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Shame and Other Cases of Modularity without Modules

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Ruwen Ogien
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Extract

On the surface, self-centred emotions like shame or pride are related to subtle understandings of one's own identity and relevant objects (Taylor 1985; Ben Ze'ev 2000). Changes of beliefs about these objects often result in changes in the related emotions.

If I am very proud that, on the first of April, I won the Jacques Chirac Prize for moral philosophy and then realize that it was just an April Fool's joke, my pride will probably vanish. I will probably be ashamed that I believed it. Cases like this support the idea that having beliefs is a necessary condition for feeling pride or shame.

If this is true and if we endorse Jerry Fodor's views about modularity, it follows that shame can't be modular because, according to these views, no beliefs or other central mental processes are supposed to be involved in the operation of modules (Fodor 1983). Further, contempt, derision, or avoidance are supposed to be typical causes of shame, but they may trigger other emotions as well: hatred, anger, self-pity, or sadness, etc.

Type
4. The Modularity of Particular Emotion Types
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 32: The Modularity of Emotions , 2006 , pp. 230 - 254
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2006

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