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On Choosing a Morality1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

G. B. Thomas*
Affiliation:
University of Virginia

Extract

John Rawls’ use of a contractarian strategy for justifying basic principles of justice has raised the hope that a similar strategy might work for a theory of right and moral principles generally. I want to show that this hope cannot be fulfilled.

In what follows I interpret contractarianism in a Rawlsian way on the grounds that his is the most plausible version of the doctrine we are likely to get. I am not however concerned with the details of Rawls’ argument for justice but instead with an idea that appears to underlie the contractarian strategy. In order to avoid the complications of Rawlsian exegesis, I choose to discuss the doctrine as it might be used to justify a moral principle of mutual assistance and not as Rawls in fact uses it to justify principles of justice.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1975

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Footnotes

1

This paper is a revised version of a paper read at the December, 1973 meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, at Atlanta, Georgia. I have profited from criticisms of that earlier draft by my colleagues Cora Diamond and John Marshall, and by the A.P.A. commentator, Norman Daniels.

References

2 Rawls, John A Theory of justice, Harvard University Press (Cambridge: 1971).Google Scholar See especially Chapter III. All references are to this work.

3 See especially pp. 14, 142, and 143.

4 See, e.g., pp. 13-14, 128· i29, 142-150.

5 This is no doubt among the reasons why Rawls, ’ conception of the original position in A Theory of justice has restrictions on motivation and knowledge that are not to be found in the conception of that position in his earlier paper, “Justice as Fairness,” Philosophical Review, vol. 57 (1958).Google Scholar

6 P. 14.

7 Chapter VIII (pp. 453-512).

8 Pp. 16-17.

9 P. 47.