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Propositionalism about intention: shifting the burden of proof

  • Lucy Campbell (a1)

Abstract

A widespread view in the philosophy of mind and action holds that intentions are propositional attitudes. Call this view ‘Propositionalism about Intention’. The key alternative holds that intentions have acts, or do-ables, as their contents. Propositionalism is typically accepted by default, rather than argued for in any detail. By appealing to a key metaphysical constraint on any account of intention, I argue that on the contrary, it is the Do-ables View which deserves the status of the default position, and Propositionalism which bears the burden of proof. I go on to show that this burden has not been met in the literature.

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Corresponding author

CONTACT Lucy Campbell lucy.campbell@philosophy.ox.ac.ukhttps://warwick.academia.edu/LucyCampbell Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

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Propositionalism about intention: shifting the burden of proof

  • Lucy Campbell (a1)

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