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A semantic challenge to non-realist cognitivism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

David Copp
David Copp*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of California, Davis, CA, USA
*
Email: dcopp@ucdavis.edu
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Abstract

Recently, some philosophers have attempted to escape familiar challenges to orthodox nonnaturalist normative realism by abandoning the robust metaphysical commitments of the orthodox view. One such view is the ‘Non-Metaphysical Non-Naturalism’ or ‘Non-Realist Cognitivism’ proposed by Derek Parfit and a few others. The trouble is that, as it stands, Non-Realist Cognitivism seems unable to provide a substantive non-trivial account of the meaning and truth conditions of moral claims. The paper considers various strategies one might use to address the challenge. There is a rich field of views that are cognitivist and non-realist. But the paper is skeptical of the prospects of Non-Realist Cognitivism.

Keywords

Non-realist cognitivismnonnaturalismnon-metaphysical non-naturalismparfitnormative non-realismavant-garde nonnaturalismnormative naturalismmoral semantics
Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 48 , Issue 3-4: Special issue: Representation and Evaluation , 2018 , pp. 569 - 591
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

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