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The Role of Magnitude in Kant's Critical Philosophy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Daniel Sutherland
Daniel Sutherland*
Affiliation:
University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL60607-7114, USA
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Extract

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues for two principles that concern magnitudes. The first is the principle that ‘All intuitions are extensive magnitudes,’ which appears in the Axioms of Intuition (B202); the second is the principle that ‘In all appearances the real, which is an object of sensation, has an intensive magnitude, that is, a degree,’ which appears in the Anticipations of Perception (B207). A circle drawn in geometry and the space occupied by an object such as a book are paradigm examples of extensive magnitudes, while the intensity of a light is a paradigm example of an intensive magnitude. These principles justify and explain the possibility of applying mathematics to objects of experience. The Axioms principle also explains the possibility of any mathematical cognition at all.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 34 , Issue 3 , September 2004 , pp. 411 - 441
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2004

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