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A United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: The Decline and Fall of an Initiative
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 March 2016
Extract
In 1967 the Yearbook published a comment by me on ECOSOC Resolution 1237 (XLII) of June 6, 1967. In that resolution the Economic and Social Council recommended to the General Assembly the creation of the Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The comment referred to concluded with the opinion that Resolution 1237 (XLII) provided an adequate basis on which the General Assembly might appropriately proceed to establish the Office; it expressed the view that this resolution would eventually be adopted and that the proposed High Commissioner would become an important personality in the United Nations programme for the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
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- Information
- Canadian Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire canadien de droit international , Volume 10 , 1973 , pp. 40 - 64
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Canadian Council on International Law / Conseil Canadien de Droit International, representing the Board of Editors, Canadian Yearbook of International Law / Comité de Rédaction, Annuaire Canadien de Droit International 1973
References
1 5 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 84–118 (1967).
2 For analysis of the views submitted by governments and specialized agencies on each paragraph of ECOSOC Resolution 1237 (XLII) and the amendments thereto, see Report of the Secretary-General on the Creation of the Post of United Nations High Commisnoner for Human Rights (U.N. Doc. A/8035, August 28, 1970).
3 The statements on which this account is based are to be found in the following U.N. documents: A/C.3/SR.1804, December 3, 1970 (meeting of December 1, 1970); A/G.3/SR. 1805, December 7, 1970 (meeting of December 2, 1970); A/G.3/SR.1806, December 4, 1970 (meeting of December 2, 1970); A/C.3/SR.1807, December 9, 1970 (meeting of December 3, 1970); A/C.3/SR.1808, December 7, 1970 (meeting of December 3, 1970); A/C.3/SR.1809, December 8, 1970 (meeting of December 4, 1970); A/G.3/SR.1810, December 10, 1970 (meeting of December 5, 1970); A/C.3/SR.1811, December 10, 1970 (meeting of December 7, 1970); A/C.3/SR.1812, December 9, 1970 (meeting of December 7, 1970).
4 The Romanian chairman was not enthusiastic at the prospect of having to put the Soviet motion to a vote.
5 U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.1819 (France); U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.1820 (Saudi Arabia).
6 The following documents were before the committee: ECOSOC Resolution 1237 (XLII); a statement on administrative and financial implications (U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.1768); and, the Report of the Secretary-General (U.N. Doc. A/8035), which recalled the history of the subject, the documentation that had accumulated over the years, the discussions in the Commission on Human Rights and ECOSOC, and the views of governments.
7 As the representative of Denmark later observed: “The question of creating the post of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights touched on a central aspect of relations between the individual, the State and the international community. Everyone recognized that each State, to be able to function, must have extensive jurisdiction over individuals and must be able without intervention to exercise the jurisdiction referred to in Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter. On the other hand, it was obvious that in any exercise of power by a State there was the potentiality of mistakes which, if they exceeded certain limits, would arouse the concern of the international community for the fate of the individual. When the international community, as represented by the United Nations, was apprised of alleged violations of human rights, it was faced with a dilemma. Direct intervention was not feasible, and passiveness was incompatible with the high ideals to which the United Nations was dedicated. Up to now, the Organization had been reluctant to cope with that dilemma.” U.N. Doc. A/G.3/SR.1900, December 14, 1971, at 15 (meeting of December 8, 1971).
8 Statement of the representative of the United Kingdom (Miss Solesby) at the 1811th meeting on December 7, 1970: U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1811, at 8–10.
9 U.N. Doc. A/7498, para. 15.
10 U.S.S.R. This and several of the arguments referred to above have been analyzed by Clark, Roger S., A United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (The Hague, 1976).Google Scholar
11 Byelorussia.
12 U.S.S.R.
13 U.S.S.R.
14 Romania; Saudi Arabia.
15 U.S.S.R.; Ukraine; Poland; Romania.
16 Ceylon.
17 In a statement that is not easy to follow, the representative of Pakistan (Mrs. Hamidulla) urged that the High Commissioner should act (i) on the basis of recommendations from the panel of experts, ECOSOC, the Commission of Human Rights, and the General Assembly; (ii) at the request of the state concerned; or (iii) on the recommendation of the Secretary-General: U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1812 (meeting of December 7, 1970). It is obvious that this is a considerable weakening of the original ECOSOC text. Madagascar went so far as to suggest that the experts should be elected by the General Assembly: U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1811, at 11.
18 Canada, U.N. Doc. A/8035, para. 71.
19 An excellent summary of recent developments can be found in the Report of the International Committee on Human Rights to the New York Conference of the International Law Association, 1972. The report was prepared by Professor John P. Humphrey and Dr. Egon Schwelb.
20 This point was emphasized by France.
21 U.S.S.R.; Ceylon.
22 U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1812, at 12, 13 (meeting of December 7, 1970).
23 Useful suggestions for improving the work of the committees can be found in the conclusions of the Special Committee on the Rationalization of the Procedures and Organization of the General Assembly, Official Records of the G.A., Twenty-Sixth Session, Supp. No. 29 (U.N. Doc. A/8429), at 6-16; para. 20 suggests the staggering of items over two or more years as one means of rationalizing the procedures of the Assembly.
24 Only the skill of the chairman prevented a repetition of the procedural difficulties of the previous year.
25 U.N. Doc. A/G.3/L.1815, October 8, 1971.
26 U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1899, at 13–14, statement of Mr. Heyman, representative of Sweden, at the meeting on December 8, 1971.
27 U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1900, at 9–14, statement of Mr. Tarassov, at the meeting of December 8, 1971.
28 I have tried to analyze theoretical aspects of the Soviet position in my essay entitled “Petitioning an International Authority,” in Gotlieb, A. E. (ed.,) Federalism, Minorities and Human Rights 121–44, at 131–37 (Toronto, 1968).Google Scholar In this connection we should heed the eloquent words of Solzhenit-syn: “As a result of an obedient vote, it [the U.N.] declines to undertake the investigation of private appeals — the groans, screams and beseechings of humble individual plain people — not large enough a catch for such a great organization.” This excerpt is from the lecture that Mr. Solzhenitsyn would have delivered if he could have accepted his Nobel Prize in person in 1970: N.Y. Times, August 25, 1971, at 1, 2.
29 Statement of Mr. Heyman, representative of Sweden: U.N. Doc. A/G.3/-SR.1899, at 14.
30 All in all the Committee’s attitude to the question was a distinct improvement over the previous year; more delegations were willing to discuss the issues; the conduct of the meetings was more business-like; the atmosphere was less emotional; and the level of the debate was higher.
31 The draft resolution as amended was adopted 54–12–39.
32 U.N. Doc. A/PV.2025, December 18, 1971, at 47, 51.
33 It will be recalled that the U.S.S.R. refused to participate in the deliberations of the Working Group established by the Commission on Human Rights in 1966 to consider all relevant questions pertaining to the institution under consideration.