Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home

Commutativity, Normativity, and Holism: Lange Revisited

  • Lisa Cassell (a1)

Abstract

Lange (2000) famously argues that although Jeffrey Conditionalization is non-commutative over evidence, it’s not defective in virtue of this feature. Since reversing the order of the evidence in a sequence of updates that don’t commute does not reverse the order of the experiences that underwrite these revisions, the conditions required to generate commutativity failure at the level of experience will fail to hold in cases where we get commutativity failure at the level of evidence. If our interest in commutativity is, fundamentally, an interest in the order-invariance of information, an updating sequence that does not violate such a principle at the more fundamental level of experiential information should not be deemed defective. This paper claims that Lange’s argument fails as a general defense of the Jeffrey framework. Lange’s argument entails that the inputs to the Jeffrey framework differ from those of classical Bayesian Conditionalization in a way that makes them defective. Therefore, either the Jeffrey framework is defective in virtue of not commuting its inputs, or else it is defective in virtue of commuting the wrong kinds of ones.

  • View HTML
    • Send article to Kindle

      To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

      Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

      Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

      Commutativity, Normativity, and Holism: Lange Revisited
      Available formats
      ×

      Send article to Dropbox

      To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

      Commutativity, Normativity, and Holism: Lange Revisited
      Available formats
      ×

      Send article to Google Drive

      To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

      Commutativity, Normativity, and Holism: Lange Revisited
      Available formats
      ×

Copyright

Corresponding author

References

Hide All
Bradley, Richard. 2005. “Radical Probabilism and Bayesian Conditionalization.” Philosophy of Science, 72(2): 342–64.
Christensen, David. 1992. “Confirmation Holism and Bayesian Epistemology.” Philosophy of Science, 59(4): 540–57.
Diaconis, Persi, and Zabell, Sandy. 1982. “Updating Subjective Probability.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 77 (380): 822–30.
Domotor, Zoltan. 1980. “Probability Kinematics and Representation of Belief Change.” Philosophy of Science, 47: 384403.
Doring, Frank. 1999. “Why Bayesian Psychology is Incomplete.” Philosophy of Science (Proceedings), 66: 379–89.
Dunn, Jeffrey. “Bayesian Epistemology and Having Evidence” (PhD diss., University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 2010).
Dunn, Jeffrey. 2015. “Reliability for Degrees of Belief.” Philosophical Studies, 172(7): 1929–52.
Field, Hartry. 1978. “A Note on Jeffrey Conditionalization.” Philosophy of Science, 45(3): 361–67.
Garber, Daniel. 1980. “Field and Jeffrey Conditionalization.” Philosophy of Science, 47(1): 142–45.
Hedden, Brian. 2015. Reasons without Persons: Rationality, Identity, and Time. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Jeffrey, Richard. 1965. The Logic of Decision. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Jeffrey, Richard. 1975. “Carnap’s Empiricism.” In Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Induction, Probability, and Confirmation Vol. 6, edited by Maxwell, G. and Jr.Anderson, R. M., 3749. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Lange, Marc. 2000. “Is Jeffrey Conditionalization Defective in Virtue of Being Non-Commutative.” Synthese, 123(3): 393403.
Schwartz, Wolfgang. 2018. “Imaginary Foundations.” Ergo, 29: 764–89.
van Fraassen, Bas. 1984. “Belief and the Will.” Journal of Philosophy, 81: 235–56.
Wagner, Carl. 2002. “Probability Kinematics and Commutativity.” Philosophy of Science, 69: 266–78.
Wagner, Carl. 2003. “Commuting Probability Revisions: The Uniformity Rule.” Erkenntnis 59 (3): 349–64.
Weisberg, Jonathan. 2009. “Commutativity or Holism? A Dilemma for Conditionalizers.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 60(4): 793812.

Keywords

Commutativity, Normativity, and Holism: Lange Revisited

  • Lisa Cassell (a1)

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between <date>. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed