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Is The Mind-Body Problem Empirical?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Jeffrey Foss
Jeffrey Foss*
Affiliation:
University of Victoria, P.O. Box 1700, Victoria, BC, CanadaV8W 2Y2
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Extract

There is no problem more paradigmatically philosophical than the mind-body problem. Nevertheless, I will argue that the problem is empirical. I am not even suggesting that conceptual analysis of the various mind-body theories be abandoned – just as I could not suggest it be abandoned for theories in physics or biology. But unlike the question, ‘Is every even number greater than 2 equal to the sum of two primes?’ the mind-body problem cannot be solved a priori, by analysis alone; though I will not argue this thesis here, it is nearly obvious, since purported solutions must make matter of fact claims, heavy with existential import, about the real world. By contrast, an investigation of the sensitivity of the mind-body problem to empirical evidence will show that purported solutions to the problem are empirically testable, to a degree consistent with philosophy giving a clarified mind-body problem to the sciences. I offer the bold outlines of such an investigation here.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 17 , Issue 3 , September 1987 , pp. 505 - 532
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1987

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