Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-r6qrq Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-26T04:41:46.167Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The simple duality: Humean passions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Hsueh Qu
Hsueh Qu*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, New York University, 5 Washington Place, New York City, NY, 10003, USA
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Hume views the passions as having both intentionality and qualitative character, which, in light of his Separability Principle, seemingly contradicts their simplicity. I reject the dominant solution to this puzzle of claiming that intentionality is an extrinsic property of the passions, arguing that a number of Hume's claims regarding the intentionality of the passions (pride and humility in particular) provide reasons for thinking an intrinsic account of the intentionality of the passions to be required. Instead, I propose to resolve this tension by appealing to Hume's treatment of the ‘distinctions of reason’, as explained by Garrett (Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

Keywords

Humepassionsintentionalityphenomenologysimplicity
Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 42 , Issue S1: Hume in Alberta: Selected Papers from the 2012 Hume Conference in Calgary , February 2012 , pp. 98 - 116
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2012

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

Current address: Department of Philosophy, National University of Singapore, 3 Arts Link, Block AS3, #05-22, Singapore. Email: phiqhm@nus.edu.sg

References

Alanen, Lilli 2005. “Reflection and Ideas in Hume's Account of the Passions.” In Persons and Passions: Essays in Honor of Annette Baier, edited by Jenkins, J. Whiting, J. and Williams, C. 117–142. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.Google Scholar
Ardal, Pall 1989. Passion and Virtue in Hume's Treatise. 2nd ed. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.Google Scholar
Baier, Annette 1991. A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's ‘Treatise’. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Baillie, James 2000. Hume on Morality. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Baxter, Donald 2011. “Hume, Distinctions of Reason, and Differential Resemblance.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1): 156–182.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chalmers, David 1995. “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3): 200–219.Google Scholar
Cohon, Rachel 1994. “On an Unorthodox Account of Hume's Moral Psychology.” Hume Studies 20: 179–194.Google Scholar
Cohon, Rachel 2008. “Hume's Indirect Passions.” In A Companion to Hume, edited by Radcliffe, E. 159–184. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Cohon, Rachel and Owen, David 1997. “Representation, Reason, and Motivation.” Manuscrito 20: 47–76.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald 1976. “Hume's Cognitive Theory of Pride.” Journal of Philosophy 73: 744–757.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fogelin, Robert 1985. Hume's Scepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
Garrett, Don 1997. Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Garrett, Don 2006. “Hume's Naturalistic Theory of Representation.” Synthese 152: 301–319.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldie, Peter 2002. “Emotions, Feelings and Intentionality.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3): 235–245.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Horgan, Terence and Tienson, John 2002. “The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality.” In Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, edited by Chalmers, D. 520–533. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Horgan, Terence Tienson, John and Graham, George 2004. “Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat.” In The Externalist Challenge, edited by Schanz, R. 297–318. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.Google Scholar
Hume, David [1739–1740] 1975. A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by Selby-Bigge, L. A. and revised by Nidditch, P. H. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Hume, David [1748] 1975. Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. Edited by Selby-Bigge, L. A. and revised by Nidditch, P. H. 3rd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hume, David [1957] 2007. A Dissertation on the Passions: The Natural History of Religion: A Critical Edition. Edited by Beauchamp, T. L. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Loar, Brian 2003. “Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content.” In Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, edited by Hahn, M. and Ramberg, B. 229–258. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Merivale, Amyas 2009. “Hume's Mature Account of the Indirect Passions.” Hume Studies 35 (1): 185–210.Google Scholar
Penelhum, Terence 1993. “Hume's Moral Psychology.” In The Cambridge Companion to Hume, edited by Norton, D. F. 117–147. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Radcliffe, Elizabeth 2006. “Moral Internalism and Moral Cognitivism in Hume's Metaethics.” Synthese 152: 353–370.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Geoffrey, Sayre-McCord 1997. “Hume's Representation Argument against Rationalism.” Manuscrito 20: 77–94.Google Scholar
Schmidt, Claudia 2003. David Hume: Reason in History. State College: The Pennsylvania State University Press.Google Scholar
Schmitter, Amy 2008. “Making an Object of Yourself: On the Intentionality of the Passions in Hume.” In Topics in Early Modern Philosophy of Mind, edited by Miller, J. 223–240. Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar
Weller, Cass 2002. “The Myth of Original Existence.” Hume Studies 28: 195–230.Google Scholar