2 Prichard, H.A“Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”, Mind 21 (1912): 21–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar (at 21,26). This essay is reprinted in Prichard, H.AMoral Writings, ed. MacAdam, Jim (Oxford: Clarendon, 2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. We rely on pagination in the original essay since it is conveniently available in electronic form available at http:/ /www. ditext.com/prichard/mistake.html. All other references are to the MacAdam edition.

3 He writes that, “if we do doubt whether there is really an obligation to originate A in a situation B, the remedy lies not in any process of general thinking, but in getting face to face with a particular instance of the situation B, and then directly appreciating the obligation to originate A in that situation.” “Does Moral Philosophy …”, 37. This passage, like much of this early paper, is often ambiguous between the belief that an action is an obligation and the belief that there is reason to keep our obligations. We argue in the text that Prichard disambiguated these issues in his later writings, and was mainly concerned with the latter.

4 “Duty and Interest,” originally published in 1928 and reprinted in H.A. Prichard, Moral Writings, 49.

5 “What is the Basis of Moral Obligation?”, reprinted in H.A. Prichard, Moral Writings, 2.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 “Duty and Interest,” 29; “What is the Basis of Moral Obligation?”, 4.

9 “Does Moral Philosophy …”, 28.

10 “Manuscript on Morals,” 117, reprinted in H.A. Prichard, Moral Writings.

11 Prichard borrows the “unconnected heap” phrase from H.W.B. Joseph. See “Moral Obligation,” reprinted in H.A. Prichard, Moral Writings, 164,185.

12 Prichard also distinguishes the constitution question described in the text from the following question relating to our beliefs: “What is the common character which leads us to think certain actions right, whether truly or falsely?”, “Manuscript on Morals,” 118. It is the former question that he addresses.

13 “What is the Basis of Moral Obligation?”, 3.

14 Ibid., 2-3.

15 “At best it can only be maintained that there is element of truth in the Utilitarian view that unless we recognized that something which an act will originate is good, we should not recognize that we ought to do the action. Unless we thought knowledge a good thing, it may be urged, we should not think that we ought to tell the truth; unless we thought pain a bad thing, we should not think the infliction of it, without special reason, wrong. But this is not to imply that the badness of error is the reason why it is wrong to lie, or the badness of pain the reason why we ought not to inflict it without special cause.” H. A. Prichard, “Does Moral Philosophy …”, 25.

16 “What is the Basis of Moral Obligation?”, 2. Compare “Does Moral Philosophy …”,25.

17 “Thus in thinking that keeping our promise to X is right we are thinking if its Tightness as constituted by its being the keeping of our promise to X.” “Manuscript on Morals,” 122.

18 “Moral Obligation,” 187-88. For more on Prichard's views regarding the constitution of morality see Jonathan Dancy, “Prichard,” http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prichard/.

19 “Duty and Interest,” 29.

20 “Moral Obligation,” 188.

21 “Manuscript on Morals,” 142—13.

22 “Moral Obligation,” 188; cf. “Manuscript on Morals,” 142-13.

23 “Manuscript on Morals,” 144.

24 Ibid., 143-44. Robert Audi claims that Sidgwick endorses utilitarian intuitionism. Contra Prichard, on Audi's reading of Sidgwick, the principle of utility is inferred from two principles (the good is agent-neutral, and a person should promote the good) that are known directly. See The Good in the Right (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 10.Google Scholar

25 “Manuscript on Morals,” 142-43.

26 Ibid., 119.

27 Ibid., 142.

28 Ibid., 138.

29 “Moral Obligation,” 197.

30 Ibid., 197. Prichard suggests that Sidgwick endorsed or ought to have endorsed a ‘quasi-teleological’ view.

31 “Does Moral Philosophy …”, 21.

32 Ibid., 21. Cf. “Manuscript on Morals“: “our procedures must take the form of a proof that we ought to do certain actions” (125, original emphasis).

33 “Does Moral Philosophy …”, 22.

34 The extended discussion of Green is found in “Duty and Interest,“; the remaining figures are singled out in “Does Moral Philosophy ….“

35 Regarding the connection between duty and interest, Prichard writes: “No general answer is possible; on some occasions it may be that we ought to do our duty, and on others it may not, but as we never know all the consequences to ourselves of an action, we never know whether we ought, in the non-moral sense, to do any particular action, whether a duty or not, though sometimes we may be able to have a fairly good opinion about it.” “Moral Obligation,” 183.

36 “Does Moral Philosophy …”, 23.

37 Prichard has other complaints. He alleges that some philosophers (e.g., Butler) hold that promoting egoistic concerns is what renders right actions right. But he emphasizes, in a long discussion of Plato, that egoistic theories of obligation needn't presuppose egoistic constitution theories of a kind he attributes to Butler. See “Duty and Interest,” 27.

38 “Does Moral Philosophy …”, 23.

39 Prichard also emphasizes that there is a certain conception of action holding that a person will only intend what they judge to be the means to their ends. He thinks that theory of action is mistaken. But he claims that the mistaken doctrine helps explain why philosophers like Plato and Butler attempt to show that duty is conducive to individual happiness. See “Duty and Interest,” 34-37.

40 “Manuscript on Morals,” 125.

41 Ibid., 119.

42 Ibid., 128.

43 Ibid., 126. See also “Moral Obligation,” 166.

44 See Hurka, Tom“Underivative Duty: Prichard on Moral Obligation,” Social Philosophy and Policy (forthcoming).Google Scholar We thank Hurka for sharing this stimulating essay with us and for his generous correspondance on these issues.

45 “Manuscript on Morals,” 128.

46 “Moral Obligation,” 166.

47 Ibid., 188. See also “Manuscript on Morals,” 142-43.

48 “Does Moral Philosophy …”, 26.

49 “Moral Obligation,” 203.

50 Ibid., 198. Compare “Does Moral Philosophy …”, 26.

51 “Moral Obligation,” 203.

52 He writes that “the ‘ought’ of obligation is not that of ‘ought-to-exist', and that therefore they [intrinsic goodness theories like Moore's and Kant's] are resolving obligation into something which it is not.” “Moral Obligation,” 225.

53 “Does Moral Philosophy …”, 24.

54 “Moral Obligation,” 217.

55 This reconstruction is more elaborate, but consistent with Christine Korsgaard's interpretation. See The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996)Google Scholar, 32 and 32n52.

56 Prichard, “Does Moral Philosophy …”, 21.

57 Admittedly there is some ambiguity as to whether David Gauthier believes that the social contract over which rational agents bargain is the constituent of right action or a replacement for morality. That issue itself largely depends on the kinds of semantic considerations one sees as constraining conceptions of morality; in fact, one could read the ambiguity simply as an intentional neutrality regarding such constraints. We do not see this issue as germane to the present discussion because, on either reading, an agent's reason to be moral (or “moral“) are grounded in one's self-interest, either because morality itself is defined in terms of the hypothetical contract or because all that is left of our pre-theoretical concept of “morality” are such agreements.

58 Gaufhier, David“Why Contractarianism?” in Contractarianism and Rational Choice, ed. Vallentyne, Peter (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991): 15–30Google Scholar (at 30), and Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).Google Scholar

59 “Prichard vs. Plato: Intuition vs. Reflection,” this volume, 1-32 (at 4). See also Hursthouse, RosalindOn Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)Google Scholar for an argument in favour of the interconnectedness of virtue and happiness.

60 Ibid.

61 E.g., Singer, PeterHow Are We To Live? (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 1995)Google Scholar, chap. 1. Prichard attributes a view of that kind to Plato in “Duty and Interest.“

62 131-147, at 133.

63 Ibic, 144.

64 149-170, at 151.

65 Ibid., 155.

66 “Underivative Duty: Prichard on Moral Obligation,” Social Philosophy and Policy (forthcoming).Google Scholar

67 Gibbard, AllanWise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 49.Google Scholar

68 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Gregor, Mary trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 23Google Scholar (4:412).

69 171-196, at 178, emphasis in original.

70 Ibid., 171.

71 “Applied Ethics, Moral Skepticism and Reasons with Expiration Dates,” 263-280, at 264.

72 Ibid., 270.

73 Ibid., 276.

74 Ibid., 280.