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Not quite neo-sentimentalism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Abstract
The view that some evaluative concepts are identical to some affective concepts naturally falls out of neo-sentimentalism, but it is unstable. This paper argues for a view of evaluative concepts that is neo-sentimentalist in spirit but which eschews the identity claim. If we adopt a Peacockean view of concepts, then we should think of some evaluative concepts as having possession conditions that are affective in some way. I argue that the best version of this thought claims that possessing those concepts requires being rationally compelled to form evaluative beliefs in response to certain emotions.
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- Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2017
Footnotes
The first version of this paper was written while Tristram Oliver-Skuse was a postdoctoral fellow at the Thumos Research Group at the University of Geneva.
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