Hostname: page-component-7479d7b7d-pfhbr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-10T00:39:19.263Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Rights, Utilities and Contracts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Alan H. Goldman
Alan H. Goldman*
Affiliation:
University of Miami
Get access

Extract

My purpose here is to show how rights relate to utilities by showing how they arise from interests. My account will support a classic objection to utilitarianism—that the utilitarian who simply adds and balances utilities on an equal scale cannot generate a plausible analysis of rights. On the other hand, I will maintain that rights are recognized only to protect or guarantee the satisfaction of certain interests. One central claim will be that certain interests must be internally ordered in a nonadditive way, while others are merely added or balanced in sum in deciding moral courses of action or social policy. I will also indicate how different contractarian frameworks generate systems of rights from interests and how priorities among rights can be established by thinking of these different frameworks.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 3: New Essays on Contract Theory , 1977 , pp. 121 - 135
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1977

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Cf. Wasserstrom, Richard, “Rights, Human Rights, and Racial Discrimination,“ The journal of Philosophy, LXI (1964) : 628-41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Cf. Feinberg, Joel, Social Philosophy (New Jersey, 1973),Google Scholar Chap. V.

3 The right of those most competent to various positions has been debated of late in relation to the topic of reverse discrimination. I believe that unless we recognize such rights, we will have to find not only reverse discrimination, but first order discrimination as well not seriously unjust. For full discussion see Goldman, A., “Justice and Hiring by Competence,” American Philosophical Quarterly, XIV (1977); 17-28.Google Scholar

4 Cf. Feinberg, Joel, “The Nature and Value of Rights,” The journal of Value Inquiry, IV (1970) : 243-57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 Melden, A.I., “The Play of Rights,” The Monist, LVI (1972) : 479-502,Google Scholar p. 497.

6 I speak of a fundamental right to have one's interests considered equally, rather than an equal right to freedom, as does H.L.A. Hart, since I think it is awkward to speak of rights to goods as freedoms. Cf. Hart, , “Are There Any Natural Rights?”, The Philosophical Review, LXIV (1955) : 175-91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar