Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-qxdb6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-26T23:17:12.079Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The points of concepts: their types, tensions, and connections

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Matthieu Queloz Open the ORCID record for Matthieu Queloz [Opens in a new window]
Matthieu Queloz*
Affiliation:
Department of Arts, Media and Philosophy, University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland
*
Matthieu Queloz matthieu.queloz@unibas.chDepartment of Arts, Media and Philosophy, University of Basel, Steinengraben 5, Basel4051, Switzerland
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In the literature seeking to explain concepts in terms of their point, talk of ‘the point’ of concepts remains under-theorised. I propose a typology of points which distinguishes practical, evaluative, animating, and inferential points. This allows us to resolve tensions such as that between the ambition of explanations in terms of the points of concepts to be informative and the claim that mastering concepts requires grasping their point; and it allows us to exploit connections between types of points to understand why they come apart, and whether they do so for problematic ideological reasons or for benignly functional reasons.

Keywords

Conceptsconceptual point, function or purposepoint-based explanationpoint-based conceptual engineeringthick conceptsideological function
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 8 , December 2019 , pp. 1122 - 1145
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2019

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Anderson, E. S. 1999. “What Is the Point of Equality? ” Ethics 109 (2 ): 287–337. doi:10.1086/233897.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Anderson, E. S. 2004. “Uses of Value Judgments in Science: A General Argument, with Lessons from A Case Study of Feminist Research on Divorce.” Hypatia 19 (1 ): 1–24. doi:10.1111/j.1527-2001.2004.tb01266.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Anghie, A. 2007. Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law. Vol. 37. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Barnes, B. 1995. The Elements of Social Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bealer, G. 1982. Quality and Concept. New York: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Beaney, M. 2014. “Analysis.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward, N. Z.. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analysis/.Google Scholar
Bell, D. 2016. Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Blackburn, S. 1993. Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Blackburn, S. 1998. Ruling Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Blackburn, S. 2013a. “Pragmatism in Philosophy: The Hidden Alternative.” Philosophic Exchange 41 (1 ): 2–13.Google Scholar
Blackburn, S. 2017a. “Pragmatism: All or Some or All and Some? ” In The Practical Turn: Pragmatism in Britain in the Long Twentieth Century, edited by Misak, C. and Price, H., 61–74. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Blackburn, S. 2017b. Truth: Ideas in Profile. London: Profile Books.Google Scholar
Blackburn, Simon. 2013. “Pragmatism: All or Some?” In Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism, edited by Price, H., 67–84. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brandom, R. 2000. Articulating Reasons. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Brandom, R. 2015. From Empiricism to Expressivism: Brandom Reads Sellars. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Brigandt, I. 2010. “The Epistemic Goal of a Concept: Accounting for the Rationality of Semantic Change and Variation.” Synthese 177 (1 ): 19–40. doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9623-8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brigandt, I., and Rosario, E.. forthcoming. “Strategic Conceptual Engineering for Epistemic and Social Aims.” In Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, edited by Burgess, A., Cappelen, H., and Plunkett, D.. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Brink, David O. 2016. “Originalism and Constructive Interpretation.” In The Legacy of Ronald Dworkin, edited by Wil Waluchow and Stefan Sciaraffa, 273–298. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burgess, A. 2013b. “Conceptual Ethics II.” Philosophy Compass 8 (12 ): 1102–1110. doi:10.1111/phc3.12085.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burgess, A., and Plunkett, D.. 2013a. “Conceptual Ethics I.” Philosophy Compass 8 (12 ): 1091–1101. doi:10.1111/phc3.v8.12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burgess, A., Cappelen, H., and Plunkett, D., eds. forthcoming. Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Cappelen, H. 2018. Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cappelen, H., and Plunkett, D.. forthcoming. “A Guided Tour of Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics.” In Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, edited by Burgess, A., Cappelen, H., and Plunkett, D.. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Cobb, J. 2001. “Problems for Linguistic Solutions to the Paradox of Analysis.” Metaphilosophy 32 (4 ): 419–426. doi:10.1111/meta.2001.32.issue-4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Craig, E. 1990. Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Craig, E. 1993. Was wir wissen können: Pragmatische Untersuchungen zum Wissensbegriff. Wittgenstein-Vorlesungen der Universität Bayreuth, edited by Vossenkuhl, W.. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.Google Scholar
Craig, E. 2007. “Genealogies and the State of Nature.” In Bernard Williams, edited by Thomas, A., 181–200. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dancy, J. 1995. “In Defense of Thick Concepts.” Midwest Studies In Philosophy 20 (1 ): 263–279. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1995.tb00316.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
de Graaf, F. W, C.. 2015. “Dworkin’s Constructive Interpretation as a Method of Legal Research.” In Law and Method, 12. doi:10.5553/REM/.000012.Google Scholar
Dogramaci, S. 2012. “Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3 ): 513–530. doi:10.1111/phpr.2012.84.issue-3.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dummett, M. 1959. “Truth.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1 ): 141–162. doi:10.1093/aristotelian/59.1.141.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dummett, M. 1973. Frege: Philosophy of Language. New York: Harper and Row.Google Scholar
Dutilh Novaes, C. 2018. “Carnapian Explication and Ameliorative Analysis: A Systematic Comparison.” Synthese 1–24. doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1732-9.Google Scholar
Dutilh Novaes, C., and Reck, E.. 2017. “Carnapian Explication, Formalisms as Cognitive Tools, and the Paradox of Adequate Formalization.” Synthese 194 (1 ): 195–215. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0816-z.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dworkin, R. 1986. Law’s Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Dworkin, R. 2006. Justice in Robes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Earl, D. 2007. “A Semantic Resolution of the Paradox of Analysis.” Acta Analytica 22 (3 ): 189–205. doi:10.1007/s12136-007-0010-0.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
EPM. Hume, D. 1998. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, edited by Beauchamp, T. L.. Oxford: Clarendon PressGoogle Scholar
Ertz, T.-P. 2008. Regel und Witz: Wittgensteinsche Perspektiven auf Mathematik, Sprache und Moral. Berlin: De Gruyter.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fricker, M. 2016. “What’s the Point of Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation.” Noûs 50 (1 ): 165–183. doi:10.1111/nous.2016.50.issue-1.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fricker, M. forthcoming. “Forgiveness: An Ordered Pluralism.” Australasian Philosophical Review.Google Scholar
Fumerton, R. A. 1983. “The Paradox of Analysis.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (4 ): 477–497. doi:10.2307/2107643.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gardiner, G. 2015. “Teleologies and the Methodology of Epistemology.” In Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology, edited by Greco, J. and Henderson, D., 31–45. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Greco, J., and Henderson, D., eds. 2015. Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hannon, M. 2015. “The Universal Core of Knowledge.” Synthese 192 (3 ): 769–786. doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0587-y.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hannon, M. 2019. What’s the Point of Knowledge? A Function-First Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harman, G. 1987. “(Non-Solipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics.” In New Directions in Semantics, edited by Lepore, E., 55–81. London: Academic Press.Google Scholar
Hart, H., and Adolphus, L.. 1986. “Who Can Tell Right from Wrong? ” The New York Review of Books 33: 12.Google Scholar
Haslanger, S. 1999. “What Knowledge Is and What It Ought to Be: Feminist Values and Normative Epistemology.” Noûs 33 (Supplement s13 ): 459–480. doi:10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haslanger, S. 2000. “Gender and Race: (What) are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be? ” Noûs 34 (1 ): 31–55. doi:10.1111/0029-4624.00201.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haslanger, S. 2012. Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heal, J. 2013. “Social Anti-Individualism, Co-Cognitivism, and Second Person Authority.” Mind 122 (486 ): 339–371. doi:10.1093/mind/fzt052.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henderson, D. 2009. “Motivated Contextualism.” Philosophical Studies 142 (1 ): 119–131. doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9306-1.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henderson, D. 2011. “Gate-Keeping Contextualism.” Episteme 8 (1 ): 83–98. doi:10.3366/epi.2011.0008.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henderson, D., and Horgan, T.. 2015. “What’s the Point? ” In Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology, edited by Greco, J. and Henderson, D., 87–114. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kail, P. J. E. 2007. Projection and Realism in Hume’s Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kelp, C. 2011. “What’s the Point of ‘Knowledge’ Anyway? ” Episteme 8 (1 ): 53–66. doi:10.3366/epi.2011.0006.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kirchin, S. 2010. “The Shapelessness Hypothesis.” Philosophers’ Imprint 10 (4 ): 1–28.Google Scholar
Kirchin, S. 2013. “Introduction: Thick and Thin Concepts.” In Thick Concepts, edited by Kirchin, S., 1–19. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Koskenniemi, M. 2005. “International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal.” European Journal of International Law 16 (1 ): 113–124. doi:10.1093/ejil/chi105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kusch, M. 2009. “Testimony and the Value of Knowledge.” In Epistemic Value, edited by Haddock, A., Millar, A., and Pritchard, D., 60–94. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kusch, M., and McKenna, R. 2018a. “The Genealogical Method in Epistemology.” Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1675-1.Google Scholar
Kusch, M. 2018b. “Metaepistemology: Realism and Anti-Realism.” In The Genealogy of Relativism and Absolutism, edited by Kyriacou, C. and McKenna, R., 217–239. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar
MacFarlane, J. 2014. Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and Its Applications. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McDowell, J. H. 1998a. “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?.” In Mind, Value, and Reality, 77–94. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
McDowell, J. H. 1998b. “Values and Secondary Qualities.” In Mind, Value, and Reality, 131–150. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
McDowell, J. H. 1998c. “Virtue and Reason.” In Mind, Value, and Reality, 50–76. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
McPherson, T., and Plunkett, D.. forthcoming. “Conceptual Ethics and the Methodology of Normative Inquiry.” In Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, edited by Burgess, A., Cappelen, H., and Plunkett, D.. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Gerken, M. 2015. “The Roles of Knowledge Ascriptions in Epistemic Assessment.” European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1 ): 141–161. doi:10.1111/ejop.12026.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Millikan, R. G. 2005. Language: A Biological Model. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Millikan, R. G. 2017. Beyond Concepts: Unicepts, Language, and Natural Information. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mills, C. W. 1998. Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race. New York: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Montgomery Hyde, H. 1973. The Trials of Oscar Wilde. New York: Dover.Google Scholar
Moore, A. W. 1997. Points of View. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Moyn, S. 2010. The Last Utopia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Pagden, A. 1995. Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France C. 1500–C. 1800. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Pitts, J. 2005. A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France. Princeton: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Plunkett, D. 2015. “Which Concepts Should We Use? Metalinguistic Negotiations and the Methodology of Philosophy.” Inquiry 58 (7–8 ): 828–874. doi:10.1080/0020174X.2015.1080184.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Plunkett, D. 2016. “Conceptual History, Conceptual Ethics, and the Aims of Inquiry: A Framework for Thinking about the Relevance of the History/Genealogy of Concepts to Normative Inquiry.” Ergo: an Open Acces Journal of Philosophy 3 (2 ): 27–64.Google Scholar
Price, H. 1988. Facts and the Function of Truth. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Price, H. 2003. “Truth as Convenient Friction.” The Journal of Philosophy 100 (4 ): 167–190. doi:10.5840/jphil200310048.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Price, H. 2011. Naturalism Without Mirrors. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Price, H. 2017. “Ramsey’s Ubiquitous Pragmatism.” In The Practical Turn: Pragmatism in Britain in the Long Twentieth Century, edited by Misak, C. and Price, H., 149–162. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Price, H., Blackburn, S., Brandom, R., Horwich, P., and Williams, M.. 2013. Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Queloz, M. 2017. “Nietzsche’s Pragmatic Genealogy of Justice.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (4 ): 727–749. doi:10.1080/09608788.2016.1266462.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Queloz, M. 2018a. “How Genealogies Can Affect the Space of Reasons.” Synthese. (Online First ). doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1777-9.Google Scholar
Queloz, M. 2018b. “Williams’s Pragmatic Genealogy and Self-Effacing Functionality.” Philosophers’ Imprint 18 (17 ): 1–20. doi:2027/spo.3521354.0018.017.Google Scholar
Queloz, M. 2019. “Genealogy and Knowledge-First Epistemology: A Mismatch?” The Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274): 100–120.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Queloz, M. forthcoming-a. “From Paradigm-Based Explanation to Pragmatic Genealogy.” Mind. doi:10.1093/mind/fzy083Google Scholar
Queloz, M. forthcoming-b. “Nietzsches Affirmative Genealogien.” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie.Google Scholar
Queloz, M. forthcoming-c. “Revealing Social Functions through Pragmatic Genealogies.” In Social Functions in Philosophy: Metaphysical, Normative, and Methodological Perspectives, edited by Hufendiek, R., James, D., and Raphael, V. R.. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Queloz, M., and Cueni, D.. Manuscript. Left Wittgensteinianism.Google Scholar
Reynolds, S. L. 2017. Knowledge as Acceptable Testimony. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Richard, M. forthcoming. “The A-Project and the B-Project.” In Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, edited by Burgess, A., Cappelen, H., and Plunkett, D.. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Roberts, D. 2011. “Shapelessness and the Thick.” Ethics 121 (3 ): 489–520. doi:10.1086/658898.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roberts, D. 2013. “Thick Concepts.” Philosophy Compass 8 (8 ): 677–688. doi:10.1111/phc3.12055.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scanlon, T. M. 2003. “Thickness and Theory.” The Journal of Philosophy 100 (6 ): 275–287. doi:10.5840/jphil2003100612.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sellars, W. 1997. Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Edited by Rorty, R.. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Stanley, J. 2018. How Fascism Works: The Politics of Us and Them. New York: Random House.Google Scholar
Suits, B. 2005. The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia. Ontario: Broadview Press.Google Scholar
Thomas, A. 2006. Value and Context: The Nature of Moral and Political Knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thomasson, A. L. forthcoming. “A Pragmatic Method for Conceptual Ethics.” In Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, edited by Burgess, A., Cappelen, H., and Plunkett, D.. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Wiggins, D. 1976. “Deliberation and Practical Reason.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1 ): 29–52. doi:10.1093/aristotelian/76.1.29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, B. 1995a. “Ethics.” In Philosophy 1: A Guide through the Subject, edited by Grayling, A. C., 545–582. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Williams, B. 1995b. “Replies.”In World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams. Edited by Altham, J. E. J. and Harrison, R., 185–224. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, B. 1996. “Contemporary Philosophy: A Second Look.” In The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy, edited by Bunnin, N. and Tsui-James, E. P., 23–35. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Williams, B. 2002. Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Williams, B. 2011. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Routledge Classics. London: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, M. 2013. “How Pragmatists Can Be Local Expressivists.” In Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism, edited by Price, H., 128–144. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wittgenstein, L. 2009. Philosophische Untersuchungen = Philosophical Investigations. 4th ed. Translated by Anscombe, G. E. M., Hacker, P. M. S. and Schulte, Joachim. Edited by Hacker, P. M. S. and Schulte, J.. rev. Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell.Google Scholar