This paper briefly and systematically examines H. L. A. Hart's life and work in the philosophy of law and jurisprudence. The author discusses his most important contributions and attempts to demonstrate the originality and innovation of Hart's philosophy, which, more than 40 years ago, revolutionized the philosophy of law in English-speaking countries.

This paper represents the first scholarly effort to explore the meaning and practice of divorce in Canada between the end of World War II and the coming of divorce reform in 1968. It is based on a thorough analysis of the case files of the divorce court of Prince Edward Island, resurrected in 1946 to deal with divorce in that province. The paper attempts to place the law and practice of divorce in Prince Edward Island in a national context. It also discusses social patterns of divorce 1946–67 (based upon data never before collected for the period), generally finding them consistent with other available information for the periods immediately preceding and following the one under discussion. The paper concludes with an examination of patterns of divorce among farm families on the Island, exploring other explanatory variables besides traditional morality to explain their distinctiveness

This paper argues that the effort to teach law critically from the external viewpoint reinforces the ideological and social function of a professional law school in a modern state. One should realize that law is a language, a secondary language that conceals suffering as it parasitically assimilates all primary discourses. The professional law school of a modern state aids in the production of such concealment. Examples are offered from different areas of legal discourse as well as from the author's experiences. The suffering arises from the concealment of the languages of embodied subjects, whose harm can only be recognized through the chains of authoritative signifiers that the professor pro-fesses. The secondary legal language either excludes the primary languages or redefines the subject's experience. Further, the legal language is inculcated into the subject's language to the point that the citizen must identify with the secondary legal language or, if not, may be authoritatively en-forced to do so. The second sense of suffering aggravates the first.

Western mediators have accepted at face value claims as to the general acceptability and voluntariness of Chinese mediation. Their failure to attend to the cultural context in which Chinese mediation practices are embedded has led to a partial and uncritical impression. Those who cite current mediation practices in China either as positive examples or as models to follow should note mediation's implication in the social control exercised by an authoritarian government and the maintenance of feudal, or patriarchal, norms.

In this article, the author proposes the creation of a parliamentary organization of technology assessment. Beginning with the definition of the concept of technology assessment and a review of the deficiencies of the actual parliamentary assessment of technological developments, he presents Canada's interests in this project. An organization of technology assessment would better inform the members of Parliament on questions concerning technology. It would also facilitate true and open debates on technological developments. After a brief examination of some foreign examples, the author portrays some of the structural and practical aspects of a Canadian organization of technology assessment that would be composed approximatively of ten members of Parliament assisted by two advisory groups. He further discusses the elements required for the success of this project. Finally, the integration of the North American economy is said to cast doubt on the sufficiency of the institutionalization of technology assessment at the national level. The author therefore favors regional collaboration in matters regarding technology assessment.

A social activity is characterized and understood, this paper argues, only after one has found a place to put it among one's more general understandings and a frame to put around it to render it discrete and prevent its escape into chaos. Framing and reframing are the concomitants of social struggles for and against closure and exclusion. The paper sees critique as a form of practical and scholarly struggle against disciplinary closure, doubting question posed to disciplines. Law school education in Australia, because it offers guaranteed universal knowledge about its object, law, is unsympathetic to critique.

The social sciences have been prominent in demonstrating that the legislative approach of the early years to systemic discrimination was erroneous insofar as the individual and intentional foundation of this phenomenon is concerned. Sociological studies have identified sources and socio-cultural effects that have brought to light the collective and perceptual dimensions of a phenomenon that proves to be social and complex before it is individual. Further, an overview of the major decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada shows the legal evolution of the notion of discrimination itself toward recognition of a singular concept with variables that are simple or multiple, homogeneous or complex, but above all inseparable. This article concludes with a brief presentation of the systemic approach, an analytical framework for complex phenomena introduced as a useful and pertinent tool in the study of situations involving discrimination.

This article directs attention to the regulatory system in Canada and highlights certain important organizational developments that have been largely ignored by political scientists and legal academics in their studies of this system. Most analysts assessing the nature and functioning of the regulatory system in this country have used pluralist approaches to understand the political and legal phenomena in question, and have explicitly or implicitly rejected the validity of corporatist approaches to this task. This is unwise. Evidence from various regulatory agencies in this country indicates that meso corporatist forms of organization are present in this country's regulatory system. The presence of these forms thus calls for recognition and analysis. The author argues that while a modest degree of corporatism does not invalidate the general worth of pluralist interpretative approaches, our understanding of the regulatory system can only be enhanced through an appreciation of how and why meso corporatist forms of organization arise in particular regulatory agencies and how these developments pose a challenge to agency accountability

In Moore v. Regents of the University of California, the Supreme Court of California held that the human source of blood and tissue used by his physician and other defendants in potentially lucrative medical research without his permission could not assert a legal claim that, in doing so, the defendants had deprived him of any property right in these materials or the cell line developed from them. He was, however, permitted to proceed with his claim that there had been a failure to obtain his informed consent to the excision or removal of these materials, given that their end uses were not disclosed. The decision in Moore is but one example of the range of new legal problems created by the many and rapid advances in biotechnology, and of the attempts courts are making to respond. The judgment raises questions about whether these types of issues as between the patient and medical, research, and pharmaceutical concerns can or ought to be analyzed in terms of property rights. Are the general justifications for recognizing proprietary rights that have traditionally been influential in judicial decisions useful or helpful in this context? And what of the identity of the decision-maker? In Moore, the majority was content to effectively delegate much of the decision-making authority to the U.S. Patent Office and the Office of Technology Assessment. While there are no Canadian decisions directly on point as yet, the pace of technological advances, the potential for economic gain, and the international nature of biotechnology enterprises all set the scene for these issues' coming before our courts in the near future. This paper begins to explore the implications of adopting an analytical model based on property rights and to address the fact that the biotechnology industry already operates on the premise that such material can be owned. It concludes that the current legal regime needs to be modified to allow effective control of these new realities and suggests principles that might be adopted to address important concerns that are raised by the transformation of human tissue and cells into economic goods.

Most, if not all, high school graduates have experienced the following event at some stage of their academic careers. Their teacher wishes to leave the classroom but is fearful about the noise level that will ensue after he or she departs, and so issues the following stern warning to the class:

Our system of justice is generally referred to as an “adversary system,” although this term is used very loosely. At times, the term is used in a technical way to refer to a system with structured rules of evidence, party presentation of evidence, and a neutral decision-maker. At other times, the phrase seems to be given a broader meaning, referring to the way in which law is practised—that hard-headed competitiveness is the proper, and normal, approach. In fact, neither the rules of our justice system, whether criminal or civil, nor the way in which lawyers behave most of the time are best described as “adversarial.” The current situation, in which largely nonadversarial behavior and rules are described as an adversary system, gives rise to confusion and, more importantly, to unethical action. A possible solution is to cease calling our system an adversary one, and to acknowledge that other rules and behavior are more defining.

One of the former members of the U.S. Sentencing Commission was an economist who proposed the following reasoning during a conference on sentencing held in Ottawa in 1988. Since there was no doubt that doubling all fares for air travel would result, at least momentarily, in fewer customers using air transportation, it was presumed to follow at least as clearly that noticeably increasing the punishment for crime would result in fewer persons willing to engage in crime. What the economist had overlooked was that the probability that you would have to pay for your plane ticket at the increased rate is very high; actually, you cannot fly unless you have bought a ticket. In contrast, the probability that a criminal will be caught and suffer the consequences of his or her behavior is perceived to be rather low in the case of most criminals, and with regard to certain crimes, such as break and enter, is actually quite low. Hence, increasing criminal punishments will not deter criminals as automatically as raising the cost of air travel will deter potential customers.

I welcome the opportunity to respond to Professor Brodeur's thoughtful and provocative comments on my paper. Notwithstanding the gracious tone of his rejoinder, I am afraid that I must take issue with several points that Professor Brodeur makes.

The concept of “collective punishment” is a rather elastic one that lends itself to a wide range of interpretation. I believe that ambiguity in the interpretation of “collective punishment” lies at the heart of the differences between Professor Brodeur and myself.

To elaborate, let me begin by drawing a sharp distinction between the following two types of policy:

(i) an authority punishes, in an undifferentiated way, each member of a group (of suspects) known to comprise innocent and guilty individuals;

(ii) an authority punishes a guilty individual, but in doing so, unintentionally or unavoidably causes a harmful effect upon innocent third parties.

Given the recent penetration of the judicial profession by women, and concomitant speculation about the possible impact of women judges upon judicial decision-making, the authors examine criminal appeals to the Alberta Court of Appeal between 1985 and 1992 to address in general statistical terms the parameters of the participation of women judges. The results suggest that there is little statistically identifiable difference in the performance of men and women judges, even on specific issues such as sexual assault offenses, and what modest differences can be found are in the opposite direction from those suggested by comparable research in the United States

This comment is approached with some trepidation. My eclectic background does not allow me the peace of mind I might have if I had arrived at this point in my life with a more connected or cohesive history. I therefore approach this review from at least three perspectives: (i) as a sociologist with training in traditional social science research methods and methodology, (ii) as a lawyer with some experience prosecuting in provincial court, and (iii) as an academic who has recently dabbled in feminist legal methods and methodology, in law and the social sciences. The first two perspectives require assumptions about social science research and law; the third perspective challenges, questions, and debunks many of these assumptions. Whether there can be an integration of the third with the first or the second is the subject of much debate among feminist academics in, and between, the social sciences and law. At times it is unclear which perspective is influencing my comments, and so I slide from one to another and back again.

As recipients of a “Comment” longer than our own article, we cannot help being reminded of Abraham Lincoln's story about the man who was being tarred and feathered and run out of town on a rail. Queried by a bystander, the man replied: “Actually, if it wasn't for the honor of the thing, I'd rather walk.” We appreciate the courtesy of the Journal in permitting us to make a brief nonfeminist response to a self-described feminist critique of a nonfeminist article.

We have, of course, the same ultimate destination as Ms. Brockman, that being some empirically grounded understanding of whether, and if so how, the participation of women judges is changing the judicial system. This is a very large and a very important question; our immediate and much more modest purpose, as our opening comments stressed, was “to assess one fragment of the accumulating evidence.” It seemed to us that it would have been important to know if women trial judges were reversed far more often than men, or if the performance of women appeal judges differed from that of their male colleagues in some way that could be generally characterized and linked to gender. This being so, it seemed just as important—although much less exciting—to report that there is (in one province, over a limited number of years, on criminal cases only) no clear indication of either of these trends.