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³ E.g., Brenner, N. & Theodore, N., “Cities and the Geographies of ‘Actually Existing Neoliberalism’” (2002) 34 Antipode 349CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hubbard, P., “Revenge and Injustice in the Neoliberal City: Uncovering Masculinist Agendas” (2004) 36 Antipode 665CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ruppert, E., The Moral Economy of Cities: Making Good Citizens (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006)Google Scholar.

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⁹ This is not to say other cities in the U.S., U.K. and Canada have not encountered similar problems with entertainment districts.

¹⁰ Blomley, N., Unsettling the City: Urban Land and the Politics of Property (New York: Routledge, 2004) at 30Google Scholar.

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¹⁶ See Rose, N., Powers of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dean, M., Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1999)Google Scholar.

¹⁷ See Lippert, R., Sanctuary, Sovereignty, Sacrifice: Canadian Sanctuary Incidents, Power, and Law (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005) at 5–6Google Scholar.

¹⁸ See Stenson, K., “Sovereignty, Bio-politics, and the Local Government of Crime in Britain” (2005) 9 Theoretical Criminology 265CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hunt, A., Governing Morals: a Social History of Moral Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)Google Scholar; Lippert, R., “Rationalities and Refugee Resettlement” (1998) 27 Economy and Society 380CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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²¹ Valverde, “Authorizing”, supra note 20 at 421.

²² Approaching B.R. as an agent is a heuristic device that seeks to lay bare the Bellmio Report's influence.

²³ City of Windsor, Assessment of Social and Physical Conditions in Windsor's City Centre by Bellmio, Peter (January 2003) [Bellmio Report]Google Scholar.

²⁴ City of Windsor, Windsor City Centre Revitalization and Design Study: Final Report (Brisbin Brook Beynon Architect/Urban Design and Planning, September 1994) at 1 [Windsor Revitalization and Design Study]Google Scholar.

²⁵ Though no explicit policy of relaxing business licensing requirements for potential downtown businesses was implemented during the 1990s, few if any special conditions for bars were actually in place, other than those targeting smoking. After election of the hybrid neo-liberal/neo-conservative Harris government in 1995, Ontario's municipalities were generally discouraged from increasing licensing restrictions on business activity. Revocations of business licenses for bars by the local licensing commission were unheard of in part because the burden of proof rested with the City officials. Such recommendations to the licensing commission by City officials were avoided because they were likely to be challenged in the provincial courts, thus operating in the shadow of law—not unlike local planning decisions in relation to the provincial OMB noted above—and in order to avoid generating the undesirable image of government bureaucracy ending a small businessperson's capacity to make a living. However, as downtown residents' complaints about “kiddie bars” mounted, gradually specific conditions such as keeping bar doors and windows closed to reduce noise and having adequate security arrangements were introduced. In 2004 a new licensing regime and by-law (City of Windsor, By-law No. 395-2004, By-Law Respecting the Licensing and Regulation of Various Businesses (13 December 2004)) were introduced—notably consistent with B.R.'s arrival and recommendation to step-up by-law enforcement downtown—which for the first time specified (concurrently with the City's new zoning bylaw discussed later in this article) an “entertainment lounge.” Licensing fees were then increased dramatically from $70 annually to more than $400 for a new bar and $300 for a renewal, thus helping to deter new “kiddie bar” growth. Raising licensing fees for a specific class of business was a tactic previously used by the City to deter further growth of “strip” clubs downtown. Personal communication with City official (1 November 2007). The current licensing regime was then successfully challenged in the courts by several Windsor “strip” club owners. Part of the ruling was that the new licensing fees were plainly designed to cover policing costs in the downtown core rather than to administer the by-law and that the City could only set fees to cover the latter. See Superior Court of Justice (30 September 2005) 14 M.P.L.R. (4^th) 195.

²⁶ Windsor Revitalization and Design Study, supra note 24 at 5.

²⁷ Interview 1 [emphasis added].

²⁸ Personal communication with City official (2 May 2007).

²⁹ City of Windsor, City Centre Interim Control Land-Use Study, prepared by Next-plan Architecture Corporation and Downtown Dynamics, Inc. (2004) at 17 [Windsor Land-Use Study]Google Scholar.

³⁰ Interview 1, supra note 27.

³¹ S.O. 2001, c. 25.

³² E.g., Houstoun, L., “BIDs at Home and Abroad” (2002) Urban Land 42Google Scholar.

³³ In the U.S. these areas are called Business Improvement Districts.

³⁴ Interview 4.

³⁵ Windsor Revitalization and Design Study, supra note 24 at 158.

³⁶ Interview 3.

³⁷ E.g., Valverde & Levi, supra note 13 at 26. The Harris government came to power in 1995 on a hybrid neo-liberal—neo-conservative platform. The City of Windsor was rumoured to have been promised a full ten percent of casino revenues in the 1990s, but what have been a lucrative arrangement never materialized.

³⁸ Interview 1, supra note 27.

³⁹ See ibid.; Interview 3, supra note 36; Interview 4, supra note 36; Interviews 2 & 6.

⁴⁰ Interview 2, ibid.

⁴¹ Some residents were able to gain the attention of several City councillors but no consensus on Council formed about the bars as a consequence. A study of youth-oriented, night-time, alcohol-based industries in northern cities in the U.K. found significant age segregation whereby elderly residents were driven away from “entertainment districts.” See Hobbs, D. et al. , Bouncers: Violence and Governance in the Night-time Economy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003)Google Scholar.

⁴² Interview 3, supra note 36.

⁴³ E.g., Mayne, E., “Proposed Restaurant under Fire” Windsor Star (25 November 1999) A3Google Scholar; Battagello, D., “Freeze on New Clubs Backed; ‘Kiddie bars’ Targeted” Windsor Star (20 June 2003) A3Google Scholar; Thompson, C., “North-core Bars Shed ‘Kiddie’ Tag” Windsor Star (30 December 2004) A2Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ “Council approves 8-month Bar Ban” Windsor Star (9 December 2003) A1Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ E.g., Hall, D., “Sin City Reputation” Windsor Star (16 September 2003) A3Google Scholar. Besides adult entertainment establishments, massage parlours also gained B.R.'s attention.

⁴⁶ Laycock, J., “Bloom Falls off ‘Bartown’ Rose” Windsor Star (5 October 2001) A1Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ E.g., Macaluso, G., “Paid-duty Policing: In Whose Interest?: Potential Conflict Sparks City Debate” Windsor Star (29 August 2004) A1Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Veresuk, J. & Borysiak, M., “Hospitality Resource Panel would Benefit City- Guest Column” Windsor Star (18 October 2005) A6Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ Windsor Revitalization and Design Study, supra note 24 at 4 [emphasis added].

⁵⁰ Ibid. at 24.

⁵¹ Interview 4, supra note 34.

⁵² City of Windsor, “Report of the S.A.R.A. Model Committee regarding the recommendations by Peter Bellmio- Assessment of Social and Physical Conditions in Windsor's City Centre” (30 January 2003) at 2 [Windsor S.A.R.A. Report]Google Scholar; Interview 2, supra note 39.

⁵³ Interview 3, supra note 36.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Interview 4, supra note 34.

⁵⁶ Shortly after B.R.'s arrival the International Downtown Association “audited” Windsor's downtown BIA and subsequently encouraged increased spending on “clean and safe” measures, see Interview 5.

⁵⁷ Interview 4, supra note 34 [emphasis added].

⁵⁸ See Rose, supra note 16.

⁵⁹ See Latour, Science in Action, supra note 19.

⁶⁰ Interview 4, supra note 34.

⁶¹ Valverde, “Authorizing”, supra note 20 at 422.

⁶² Rose, supra note 16 at 28.

⁶³ Windsor S.A.R.A. Report, supra note 52 at 2 [emphasis added].

⁶⁴ See Ruppert, supra note 3.

⁶⁵ Interview 6, supra note 39.

⁶⁶ Gladwell, M., The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (New York: Black Bay Books, 2003) at 141–6Google Scholar.

⁶⁷ See Valverde, “Authorizing”, supra note 20 at 431.

⁶⁸ E.g., Downtown Windsor Business Improvement Area, “Annual Report” online: Downtown Windsor BIA <www.downtownwindsor.ca/document_uploads/2005%20 Annual%20Report.pdf>>Google Scholar [Windsor Annual Report].

⁶⁹ Supra note 2 at 31 [emphasis added].

⁷⁰ Bellmio Report, supra note 23 at 8.

⁷¹ A code of conduct was introduced into downtown bars by owners and a host program was introduced with support of the BIA after B.R., both of which plainly targeted bar patrons and operators (see Interview 4, supra note 34 & Interview 5, supra note 56). While beyond this article's scope, the code of conduct also implies young bar patrons govern “from below” according to their own logic, which undoubtedly requires having “fun” by making noise, destroying property, and occasionally engaging in violence during various stages of inebriation.

⁷² Interviews 7, 8; Windsor Annual Report, supra note 68 at 13.

⁷³ Downtown Windsor Business Improvement Association, “Position Statement,” online: Downtown Windsor BIA <www.downtownwindsor.ca/documentuploads/DWBIA_PositionStatem7B652.pdf>>Google Scholar.

⁷⁴ Windsor S.A.R.A. Report, supra note 52 at 3.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Levi, R. & Valverde, M., “Knowledge on Tap: Police Science and Common Knowledge in the Legal Regulation of Drunkenness” (2001) 26 Law and Social Inquiry 819 at 821 [Levi & Valverde, “Knowledge”]CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁸ Valverde, “Authorizing”, supra note 20 at 442.

⁷⁹ R.S.O. 1990.

⁸⁰ Windsor Land-Use Study, supra note 29 at 5.

⁸¹ City of Windsor, City Centre Revitalization Task Force, Meeting minutes (30 July 2003) at 5Google Scholar.

⁸² Interview 4, supra note 34.

⁸³ See Ashenden, S., “Reflexive Governance and Child Sexual Abuse: Liberal Welfare Rationality and the Cleveland Inquiry” (1996) 25 Economy and Society 64CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁴ Windsorfocus, “Interim Control Bylaw Good for Downtown” (December 2003) online: <http://www.windsorfocus.com>>Google Scholar.

⁸⁵ Windsor Police Service, “Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) Assessment: Windsor City Centre Sep. 9–Jan. 10” (February 2003)Google Scholar.

⁸⁶ City of Windsor Corporate Services Department, “Report on ‘Municipal Act, 2001 and Recovery of Policing Costs’” (5 February 2003) at 1Google Scholar.

⁸⁷ Interview 4, supra note 34.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Levi & Valverde, “Knowledge”, supra note 77 at 823.

⁹⁰ Williamson, D., “City Centre's Future at Stake?” Windsor Star (11 February 2003) A1Google Scholar.

⁹¹ Windsor S.A.R.A. Report, supra note 52.

⁹² Levi & Valverde, “Knowledge”, supra note 77 at 823.

⁹³ McKaig, W., “Review of Contract Duty Policing Issue for the Windsor Police Services Board” Sullivan-Mahoney, LLP (2006) at 7Google Scholar.

⁹⁴ Bellmio Report, supra note 23 at 4.

⁹⁵ E.g., Henderson, G., “Questioning Contract Cops” Windsor Star (9 September 2000) A3Google Scholar; Lippert, “Canadian Refugee”, supra note 14.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ McKaig, supra note 93.

⁹⁸ Wolfson, M., “New Contract rules for cops: Officers Randomly Chosen for Night Club, Festival Duty” Windsor Star (27 July 2006) A3Google Scholar.

⁹⁹ McKaig, supra note 93 at 49 [emphasis added].

¹⁰⁰ Letter to City of Windsor SARA Committee from Windsor Police Service, “Policing Costs for Downtown Core” (31 January 2003)Google Scholar.

¹⁰¹ Letter to City Council from City Centre Business Association, “Fact Sheet for Procedures RE: Liquor Licensing Establishment” (3 February 2003) at 1Google Scholar.

¹⁰² Windsor Land-Use Study, supra note 29 at 7.

¹⁰³ Ibid. at 26.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. at 32.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. at 33 [emphasis added].

¹⁰⁶ The BIA's tepid outcry against the prospect of this new zoning is likely due to the fact that only a segment of the downtown would experience new zoning restrictions, but also because some bar owners welcomed this development because they thought it would reduce competition in a fiercely competitive environment, one that had led to marketing strategies such as “one dollar drinks” noted above.

¹⁰⁷ Interview 5, supra note 56.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. [emphasis added].

¹⁰⁹ Windsor Land-Use Study, supra note 29.

¹¹⁰ Ibid. at 26.

¹¹¹ Bellmio Report, supra note 23 at 12 [emphasis added].

¹¹² Interview 6, supra note 39.

¹¹³ See Windsor Annual Report, supra note 68.

¹¹⁴ E.g., Coleman, supra note 4.

¹¹⁵ Interview 10.

¹¹⁶ Bellmio Report, supra note 23 at 9, 12.

¹¹⁷ Henderson, G., “Concrete Jungle Here” Windsor Star (14 September 2004) A3Google Scholar.

¹¹⁸ E.g., Ruppert, supra note 3.

¹¹⁹ Wagenningen, E., “Thirty per cent of Downtown Office Space is Now Vacant and about 15 per cent of Stores are Empty” Windsor Star (22 May 1996) A3Google Scholar.

¹²⁰ Interview 5, supra note 56.

¹²¹ “Storefront Vacancies” Windsor Star (9 March 2006) A3Google Scholar.

¹²² Windsor Revitalization and Design Study, supra note 24 at 3. Of course these effects are not wholly attributable to the downtown's security problem that threatened its economic viability. But nor would other factors (e.g., falling world oil prices, domestic automotive industry resurgence, etc.) likely have been invoked in local discourse if revitalization had prevailed.

¹²³ Interview 5, supra note 56.