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Not the optimistic type

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Ben Caplan ,
Chris Tillman ,
Brian McLean  and
Adam Murray
Ben Caplan*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Ohio State University, 350 University Hall, 230 N. Oval Mall, Columbus, OH, USA, 43210
Chris Tillman
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Manitoba, 454 University College, Winnipeg, MBR3T 2N2
Brian McLean
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Ohio State University, 350 University Hall, 230 N. Oval Mall, Columbus, OH, USA, 43210
Adam Murray
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, 170 St. George Street, Toronto, ONM5R 2M8
*
*Corresponding author. Email: caplan.16@osu.edu
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Abstract

In recent work, Peter Hanks and Scott Soames argue for the type view, according to which propositions are types whose tokens are acts, states, or events. Hanks and Soames think that one of the virtues of the type view is that it allows them to explain why propositions have semantic properties. But, in this paper, we argue that their explanations aren't satisfactory.

Keywords

propositionssemanticstypesHanksSoames
Type
On Act- and Language-Based Conceptions of Propositions
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 43 , Issue 5-6: Special issue: Essays on the Nature of Propositions , December 2013 , pp. 575 - 589
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2013

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References

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