Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-9q27g Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-22T12:24:27.389Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Seabed Issues at the Law of the Sea Conference: The Caracas Session1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 March 2016

Barry Buzan
Barry Buzan*
Affiliation:
Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia
Get access

Extract

The caracas meeting was only the first of three, or possibly four, sessions of the Third Law of the Sea Conference that will try to bridge the gap between the rambling six volume result of the Seabed Committee’s work and the concise articles of a new Law of the Sea Convention. The work at Caracas did not reach a stage at which it became possible to submit draft articles for the approval of the Conference. As a result, the final documents of the session made no commitment on any matters of substance. Such movement towards agreement as was achieved is therefore not binding, and is extremely vulnerable to changes of position by states in the six months preceding the next session in Geneva. Because of this, the emphasis of the present report will be more on the political process at Caracas than on the development of international law. My purpose is, first, to examine the new proposals on seabed issues and relate them to previously existing positions; second, to analyse the alignments behind the key positions; and third, to look at the other factors emerging as influences on the seabed negotiations.

Type
Notes and Comments
Information
Canadian Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire canadien de droit international , Volume 12 , 1975 , pp. 222 - 238
Copyright
Copyright © The Canadian Council on International Law / Conseil Canadien de Droit International, representing the Board of Editors, Canadian Yearbook of International Law / Comité de Rédaction, Annuaire Canadien de Droit International 1975

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

1

This article was written in late September 1974 and it does not, therefore, take into account the effect of any unilateral actions or other events succeeding Caracas. Research for this article was supported by the Donner Canadian Foundation under its grant to the Institute of International Relations at U.B.C. for a project on “Canada and the International Management of the Oceans.”

References

2 “Sovereign rights” to the exploration and exploitations of continental shelf resources were given to the coastal state in the Continental Shelf Convention of 1958.

3 “Geographically disadvantaged countries” was a phrase that became popular at Caracas. It was never satisfactorily defined, but it can be taken as including all shelflocked states and any others with geographical characteristics that create difficulties of access to the open ocean.

4 These calculations, and others following, are taken from statements of position made in the Seabed Committee from 1968 through to the summer session of 1973, from positions supported in documents submitted to the Committee (UN documents A/AC. 135 and A/AC.138), and from various records of existing national legislation. Three of the eighteen states opposing 200 miles were among those supporting the margin limit: USA, USSR, Sweden.

5 See footnote 4.

6 These six landlocked and shelflocked states were the sponsors of A/AC.138/ 55, advocating either a 200 metre or a 40 mile continental shelf limit, with an additional 40 mile “priority zone” for the coastal state.

7 There were signs of this latter shift during the last year of the Seabed Committee. Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Nepal, and Singapore (four of whom sponsored A/AC.138/55) sponsored A/AC.138/SC.II/L.39 in which they demanded equal rights for landlocked and shelflocked states, and revenue sharing with the “International Authority” within economic zones.

8 These calculations, and others following, are taken from statements made at the Caracas session (in the provisional summary records) and from positions supported in documents submitted to the Conference (in the A/CONF.62 series).

9 Canada supported this position in the Seabed Committee (A/AC.138/SR.58, at 201) but did not revive it at Caracas. While the Canadians emphasized coastal state rights to the margin in their Conference proposals, it seems likely that they would be prepared to negotiate on sharing if serious proposals were put forward.

10 The seven were Afghanistan, Belgium, Bhutan, West Germany, Kuwait, the Netherlands, and Nepal, four of whom were sponsors of A/AC. 138/55. The landlocked and geographically disadvantaged state group, comprising up to fifty states, was one of the most active informal caucusing groups at Caracas. On the other side of the spectrum was a coastal state group comprising about twenty-five states and led by middle powers including Canada, Australia, Chile, India, Norway, Mexico, and the United Kingdom. These informal groups, based on common geographical characteristics, often crossed the boundaries of the more traditional regional and political groups and were an important feature of the negotiating process at the Conference.

11 A/CONF.62/C.2/L.39. Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Finland, Iraq, Laos, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Nepal, Netherlands, Paraguay, Singapore, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Uganda, Upper Volta, and Zambia. These states represent the core of the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged state group.

12 A/CONF.62/23.

13 The United States proposed revenue sharing from beyond a 12 mile/200 metre line. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.47.

14 A bargain of this sort seems to underlie the unanimous Mogadiscio Declaration of the forty-one members of the Organization of African Unity on the issues of the Law of the Sea: A/CONF.62/33.

15 A/CONF.62/C.2/L.65.

16 A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.33, at 4–5.

17 A/CONF.62/C.2/L.42.

18 A/CONF.62/C.2/L.43 Rev. I.

19 The sponsors, all coastal states, included sixteen Latin American, twelve African (including three Arab), seven Asian, and Yugoslavia. A/CONF.62/ C.2/SR.40, at 14, and A/CONF.62/SR.41, at 7.

20 There is some evidence that the sponsors have agreed to revise the wording so as to remove the problem of submarines, and make the proposal applicable only to the seabed. This would take some of the difficulty out of it, but would still leave major differences of opinion unresolved. The naval powers oppose any such restrictions on their freedom of activity, particularly as regards the placement of passive sonar devices on the seabed.

21 Virtually all of the oil likely to be exploitable for some decades is found on the coastal state side of the 200 mile plus margin boundary, and the great bulk of it is found within 200 miles of the coast. See A/AC.138/87.

22 The Enterprise idea became an important aspect of the Seabed Committee’s work in 1971, when thirteen Latin American states submitted A/AC.138/49 in which the Enterprise was proposed as an alternative to licensing schemes.

23 This appears formally as alternative B of Article 9 in A/CONF.62/C.1/L.3, at 6, where it replaced alternatives Β and C at 57–58 of Volume II of the Seabed Committee Report for 1973 (A/9021). Alternative C of C.1/L.3, at 7, is a new proposal by the United States and reflects that country’s desire to have all the relevant conditions relating to exploitation set down in the Convention. Page 19 of C.1/L.3 contains an emasculated version of a proposal relating to Article 9 originally made by Jamaica in the informal sessions of Committee I. The United States looked on this proposal with some favour, and Jamaica defended it vigorously as complementary to the Group of 77 draft. Most of the Group of 77, however, were unenthusiastic about it. There were some indications towards the end of the Caracas session that the Group of 77 was having difficulty maintaining its consensus on conditions of exploitation in the face of pressures to compromise in negotiations.

24 A/CONF.62/C.1/L.6 (USA, August 13, 1974), L.7 (Group of 77, August 16, 1974), L.8 (EEC countries, August 16, 1974), L.9 (Japan, August 19, 1974).

25 A/CONF./62/C.1/SR.8, at 7–10 and interviews with delegates. The USSR’s primary interest here was to establish the rights of states themselves to exploit the seabed, and not just capitalist enterprises working for the Authority. Canada refused to join either group. Instead, the Canadians occupied the middle ground virtually alone and encouraged compromise positions. Neither the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged state group nor the coastal state group was active in the debate on Article 9 and the conditions of exploitation. On these issues, states tended to follow overtly political developed/developing alignments rather than alignments based on common geographical interests. Although these groups did not participate in the central debate in Committee I, fifty landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states did unite to present an amendment to Article 7 that would make more explicit their right to participate in exploitation of the Area: A/CONF.62/C.1/L.3/COrr.6 and A/CONF.62/C.1/SR.17, speech by Bolivia.

26 The Group of 77 displayed remarkable solidarity in defending the interests of its minority of affected mineral exporting states. Many developing countries would benefit from a drop in nodule metal prices, but their suspicion that the developed countries would accrue all advantage to themselves if unregulated production were allowed was sufficient to keep their ranks unified. The depth of this distrust of the developed countries is illustrated by the delegate of Paraguay, who, finding himself in agreement with a developed country, felt compelled to remark that “his delegation firmly rejected any allegations of collusion with the highly developed countries: the fact that their position was in certain cases similar to those of his own country was a mere coincidence”: A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.22 at 14.

27 Canada leaned toward the Group of 77’s position on this. A/CONF.62/C.1/ SR.2, at 16.

28 A/CONF.62/C.1/SR.14, at 6.

29 A/CONF.62/33, at 3.

30 A/CONF.62/C.I/SR.6, at 2, SR.7, at 6, SR.8, at 8. Both superpowers were primarily concerned with assuring complete freedom for their navies against any meddling from the Authority under the “peaceful uses” part of the Convention. Only secondarily was their opposition related to fishing interests, although this interest should by no means be discounted, especially for the USSR (interviews with delegates).

31 A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.36–40.

32 A/CONF.62/C.3/L.12 (August 32, 1974). An earlier proposal by Nigeria (A/CONF.62/C.3/L.8, August I, 1974) expressed very similar demands.

33 TD/B/449. 449 Add. I, 483, and 484, and TD/113/Supp. 4. These are summarized in A/CONF.62/C.I/L.2. Chile submitted a paper that largely reflects the Group of 77’s line of argument: A/CONF.62/C.I/L.11 and Corr. I.

34 A/CONF.62/25.

35 A/CONF.62/C.I/L.5.

36 A/CONF.62/25 at 17, and interviews with delegates.