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Aristotle and Aquinas on Cognition
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Extract
There is little need today to be apologetic about making Aristotle the basis for a philosophical discussion on human cognition. Interest in the Stagirite is in fact on the upsurge: interest in Aristotle not merely as a great thinker who lived in a particular epoch of time, but more pointedly as a philosopher who has much to offer for the promotion of serious thinking in our own day. In this regard I might merely refer to some straws that are indicative of the direction in which the winds are blowing. One was a series of four lectures given by Richard Sorabji in the spring of 1990 at the University of Toronto, in which the relevance of Aristotle for understanding current philosophical problems became strikingly apparent to those who listened to or took part in the discussions. Another was the conference held at the University of Alberta the same year on Aristotle and his medieval commentators. A third is the reprinting of John Herman Randall’s book Aristotle, which is scheduled to appear shortly in the collection entitled The Easton Press Library of Great Lives.
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 17: Aristotle and his Medieval Interpreters , 1991 , pp. 103 - 123
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Authors 1991
References
1 Herman Randall, John Jr.Aristotle (New York: Columbia University Press 1960) 300.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2 Aristotle [4], Metaphysics XII.7.1072b30–1073al
3 Aristotle [1], De interpretation 1.16a3–8
4 Aristotle [3], De anima III.4.429a21–4
5 Ibid., III.2.425b25–426al9; 5.430al9–20; 7.431al-2; 8.431b20–3
6 Augustine [2], De magistro 12.40; 48.23-49.5
7 Russell, , My Philosophical Development (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1959), 230.Google Scholar
8 Brent Madison, Gary ‘Hermeneutics and (the) Tradition,’ Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 62 (1988), 169.Google Scholar
9 Aristotle [4], Metaphysics XII.9.1074b35–6
10 Ibid., IV.2.1003b22–30
11 Aquinas Scriptum super Sententiis 1.36.1.3 ad lm; Thomas Aquinas [2], I, 836.
12 Aquinas, Quaestiones quodlibetales 8.1.1. Resp.; Thomas Aquinas [10] 159-60.
13 Aristotle [3], De Anima III.8.431b28–432a3; cf. I.5.410al-12
14 Aquinas, Thomas [8], De veritate 2.2.Solut.; Thomas Aquinas [1] vol. XXII, 44.118–33
15 For a discussion of this topic, see Haack, Susan ‘Recent Obituaries of Epistemology,’ American Philosophical Quarterly, 27 (1990) 199-212Google Scholar
16 Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 1.1.4; John Locke [1], 44–5. Cf. ibid., ‘Epistle to the Reader,’ 7.
17 Cf. Russell, Bertrand “I could no longer believe that knowing makes any difference to what is known” [First Series], Muirhead, J. H. ed. [London: George Allen & Unwin 1924], 360).Google Scholar This was in reaction to the argument previously accepted from Bradley that a thing may be altered in the process of being known: “And you cannot ever get your product standing apart from its process” (Bradley, Francis HerbertAppearance and Reality, 9th imp. [Oxford: Clarendon 1930], 23).Google Scholar