Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-qxdb6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-26T22:01:50.000Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Decision of the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Canada)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 March 2016

Colleen Swords  and
Alan Willis
Colleen Swords
Affiliation:
Government of Canada
Alan Willis
Affiliation:
Government of Canada
Get access

Summary

In the spring of 1999, the NATO allies conducted a bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for several weeks. The campaign was a response to the failure of negotiations at Rambouillet, France, relating to a situation in Kosovo that United Nations agencies had characterized as a “humanitarian crisis.” In late April, only a few days after filing an Optional Clause declaration under the Statute of the International Court of Justice accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the court subject to reservations, Yugoslavia initiated proceedings in the court against ten NATO allies, including Canada. The application was accompanied by a request for the indication of “provisional measures” pursuant to the statute, enjoining the NATO allies from continuing the use of force against Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia relied upon its new declaration and upon the compromissary clause of the Genocide Convention as grounds of jurisdiction. In June 1999, the court refused the request for provisional measures on the ground that it lacked prima facie jurisdiction. Canada and other remaining respondents filed preliminary objections on jurisdiction and admissibility. The objections on jurisdiction were based on the grounds that had been advanced at the provisional measures stage and largely endorsed by the court: first, that Yugoslavia was not then a member of the United Nations and was therefore not entitled to make an Optional Clause declaration; second, that the declaration was limited to future disputes; and, third, that the subject matter of the dispute was not covered by the Genocide Convention, which could therefore not be invoked to establish jurisdiction.

Following oral hearings in April 2004, the court ruled in a judgment of 15 December 2004 that it lacked jurisdiction. The ruling was based exclusively on the fact that Yugoslavia lacked United Nations membership and standing in the court in 1999. The judgment concludes that the exception in Article 35(2) of the statute relating to “treaties in force” does not entitle a non-member of the United Nations to appear before the court in a matter related to the Genocide Convention, which the Court interprets as applying only to treaties in existence before 1945. This reasoning came as a surprise, since the court had assiduously avoided the issue of UN membership both in its provisional measures ruling and in its decisions in closely related proceedings taken by Bosnia and Croatia against Yugoslavia pursuant to the Genocide Convention. It remains to be seen how the judgment will be reconciled with rulings already made on jurisdiction in the proceedings taken by Bosnia, where jurisdiction has already been confirmed and where hearings on the merits are scheduled for 2006.

Sommaire

Sommaire

Au printemps de 1999, les alliés de l’OTAN ont mené une campagne de bombardements de plusieurs semaines contre la République fédérale de Yougoslavie. Cette campagne a été lancée à la suite de l’échec des négociations de Rambouillet, France, concernant la situation au Kosovo, que les agences des Nations Unies qualifiaient de “crise humanitaire.” A la fin d’avril, quelques jours seulement avant le dépôt de sa déclaration en vertu de la clause facultative du Statut de la Cour internationale de justice pour accepter la compétence obligatoire de la Cour, sous certaines réserves, la Yougoslavie a introduit une procédure devant la Cour contre dix alliés de l’OTAN, y compris le Canada. Elle a joint à sa requête une demande en indication de “mesures conservatoires” en vertu du Statut pour enjoindre aux alliés de l’OTAN de cesser leur emploi de la force contre la Yougoslavie. Celle-ci y invoquait sa nouvelle déclaration et la clause compromissoire de la Convention sur le génocide comme fondement de la compétence de la Cour. En juin 1999, la Cour a rejeté la demande de mesures conservatoires au motif qu ’elle n’avait pas la compétence prima facie. Le Canada et les autres défendeurs ont déposé des exceptions préliminaires relativement à la compétence de la Cour et à la recevabilité de l’affaire. Les exceptions relatives à la compétence de la Cour sont fondées sur Us motifs présentés à l’étape de la demande en mesures conservatoires, auxquels la Cour avait souscrit dans une large mesure: premièrement, que la Yougoslavie n’était pas alors membre des Nations Unies et qu’elle n’avait donc pas le droit de faire une déclaration en vertu de la clause facultative; deuxièmement, que la déclaration était valide pour les différends à venir; et troisièmement, que la question faisant l’objet de différend n’était pas couverte par la Convention sur le génocide et qu ’elle ne pouvait donc pas être invoquée pour établir la compétence de la Cour. A la suite des audiences tenues en avril 2004, la Cour a statué le 15 décembre 2004 qu’elle n’avait pas compétence dans le dossier. L’ordonnance est fondée exclusivement sur le fait que la Yougoslavie n’était pas membre des Nations Unies et n’avait pas le pouvoir d’agir devant la Cour en 1999, La Cour conclut que l’exception à l’article 35(2) du Statut de la Cour relativement aux “traités en vigueur” n’autorise pas un non membre des Nations Unies à comparaître devant la Cour dans une affaire soulevant la Convention sur le génocide. Selon l’interprétation de la Cour, cette exception ne s’applique qu’aux traités en vigueur avant 1945. Ce raisonnement est surprenant, étant donné que la Cour s’est toujours efforcée d’éviter la question du statut de membre des Nations Unies, tant en ordonnant des mesures conservatoires qu’en rendant sa décision dans une procédure très similaire prise par la Bosnie et la Croatie contre la Yougoslavie en vertu de la Convention sur le génocide. Il reste à voir comment la Cour réconciliera cet arrêt avec sa jurisprudence antérieure concernant sa compétence dans la procédure prise par la Bosnie. Dans cette affaire, la Cour a déjà confirmé sa compétence, et les audiences sur le fond sont prévues en 2006.

Type
Notes and Comments / Notes et commentaries
Information
Canadian Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire canadien de droit international , Volume 42 , 2005 , pp. 353 - 383
Copyright
Copyright © The Canadian Council on International Law / Conseil Canadien de Droit International, representing the Board of Editors, Canadian Yearbook of International Law / Comité de Rédaction, Annuaire Canadien de Droit International 2005

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Canada), 15 December 2004, available at <www.icj-cig.org> [Legality of Use of Force].

2 On 5 February 2003, the applicant notified the court that the state of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) had changed its name to Serbia and Montenegro. In this article, the applicant is referred to as the FRY before February 2003 and Serbia and Montenegro thereafter.

3 UN Security Council Resolutions 1160 (UN Doc. S/RES/1 160 (1998) 31 March 1998), 1199 (UN Doc. S/RES/1199 (1998) 23 September 1998), and 1203 (UN Doc. S/RES/1203 (1998) 24 October 1998).

4 See the Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, Rambouillet, France, 23 February 1999 available at <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_990301_rambouillet.html>.

5 France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, and European Community presidency.

6 Statute of the International Court ofjustice, annexed to the Charter of the United Nations and forming an integral part of the Charter pursuant to Article 92 thereof [ICJ Statute],

7 Yugoslavia’s purported declaration recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the court pursuant to Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute is set out in full at para. 22 of the Order of the Court of 2 June 1999 on provisional measures (infra note 17) and reads as follows:

I hereby declare that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia recognizes, in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Internationa] Court of Justice, as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, that is on condition of reciprocity, the jurisdiction of the said Court in all disputes arising or which may arise after the signature of the present Declaration, with regard to the situations or facts subsequent to this signature, except in cases where the parties have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to another procedure or to another method of pacific settlement. The present Declaration does not apply to disputes relating to questions which, under international law, fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as to territorial disputes.

8 Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, and the United States.

9 Pursuant to Article 73 of the Rules of Court of the ICJ, made pursuant to Ardele 30 of the ICJ Statute and available at <www.icj-cij.org>.

10 Legality of Use of Force, supra note 1, Application of the FRY, 25 April 1999.

11 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, GA Resolution 260(A) (III), UN GAOR, 3rd Sess., Supp. No. 1921,9 December 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 227 [Genocide Convention].

12 ICJ Statute, supra note 6 at Article 36(2), known as the Optional Clause, which allows states, on a purely voluntary basis, to file declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the court vis-à-vis other states accepting the same obligation, in relation to specified categories of legal disputes, including the interpretation of a treaty and “any question of international law.”

13 Security Council Resolution 777, UN SCOR, 47th Year, UN Doc.S/RES/777 ( 1993) (Annex 1 A); GA Res. 47/1, UN GAOR, 47th Sess., UN Doc. A/RES/47/1 (1992) (Annex lB).

14 Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference of Yugoslavia, Opinion no. 8 of 4 July 1992, 1993 (92) I.L.R. 199, at 202.

15 Readaptation of the Mavrommatis Jersusalem Concessions, Judgment no. 10, 1927, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 26.

16 Legality of Use of Force, supra note 1, Oral Proceedings, at para. 21.

17 Order Respecting the Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 2 June 1999, [1999] I.C.J. ReP. 259.

18 President Schwebel, Judges Oda, Bedjaoui, Guillaume, Ranjeva, Hercegh, Fleischauer, Koroma, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, and Judge ad hoc Lalonde.

19 Judges Oda, Kooijmans, and Higgins.

20 Judges Weeramantry, Shi, and Vereshchetin, and Judge ad hoc Kreca.

21 Legality of Use of Force, supra note 1, Order of 3 June 1999, at para. 29.

22 Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada) Jurisdiction, Judgment, [1998] I.CJ. Rep. 432.

23 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objection, Judgment, [1996] I.CJ. Rep. (II), 810.

24 Ibid, at para. 16.

25 Ibid, at para. 51.

26 See Legality of Use of Force, supra note 1, Opinion of Judge Oda, at paras. 25 ff. There have, of course, been cases in which the court found that it did have prima facie jurisdiction, only to find later that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case at a subsequent stage (Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Preliminary Objection, Judgment, [1952] I.C.J. Rep. 104; and Interhandel (Switzerland v. United States of America), [1959] ICJ. Rep. 6).

27 Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1945, Judgment, [1954] I.C.J. Rep. 19.

28 See the Preliminary Objections of Canada in Legality of Use of Force, supra note 1 at 2, n. 4, available at <www.icj-cij.org>.

29 Ibid., Written Observations of FRY of 18 December 2002, at 2, para. (a).

30 Ibid, at 2, para. (b).

31 President Shi (China) and Judges Guillaume (France), Higgins (United Kingdom), Kooijmans (Netherlands), Koroma (Sierra Leone), Vereschetin (Russian Federation), Parra-Aranguren (Venezuela) ), Ranjeva (Madagascar), Kreca (Judge ad hoc for Serbia and Montenegro).

32 Owada (Japan), Tomka (Slovakia), Elaraby (Egypt), Buergenthal (United States), Al-Khasawneh (Jordan), and Simma (Germany). However,Judge Simma recused himself from the case pursuant to Article 24(1) of the ICJ Statute. Judge Simma had written an article ("NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects” (1999) Eur. J. Int’l L. 1) suggesting that the October 1998 threat of air strikes against the FRY breached the Charter of the United Nations, despite NATO’s effort to rely on the doctrines of necessity and humanitarian intervention and to conform to the sense and logic of relevant Security Council resolutions. He did acknowledge that there are “hard cases” involving terrible dilemmas in which imperative political and moral considerations leave no choice but to act outside the law. However, his recusal probably relates more directly to advice given to one of the parties at some point before he became a judge.

33 Judges Weeramantry (Sri Lanka), Schwebel (United States), Oda (Japan), Bedjaoui (Algeria), Herczegh (Hungary), and Fleischhauer (Germany).

34 Judge ad hoc Kreca noted that the approach of the court implied that all the NATO parties are legally in the same interest. He linked the right to appoint a judge ad hoc to the jus cogens sovereign equality of states. He goes on to make a number of novel suggestions on how to deal with a situation such as this where several judges on the court originate in states with the same interest as one of the parties. One of these, inspired by discussions on the 1926 Rules of Court, would be to exclude one or more of these judges. The other would be to allow the appointment of more than one judge ad hoc. Although he argues that such innovations would be consistent with the ICJ Statute, this conclusion is questionable.

35 (1) France does not accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the court; (2) the United Kingdom’s acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the court included a twelve-month rule, and (3) the Netherlands had an additional possible jurisdictional basis argued by the applicant relating to bilateral treaties.

36 Case Concerning the Application for Revision of theJudgment of 11 July 1()()6 in the Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, [2003] I.C.J. Rep. at para. 71 [Application for Revision case].

37 Rules of Court, supra note 9.

38 Legality of Use of Force, supra note ι at Verbatim Record of the Public Sitting of 23 April 2004, Doc. CR 2004/23, available at <www.icj-cij.org>.

39 President Shi, Vice President Ranjeva, Judges Koroma, Vereshchetin, Parra-Aranguren, Rezek, Owada, and Tomka.

40 Legality of Use of Force, supra note 1 at para. 45.

41 Ibid, at para. 63.

42 Ibid, at para. 77.

43 Ibid, at para. 113.

44 Legality of Use of Force, supra note 1 at para. 108.

45 Ibid, at para. 112.

46 Ibid, at paras. 99–112.

47 See ibid, at para. 108, referring to S.S. “Wimbledon” case ([1923] P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 1,6) and Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia ([1925] P.C.I J., Series A, No. 6).

48 Legality of Use of Force, supra note 1 at para. 108.

49 Vice-President Ranjeva and Judges Guillaume, Higgins, Kooijmans, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, and Elaraby.

50 Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Order of 7 October, [1993] I.C.J. Rep. 470 [Bosnia case].

51 Resolution 777, supra note 13.

52 See Bosnia case, supra note 50, Application of 20 March 1993, at para. 101. In the course of the proceedings respecting provisional measures of protection, the applicant attempted to invoke additional bases of jurisdiction, namely a 1919 treaty, a 1992 letter to the Arbitration Commission of the International Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia, forum prorogatum, and the Customary and Conventional International Laws of War and International Humanitarian Law. None of these were considered to provide a prima facie basis of jurisdiction, and they were definitively rejected in the Preliminary Objections judgment. See Order of 13 September 1993, respecting Further Requests for the Indication of Provisional Measures, at paras. 26–32 and the Judgment of 11 July 1996 on Preliminary Objections, at para. 41.

53 See ibid., Application, at para. 135.

54 Ibid., Order of 8 April 1993, at para. 19.

55 Ibid., Judgment of 11 July 1996 on Preliminary Objections, para. 34.

56 Ibid, at para. 73.

57 Ibid., Order of 8 April 1993, at para. 18.

58 Ibid. at para. 96.

59 Ibid. at para. 9.

60 Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), supra note 21; Bosnia case, supra note 50 at para. 37.

61 Bosnia case, supra note 50 at para. 45.

62 Legality of Use of Force, supra note 1 at para. 73.

63 Application for Revision case, supra 36, Joint Declaration, at para. 10.

64 Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia and Montenegro), Order of 14 September, [1999] I.C.J. Rep. 1015 [Croatia case].

65 See Legality of Use of Force supra note 1 at para. 39.

66 Ibid., Joint Declaration of Vice-President Ranjeva and Judges Guillaume, Higgins, Kooijmans, Al-khasawneh, Buergenthal and Elaraby, at para. 13.

67 Ibid, at paras. 36 and 37.

68 There are fifteen permanent judges, but Judge Simma did not participate.

69 Legality of Use of Force, supra note l, Joint Declaration, at para. 1.

70 Ibid., Judgment, at para. 97. The quotation refers to Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, [1998] I.C.J. Rep. 292 at para. 28). Article 59 of the ICJ Statute, supra note 6, provides that “[t]he decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”

71 Legality of Use of Force, supra note 1, Joint Declaration, at para. 3.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid, at para. 12.

74 Ibid, at para. 13.

75 Case Concerning Certain Property (Liechtenstein v. Germany), Judgement of 10 February 2005, available at <www.icj-cij.org>.

76 Article 1 of the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes of 29 April 1957, entered into force between Germany and Liechtenstein on 18 February 1980. See Preliminary Objections of Germany in this case of 27 June 2002, para. 65 on the court website at <www.icj-cij.org>. The court decided that the dispute was ultimately rooted in events that took place in 1945 and not in judicial decisions of the German courts during the 1990s.

77 See Legality of Use of Force, supra note 1, Judgment of 10 February 2005, at paras. 41–46.

78 See ibid., Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, at para. 13 and Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, at paras. 11–16.

79 Ibid, at paras. 30–31.

80 Ibid, at paras. 13–14.

81 Ibid, at paras. 12 and 16.

82 Ibid, at para. 11.

83 Ibid, at para. 17 [emphasis added].

84 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.

85 Legality of Use of Force, supra note 1 at para. 108.

86 Ibid., Separate Opinion of Judge Elaraby, at part III.

87 Ibid, at para. 112 [emphasis added].

88 Colleen Swords is Legal Adviser, Foreign Affairs Canada and was Agent for Canada in this case. Alan Willis was Counsel and Advocate for the government of Canada in this case. The views expressed in this comment are those of the authors only and do not necessarily represent the views of the government of Canada.