilitate the local interest in having localized controversies decided at home, and to resolve a matter in a forum that will be in a position to apply its own law. The Canadian jurisprudence on the granting of stays based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens suggests that public interest factors such as this are unlikely to be considered, let alone to outweigh factors that relate primarily to the relative convenience to the parties and the relative logistical and administrative efficiency of resolving the matter in the alternative fora.

²⁸ See Morguard, supra note 11 . See also United States of America v. Ivey, (1996) 26 O.R. (3d) 533 (Gen. Div.), aff’d. (1996) 30 O.R. (3d) (CA), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused S.C.C. Bulletin, 1997, p. 1043. in which the court observed that the principle of comity should inform the development of the law in the area of the foreign public law exception to the enforcement ofjudgments and that “[i]n an area of law dealing with such obvious and significant transborder issues, it is particularly appropriate for the forum court to give full faith and credit to the laws and judgments of neighbouring states.” This is a view of comity that emphasizes active support and cooperation more than restraint and deference.

²⁹ EC Regulation No. 44/2001, supra note 10.

³⁰ Special accommodations are made for situations in which a forum other than the forum first seised has exclusive jurisdiction. The provisions for parallel litigation found in Articles 21-23 of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, supra note 10, are now found in Articles 27-30 of the EC Regulation No. 44/2001, supra note 10:

Section 9 — Lis pendens — Related actions

Article 27

• 1.

  1. Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same parties are brought in the courts of different Member States, any court other than the court first seised shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established.

• 2.

  2. Where the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established, any court other than the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court.

Article 28

• 1.

  1. Where related actions are pending in the courts of different Member States, any court other than the court first seised may stay its proceedings.

• 2.

  2. Where these actions are pending at first instance, any court other than the court first seised may also, on the application of one of the parties, decline jurisdiction if the court first seised has jurisdiction over the actions in question and its law permits the consolidation thereof.

• 3.

  3. For the purposes of this Article, actions are deemed to be related where they are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings.

Article 29

Where actions come within the exclusive jurisdiction of several courts, any court other than the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court.

Article 30

For the purposes of this Section, a court shall be deemed to be seised:

• 1.

  1. at the time when the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document is lodged with the court, provided that the plaintiff has not sub-sequently failed to take the steps he was required to take to have service effected on the defendant, or

• 2.

  2. if the document has to be served before being lodged with the court, at the time when it is received by the authority responsible for service, provided that the plaintiff has not subsequently failed to take the steps he was required to take to have the document lodged with the court.

³¹ See, for example, Canadian National Railway Co. v. Sydney Steel Corp. (1998), 167 N.S.R. (2d) 28 (S.C.), aff’d (1998), 164 D.L.R. (4th) 747 (NS CA) [hereinafter Canadian National Railway]; and Thrifty, supra note 15.

³² Airbus, supra note 1.

³³ The ILA is an international non-governmental organization established for the “study, elucidation and advancement of international law, public and private, the study of comparative law, the making of proposals for the solution of conflicts of law and for the unification of law, and the furthering of international understanding and goodwill.” Its work is carried on primarily through international committees that present reports at biennial conferences for discussion and endorsement. This report was presented at the sixty-ninth bienniel conference in London in July 2000. Information about the ILA is available online at <http://www.ila-hq.org>.

³⁴ Pursuant to Article 4.1, “[w]here proceedings involving the same parties and the same subject-matter are brought in the courts of more than one state, any court other than the court first seised shall suspend its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established, and not declined under this Principle, and thereafter it shall terminate its proceedings. The court first seised shall apply Principle 4.3 [appropriate forum analysis]. Should that court refer the matter to a court subsequently seised in accordance with Principle 4.3, the latter court will not be obliged to terminate its proceedings.” The commentary explained that “the Committee gave anxious consideration to whether it ought to preserve a formal lis pendens rule, or whether it should simply include the existence of parallel litigation as one of factors to be considered by the court as a ground for referral ofjurisdiction. In the end, it concluded that the special complexities of parallel litigation, which carry with it the problems of conflicts between courts, justify a separate rule. But the Committee desired to avoid some of the rigidity, and the potential for forum shopping, which could be the result of the strict operation of a ‘first past the post’ rule ... But it departs in the result radically from the automatic priority on the merits vouchsafed to the court first seised under the Brussels Convention . . . [because what] it does is to give priority to the court first seised in the determination of the appropriate court for the determination of the merits of the matter. In this way, the Committee considered that the potential for the abuse of a lis pendens system by a race to the courthouse could be curbed, whilst a specific regime for the determination of priorities between competing actions was still preserved.” ILA, supra note 12.

³⁵ Article 21 — Lis pendens

• 1.

  1. When the same parties are engaged in proceedings in courts of different Contracting States and when such proceedings are based on the same causes of action, irrespective of the relief sought, the court second seised shall suspend the proceedings if the court first seised has jurisdiction and is expected to render a judgment capable of being recognised under the Convention in the State of the court second seised, unless the latter has exclusive jurisdiction under Article 4 or 12.

• 2.

  2. The court second seised shall decline jurisdiction as soon as it is presented with a judgment rendered by the court first seised that complies with the requirements for recognition or enforcement under the Convention.

• 3.

  3. Upon application of a party, the court second seised may proceed with the case if the plaintiff in the court first seised has failed to take the necessary steps to bring the proceedings to a decision on the merits or if that court has not rendered such a decision within a reasonable time.

• 4.

  4. The provisions of the preceding paragraphs apply to the court second seised even in a case where the jurisdiction of that court is based on the national law of that State in accordance with Article 17.

• 5.

  5. For the purpose of this Article, a court shall be deemed to be seised:

• a)

  a) when the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document is lodged with the court, or

• b)

  b) if such document has to be served before being lodged with the court, when it is received by the authority responsible for service or served on the defendant [as appropriate, universal time is applicable].

• 6.

  6. If in the action before the court first seised the plaintiff seeks a determination that it has no obligation to the defendant, and if an action seeking substantive relief is brought in the court second seised:

• a)

  a) the provisions of paragraphs 1 to 5 above shall not apply to the court second seised, and

• b)

  b) the court first seised shall suspend the proceedings at the request of a party if the court second seised is expected to render a decision capable of being recognised under the Convention.

• 7.

  7. This Article shall not apply if the court first seised, on application by a party, determines that the court second seised is clearly more appropriate to resolve the dispute, under the conditions specified in Article 22.

See Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, supra note 13, which has since been revised to accommodate other developments in the negotiations.

³⁶ See ILA, supra note 12.

³⁷ Article 3135 of Book 10 of the Québec Civil Code, which deals with the International Jurisdiction of Québec Authorities, provides that “[e]ven though a Québec authority has jurisdiction to hear a dispute, it may exceptionally and on an application by a party, decline jurisdiction if it considers that the authorities of another country are in a better position to decide.”

³⁸ Courts in Ontario and in Nova Scotia on at least two occasions have not been willing to grant stays solely on the basis that Québec courts have refused to grant stays in parallel proceedings. See Guarantee, infra note 63; and Canadian National Railway, supra note 31. However, it should be noted that the Québec proceedings in Guarantee, were subsequently stayed by the Québec Court of Appeal and the dispute in Canadian National Railway was ultimately settled by the parties. See C. Richter, “Living with Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation,” in CBAO Conference Proceedings, see first unnumbered note.

³⁹ See British Airways Board v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1985] A.C. 53 and Laker, supra note 22.

⁴⁰ See Collins, L., ed, Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws, 13th ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2000) at 400;Google Scholar The Abidin Daver, [1984] A.C. 398 at 411-12; and North, P. and Fawcett, J. J. eds, Cheshire and North’s Private International Law, 13th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1999) at 347–50.Google Scholar Although, there seems to be some recognition that in matters such as those involving divorce decrees the potential for inconsistent results presents a greater concern. de Dampierre v. de Dampierre, [1988] A.C. 92 (HL) and Henry v. Henry (1995), 185 C.L.R. 571 (Aus. HC).

⁴¹ South Carolina Insurance Co. v. Assurantie Maatschappij “De Zeven Provincien,” [1987] A.C. 24, 40-41. And see CSR v. Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd. (1997), 189 C.L.R. 345 (HC).

⁴² See Cleveland Museum of Art v. Capricorn Art International SA, [1990] Lloyd’s Rep. 166.

⁴³ See Akai Pty Ltd v. People’s Insurance Co. Ltd, [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 90.

⁴⁴ See in EIDu Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Agnew and Kerr, [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 585 (Eng. CA).

⁴⁵ Turner v. Grovit, [2000] 1 Q.B. 345 (CA) [hereinafter Turner].

⁴⁶ See discussion under the heading “The American Divide: The Comity and Vexa-tiousness Standards” earlier in this article.

⁴⁷ Turner, supra note 45 at paras. 29 and 43.

⁴⁸ As was the case in Thrifty, supra note 15. However, see Canadian National Railway, supra note 31 .

⁴⁹ See Hunt v. T & N plc, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289 [hereinafter Hunt], in which the British Columbia courts hesitated to pronounce on the constitutionality of a Québec blocking statute that impeded litigation before them. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the court found that the British Columbia courts had jurisdiction to make such a determination and that the statute was constitutionally inapplicable to litigation in Canadian courts.

⁵⁰ It is arguable that the act of certifying a multi-province plaintiff case in a class action — an act that has gained the approval of a number of courts — has virtually the same preclusive effect (subject of course to the plaintiff class members’ entitlement to exclude themselves from the class). See Harrington v. Dow Corning (1997), 29 B.C.L.R. (3d) 88, aff’d (2000), 193 D.L.R. (4th) 67 (BCCA) leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, S.C.C. Bulletin 2001 at 1540; Wilson v. Servier Canada Ltd (2000), 50 O.R. (4th) 219, leave to appeal to Div. Court, refused 52 O.R. (4^th) 20, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, S.C.C. Bulletin 2001 at 1539.

⁵¹ See The Volvox Hollandia, [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 361 at 371 (CA).

⁵² On negative declarations, see MessierDowty v. Sabena, [2000] 1 Lloyd’s L.R. 428 (CA). See also Collins, L., Essays in International Litigation and the Conflict of Laws (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).Google Scholar

⁵³ Or one seeking a declaration that a judgment in a particular proceeding would not be enforceable.

⁵⁴ Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987, (Cth). The cross-vesting initiative was all the more effective for having been undertaken by the solicitors-general of the Australian states led by the Solicitor-General of Australia, Dr. Gavan Griffith, Q.C., because, as the senior counsel for the governments in Australia, they had the procedural expertise and experience necessary to craft a scheme that would work well within the Australian judicial system.

⁵⁵ Unfortunately, the seamless efficiency of the operation of the cross-vesting scheme was impaired by a 1999 High Court determination in Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999), 163 A.L.R. 270 that the state courts were constitutionally incapable of vesting their jurisdiction in the Federal Court. Still, the vesting of jurisdiction between state courts, which is the feature of the model of primary relevance for the Canadian federation, remains intact.

⁵⁶ The operative provision in the cross-vesting legislation reads as follows:

• 5 (1)

  5 (1) Where-

• (a)

  (a) proceeding (in this sub-section referred to as the “relevant proceeding”) is pending in the Supreme Court of a State or Territory (in this sub-section referred to as the “first court”); and

• (b)

  (b) it appears to the first court that-

• i)

  i) the relevant proceeding arises out of, or is related to, another proceeding pending in . . . [another Australian court] and it is more appropriate that the relevant proceeding be determined by . . . [the other Australian court];

• ii)

  ii) having regard to-

• (c)

  (c) the interests ofjustice-

• it is more appropriate that the relevant proceeding be determined by . . . [the other Australian court], as the case may be; or

• iii)

  iii) it is otherwise in the interests ofjustice that the relevant proceeding be determined by ... [the other Australian court],-

• the first court shall transfer the relevant proceeding to . . . [the other Australian court], as the case may be.

• See Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act, supra note 54.

⁵⁷ See Mason, A. and Crawford, J., “The Cross-Vesting Scheme” (1988) 62 Admin. L.J. 328;Google Scholar Griffith, G., Rose, D., and Gageler, S., “Further Aspects of the Cross-Vesting Scheme” (1988) 62 Admin. L.J. 1016.Google Scholar While there was no appeal, it would seem that an error could be corrected by sending the matter back from whence it came, which could occur either on motion of a party or on the receiving court’s own motion.

⁵⁸ Bankinvest AG v. Seabrook (1988), 14 N.S.W.L.R. 711 at 714.

⁵⁹ 28 U.S.C.A. para. 1404.

⁶⁰ Uniform Law Conference of Canada, “Uniform Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act” in Proceedings (ULCC, 1994), which can be found online at <http://www.ulcc.ca>.

⁶¹ Principle 5 provides

• 5.1

  5.1 On the hearing of an application under Principle 4 . 3 [for forum non conveniens-like relief], and subject to any terms of referral under Principle 5.3, the applicant shall satisfy the originating court that the alternative court:

• (a)

  (a) has and will exercise jurisdiction over the matter; and

• (b)

  (b) is likely to render its judgment on the merits within a reasonable time.

• 5.2

  5.2 The originating court may communicate directly with the alternative court on any application for referral in order to obtain information relevant to its determination under Principle 4, where such communication is permitted by the respective states. States are encouraged to permit their courts to make, and respond to, such communications. Any such communication shall be either on the application of one of the parties or on its own motion. Where the court acts on its own motion it shall give reasonable notice to the parties of its intention to do so, and hear the parties on the information to be sought. The originating court shall either communicate in writing or otherwise on the record. It shall communicate in a language acceptable to the alternative court.

• 5.3

  5.3 The parties and the originating court are encouraged to consider appropriate terms of referral. These may deal in particular with:

• (a)

  (a) the applicant’s submission to the jurisdiction of the alternative court;

• (b)

  (b) the terms on which the applicant may assert a defence of limitation or prescription of action in the alternative court.

• 5.4

  5.4 Save where the international convention provides otherwise, the originating court, if satisfied of the matters in paragraph 5.1 , shall on an order to decline jurisdiction either suspend further proceedings at least until the jurisdiction of the alternative court has been established, or, where national law provides, terminate its proceedings.

ILA, supra note 12.

⁶² Guarantee Co. of North America v. Gordon Capital Corp. (1994), 18 O.R. (3d) 9 (Gen. Div.), leave to appeal to Div. Ct refused, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [1994] S.C.C.A. No. 304 [hereinafter Guarantee].

⁶³ Gordon Capital Corp. c. Garantie, Cie d’assurance de l’Amérique du Nord, C.S.M. 500-05-009714-930, [1995] R.D.J. 537 (C.A.).

⁶⁴ Article 3137 provides: “On the application of a party, a Québec authority may stay its ruling on an action brought before it if another action between the same parties, based on the same facts and having the same object is pending before a foreign authority, provided that the latter action can result in a decision which may be recognized in Québec, or if such a decision has already been rendered by a foreign authority.”

⁶⁵ Hudon v. Geos Language Corporation (1997), 34 O.R. (3d) 14 (Div. Ct) [hereinafter Hudon].

⁶⁶ Turner, supra note 45.

⁶⁷ Canadian National Railway, supra note 31 at para. 22.

⁶⁸ Sydney Steel Corp. c. Canadian National Railway (Sept 8, 1997) 500-05-026912-962 (C.S.), appeal dismissed (March 13, 1998) 500-09-005566-971 (C.A.).

⁶⁹ Thrifty, supra note 15.

⁷⁰ Which was set in Avenue Properties Ltd v. First City Development Corp. (1986), 32 D.L.R. (4th) 40 (BC CA).

⁷¹ See the discussion under the heading “The ILA and The Hague Conference Proposals: Combining the ‘First-Seised’ Rule and Forum Non Conveniens” earlier in this article.

⁷² Westec, supra note 4.

⁷³ Ibid. at 507.

⁷⁴ See the description of the appeal process in this case in the text surrounding note 3.

⁷⁵ See Morguard, supra note 11.

⁷⁶ Amchem Products Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers’Compensation Board), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897.

⁷⁷ Ibid. at 914.

⁷⁸ See, generally, Hunt, supra note 49.

⁷⁹ Which would raise issues of access to justice that were simply the obverse of those canvassed in Oakley v. Barry (1998), 158 D.L.R. (4th) 679 (N.S.C.A.).

⁸⁰ See the discussion under the heading “Transfers of Proceedings under Australian Cross-Vesting Legislation” earlier in this article.

⁸¹ As seemed evident in Westec, supra note 4.

⁸² In Hudon, supra note 67.