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Resisting for other reasons*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Daniel Silvermint
Daniel Silvermint*
Affiliation:
Philosophy & WGSS, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA
*
Email: daniel.silvermint@uconn.edu
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Abstract

Does a victim have to intend to resist oppression in order to discharge her obligation to do so, or is it sufficient to resist oppression intentionally in the course of pursuing other plans and projects of importance to her? I argue that resisting intentionally can be sufficient: given the ways that oppression interferes with the lives of victims, trying to counteract that interference by living the life you want is genuine resistance. Requiring that victims have justice-oriented or agency-preserving reasons before their actions count as resistance will distort or miss a wide range of everyday responses to oppressive burdens.

Keywords

Feminist philosophyintentionobjective well-beingoppressionresistanceself-regarding obligationssexism
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 48 , Issue 1 , 2018 , pp. 18 - 42
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2017

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Footnotes

*

This paper grew out of conversations with Michael McKenna. My thanks also to Mark Alfano, Sameer Bajaj, Donald Baxter, Paul Bloomfield, Amandine Catala, Ralph DiFranco, Crawford L. Elder, Katy Fulfer, Stan Husi, Suzy Killmister, Junyeol Kim, Alycia LaGuardia-LoBianco, Scott Lehmann, Hallie Liberto, Catherine Lu, Lorenz Lüthi, Michael Lynch, Simon Cabulea May, Kristina Meshelski, Ruth Millikan, Eugene Mills, Nenad Miscevic, Alastair Norcross, Julinna Oxley, Regina Rini, David Ripley, Marcus Rossberg, Colena Sesanker, Nathan Sheff, Matthew Smith, Patrick Smith, Rosa Terlazzo, Justin Weinberg, Samuel Wheeler, Jennifer Zamzow, two anonymous referees, and audiences at the Rocky Mountain Ethics Conference and the Bled Philosophical Conference on Ethics. I’ve also benefited greatly from the intellectual environments at the University of Arizona, McGill University, and the University of Connecticut, and from the support of the UConn Humanities Institute.

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