Hostname: page-component-7479d7b7d-m9pkr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-10T11:23:03.389Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Biological Modules and Emotions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Paul Dumouchel
Get access

Extract

But as for most genes, they are not the units of interest once we get to the network level: it is the whole conspiracy we care about. (von Dassow and Meir 2003, 27)

Biologists, more precisely evolutionary biologists, and not only psychologists and philosophers also speak of modularity. However the way in which this theoretical construct functions in their discipline is relatively different from the role it obtains in evolutionary psychology and cognitive science. Rather than postulating modules to explain particular traits of organisms, such as the specificity of input systems or limitations of human reasoning abilities, biologists originally simply assume that some form of modularity constitutes a precondition of evolution. They argue that, in order for natural selection to fine tune organisms to their environment, different traits must be able to evolve independently from one another. This implies modularity in one form or another. Organisms will only be able to adapt if they do not come all in one piece, so to speak. It must therefore be possible for changes to occur in one characteristic of an animal without those changes having repercussions throughout the whole organism.

Type
2. Modularity and Basic Emotions
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 32: The Modularity of Emotions , 2006 , pp. 115 - 134
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2006

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Adolphs, R. 2003. Neural systems for recognizing emotions in humans. In The Design of Animal Communication, ed. Hauser, M. D. and Konishi, M., 187–211. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.Google Scholar
Ameisen, J.-C. 1999. La Sculpture du vivant. Le suicide cellulaire ou Ia mort creatrice. Paris: Seuil.Google Scholar
Borycki, A.-G. 2003. Sonic hedgehog and wnt signaling pathways during development and evolution. In Modularity in Development and Evolution, ed. Schlosser, G. and Wagner, G.. Chicago: Chicago University Press.Google Scholar
Camazine, S., J.-L., Deneubourg, N. R., Franks, J., Sneyd, G., Theraulaz, and E., Bonabeau. 2003. Self-Organization in Biological Systems. Princeton: Princeton University.Press.Google Scholar
D. L, Cheney, and R. M., Seyfarth. 1999 Mechanism underlying the vocalizations of nonhuman primates. In The Design of Animal Communication, ed. Hauser, M. D. and Konishi, M., 627-43. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.Google Scholar
Cosmides, L., and J., Tooby. 2000. Evolutionary psychology and the emotions. In Handbook of Emotions, ed. Lewis, M. and Haviland-Jones, J., 91–115. New York: The Guilford Press.Google Scholar
Cowley, S.J. 1997. Of representations and language. Language and Communication 17(4): 279–300.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cowley, S.J. 1998. On timing, tum-taking, and conversation. Journal of Psycholinguistic Research 27(5): 541-71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
de Celis, J. F. 2003. The notch signaling module. In Modularity in Development and Evolution, ed. Schlosser, G. and Wagner, G.. Chicago: Chicago University Press.Google Scholar
de Waal, F. BM., and F., Aureli. 1999. Conflict resolution and distress alleviation in monkeys and apes. In The Integrative Neurobiology of Affiliation, ed. Carter, S., Lederhendler, I., and Kirkpatrick, B.. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.Google Scholar
Decety, J. 2002. Neurobiologie des representations motrices partagées. In lmiter pour decouvrir l'humain, ed. Nadel, J. and Decety, J., 105-30. Paris: PUF.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fodor, J. 1983. The Modularity of Mind. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frank, R. 1988. Passions within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions. New York: Norton.Google Scholar
Frank, R. 2004. In defense of sincerity detection: Response to Ross and Dumouchel. Rationality and Society 16(3): 287–305.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gergely, G., O., Koos, and J. S., Watson. 2002. Perception causale et role des comportements immitatifs des parents dans le developpement socioémotionnel precoce. In lmiter pour decouvrir l'humain, ed. Nadel, J. and Decety, J., 59–82. Paris: PUF.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gibbard, A. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Oxford: Oxford University.Press.Google Scholar
M. D, Hauser, and M., Konishi. 2003. The Design of Animal Communication. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.Google Scholar
Hobbes, T. 1651. Leviathan. Indianapolis: Hackett.Google Scholar
Hutcheson, F. [1726]2004. An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. Leidhold, Wolfgang, ed. Indianapolis: Liberty Classic.Google Scholar
Kardon, G., T. A., Heanue, and C. T., Tabin. 2003. The Pax/Six/Eya/Dach network in development and evolution. In Modularity in Development and Evolution, ed. Schlosser, G. and Wagner, G.. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Kelley, E. F. 2002. Making Sense of Life. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
LeDoux, J. 1998. The Emotional Brain. New York: Simon & Schuster.Google Scholar
Levine, S., D. M., Lyons, and F., Schatzberg. 1999. Psychobiological consequences of social relationships. In The Integrative Neurobiology of Affiliation, ed. Carter, S., Lederhendler, I., and Kirkpatrick, B., 83–89. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.Google Scholar
Perret, D. I. 2003. A cellular basis for reading minds from faces and actions. In The Design of Animal Communication, ed. Hauser, M. D. and Konishi, M., 159-85. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.Google Scholar
Ross, D., and P., Dumouchel. 2004a. Emotions as strategic signals. Rationality and Society 16(3): 251-86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ross, D., and P., Dumouchel. 2004b. Sincerity is just consistency: Reply to Frank. Rationality and Society 16(3): 207–318.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schlosser, G. 2003. The role of module in development and evolution. In Modularity in Development and Evolution, ed. Schlosser, G. and Wagner, G., 525. Chicago: Chicago University Press.Google Scholar
Skyrms, B. 1996. Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge: Cambridge University.Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sloman, A. 2002. How many separately evolved emotional beasties live within us? In Emotions in Humans and Aritifacts, ed. Trappl, R., Petta, P., and Payr, S., 35–114. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.Google Scholar
Smith, A. (1759)1976. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Indianapolis: Liberty Classic.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Strähle, U., and P., Blader. 2003. The basic helix-loop-helix proteins in vertebrate and invertebrate neurogenesis. In Modularity in Development and Evolution, ed. Schlosser, G. and Wagner, G.. Chicago: Chicago University Press.Google Scholar
Strawson, P. 1963. Freedom and resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy 48: 1–25.Google Scholar
von Dassow, G., and E., Meir. 2003. Exploring modularity with dynamical models of gene networks. In Modularity in Development and Evolution, ed. Schlosser, G. and Wagner, G.. Chicago: Chicago University Press.Google Scholar
Wallen, K., and P. L., Tannenbaum. 1999. Hormone Modulation of sexual behavior and affiliation in rhesus monkeys. In The Integrative Neurobiology of Affiliation, ed. Carter, S., I., Lederhendler, and Kirkpatrick, B., 101-18. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.Google Scholar