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Québec's Conceptions of Aboriginal Rights*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2014

Andrée Lajoie ,
Hugues Melançon ,
Guy Rocher  and
Richard Janda
Andrée Lajoie
Affiliation:
Faculté de droit/Centre de recherche en droit public, Université de Montréal
Hugues Melançon
Affiliation:
Faculté de droit, Université de Montréal
Guy Rocher
Affiliation:
Faculté de droit/Centre de recherche en droit public, Université de Montréal
Richard Janda
Affiliation:
Faculté de droit, Université McGill
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Abstract

This study of the meaning given to aboriginal rights from within both judicial and parliamentary sources in Québec reveals, contrary to expectations, a general pattern according to which a more liberal attitude toward rights was taken by the political class than by the judiciary, except perhaps for nuances on criminal law matters. But on the whole, both groups were more insistent, and had a more open position, on legal and political autonomy, although confined within the boundaries of legal monism, than on economic rights linked with aboriginal title. Both also emphasized collective over individual rights. Beyond partisan diversity and rhetoric, there was a consensus on some basic issues, a core of specific elements common to all—or most—Quebec legislators and judges on the aboriginal question.

Résumé

Cette étude des conceptions québécoises des droits ancestraux révèle, contrairement aux attentes, une attitude plus libérale de la part de la classe politique que du pouvoir judiciaire, sauf pour certaines nuances en matière de droit criminel. Cela mis à part, les deux groupes sont plus favorables à l'autonomie politique et juridique des autochtones—cependant entendue dans un contexte moniste—qu'aux droits économiques liés au titre autochtone. Au delà des divergences et des discours partisans, on peut donc discerner un consensus dans ces deux sources sur certains éléments constitutifs des droits ancestraux.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Law and Society / La Revue Canadienne Droit et Société , Volume 13 , Issue 1 , Spring/printemps 1998 , pp. 63 - 87
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Law and Society Association 1998

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References

1. The political actors did not merely entrust judges with interpreting aboriginal rights from the beginning: it is only after several constitutional conferences failed to reach mutual agreement on the meaning of these rights that their definition was entrusted to the judiciary.

2. Method adapted by Régine Robin from the works of Harris, S. Z., more particularly Discourse Analysis Reprints (Paris: Mouton, 1963).Google Scholar Note that this is an adaptation of Harris' technique in a context where his syntaxical postulates are not endorsed: the expressions under scrutiny are simply put, when necessary, in the position of the subject of the verb in order to put predicates in evidence, so as to facilitate content analysis. See also A. Lajoie, Boivin, M.-C. & Perrault, S., «L'Efficacité spécifique respective des méthodes juridiques et linguistiques pour l'interprétation des concepts flous en droit constitutionnel» in Bourcier, Danièle, ed., L'Écriture du Droit (Paris: Diderot, 1996) at 597.Google Scholar

3. Royal Proclamation 1763 (U.K.), R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, no. 1.

4. St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. R. (1888), 14 A.C. 46 (P.C.) [hereinafter St. Catherine's Milling].

5. Calder v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1973] S.C.R. 313 [hereinafter Calder].

6. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.

7. R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 [hereinafter Van der Peet]; R. v. NTC Smokehouse Ltd., [1996] 2 S.C.R. 672 [hereinafter NTC Smokehouse]; R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 [hereinafter Gladstone].

8. R. v. Pamajewon, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821 [hereinafter Pamajewon].

9. R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101.

10. R. v. Côté, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139.

11. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (A.G.), (11 December 1997) 23 799 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Delgamuukw].

12. See Lajoie, Andrée et al. , Le Statut juridique des peuples autochtones au Québec et le pluralisme (Cowansville: Yvon Biais, 1996).Google Scholar

13. Nianentsiasa v. Akwirente (1859), 3 L.C.J. 316 (Q.B.).

14. Bastien v. Hoffman (1867), 16 R.J.R.Q. 264 (Q.B.).

15. Consolidated Statutes of Lower Canada c. 14.

16. Connolly v. Woolrich (1867), 17 R.J.R.Q. 75 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd (sub nom. Johnstone v. Connolly) [1869] 17 R.J.R.Q. 266 (Q.B.).

17. Picard v. Groslouis (1888), 7 Q.L.R. 131 (C.S.P.).

18. Commissaire aux terres indiennes v. Paiement dit St-Onge (1856), 8 R.J.R.Q. 29 (Q.B.).

19. Though lately, even common law judges have started to distinguish somewhat between land ownership and political jurisdiction, as reflected in Van der Peet, supra note 7 and Delgamuukw, supra note 11.

20. Connolly v. Woolrich, supra note 16.

21. Johnstone v. Connolly, supra note 16 at 279–80. («Even recognizing the aboriginal custom of marriage as a foreign legal rule, a Christian Lower-Canada court could not admit it, because it collides with the principles of our law and does not meet the essential characteristics of marriage in Canadian Law» [our translation]).

22. R. v. Groslouis (1944), 81 C.C.C. 167 (C.S.P.).

23. Corinthe v. The Ecclesiastics of the Seminary of St-Sulpice (1910), 38 C.S. 268, aff'd (sub. nom. Corinthe v. Séminaire de St-Sulpice) (1911) 21 Q.B. 316, aff'd (1912), 5 D.L.R. 263 (P.C.).

24. R. v. Bonhomme (1917), 16 Ex. C R. 437, aff'd (1918), 56 S.C.R. 679 [hereinafter Bonhomme].

25. Gouin & Star Chrome Mining v. Thompson & Doherty (1917), 24 R.L. 271 [hereinafter Gouin], rev'd on other grounds (sub. nom.: Quebec (A.G.) v. Canada (A.G.) (1920), 56 D.L.R. 373 (P.C.).

26. Lazare v. St-Lawrence Seaway Authority, [1957] C.S. 5 [hereinafter Lazare].

27. Supra note 3.

28. St-Catherine's Milling, supra note 4.

29. See Lajoie et al., supra note 12.

30. Bonhomme, supra note 24; Gouin, supra note 25; Lazare, supra note 26; Doherty v. Giroux (1915), 24 Q.B. 433, aff'd (1916), 30 D.L.R. 123 (S.C.C).

31. Lazare, ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Corinthe v. The Ecclesiastics of the Seminary of St-Sulpice, supra note 23.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Jacobs v. United Power Co. (1927), 65 C.S. 133.

38. An Act Respecting Indians, R.S.C. 1886, c. 43, as am. by 61 Vict., c. 34, as it read at the time of the cases. This Act and its following amendments are known today as the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1–5.

39. Boucher v. Montour (1901), 20 C.S. 291.

40. Brossura v. D'Aillebout (1914), 15 R.P. 412 (Sup. Ct.).

41. Calder, supra note 5. Note that the only Québec judge who took part in the decision was Pigeon J., who did not express an opinion on the subject of aboriginal rights or title. His opinion, however, forms the ratio decidendi of the majority decision to dismiss the appellants' claim on a point of procedure.

42. Max “One-Onti” Groslouis v. Société de développement de la Baie James, [1974] R.P. 38 (Sup. Ct.).

43. An Act to Extend the Boundaries of the Province of Quebec, 2 Geo. V 1912, c. 45, s. 2(c).

44. Société de développement de la Baie James v. Kanatewat, [1975] C.A. 166 [hereinafter Kanatewat].

45. Québec (A.G.) v. Paul, [1977] C.S.P. 1054.

46. Québec (A.G.) v. Dumont, (11 November 1977), Hauterive, 655–05–0003330–76 (Sup. Ct.).

47. Naskapis de Schefferville v. Québec (A.G.), [1982] 4 C.N.L.R. 82 (Sup. Ct.).

48. Québec (A.G.) v. Duchesneau, J.E. 81–681 (C.S.P.).

49. Pinette v. Québec (A.G.), [1980] C.P. 226.

50. Deer v. Okpik, J.E. 80–1004 (Sup. Ct.)

51. Kanatewat, supra note 44 at 171.

52. Re Stacey and Montom and The Queen (1981), 63 C.C.C. (2d) 61 (C.A.).

53. Supra note 6, s. 35(1): “The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.”

54. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c. 11, s. 25: “The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed as to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada including (a) any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763; and (b) any rights or freedoms that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired.”

55. R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.

56. Van der Peet, supra note 7; NTC Smokehouse, supra note 7; Gladstone, supra note 7; Pamajewon, supra note 8; R. v. Adams, supra note 9; R. v. Côté, supra note 10; Delgamuukw, supra note 11.

57. Québec (A.G.) v. Adams, [1985] C.S.P. 1001, aff'd [1985] 4 C.N.L.R. 39 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd [1993] R.J.Q. 1011 (CA.).

58. R. v. Coté, [1988] R.J.Q. 1969 (C.P.), aff'd (sub. nom. Decontie v. R.) [1989] R.J.Q. 1893 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd (sub. nom. Côté v. R.) [1993] R.J.Q. 1350 (C.A.).

59. R. v. Ross, [1989] 1 C.N.L.R. 140 (Sup. Ct.) [hereinafter Ross].

60. Québec (A.G.) v. Adams, [1993] R.J.Q. 1011 (C.A.).

61. Côté v. R., supra note 58.

62. R. v. Côté, supra note 10 at 174 (Lamer J.C.); R. c. Adams, supra note 9 at 120–22.

63. The Sparrow test has been revisited in two recent cases. In Gladstone, supra note 7, it was modified to take into account rights that were not intrinsically restricted (commercial fishing rights), while in Delgamuukw, supra note 11, it was specifically adapted to the aboriginal title.

64. Delgamuukw, ibid. at 111.

65. Sioui v. Québec (A.G.), J.E. 85–947 (Sup. Ct.).

66. Ross, supra note 59.

67. Côté v. R., supra note 58.

68. Québec (A.G.) v. Adams, supra note 60 (Beauregard and Proulx JJ.).

69. Ibid. (Paul J.S.P., Barrette J.C.S., Rothman J.C.A.).

70. R. v. Adams, supra note 9 at 116–119 (Lamer C.J.); R. v. Côté, supra note 10.

71. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. At issue was the presumption of innocence as it might be qualified under section 1 of the Charter which guarantees rights and freedoms “subject only to such reasonable limits … as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” The Supreme Court ruled that section 1 empowers legislatures to limit a Charter right if “(a) the legislature's objective is of sufficient importance and (b) the limitation is rationally connected to the objective, as little restrictive as possible of the right in achieving the objective, and the benefit resulting from the limitation greater than the burden or cost of the limitation.”

72. For a recent narrowing of the Sparrow test, see Gladstone, supra note 7 at 762–80.

73. R. v. Côté, supra note 10; R. v. Adams, supra note 9.

74. Bande d'Eastmain v. Gilpin (no.l), [1987] R.J.Q. 1637 (C.P.). In that case, a Provincial Court judge expressed the view that the regulatory powers conferred to a Cree band council by the James Bay Convention were a form of residuary aboriginal sovereignty.

75. Québec (A.G.) v. Adams, supra note 68 (Rothman, J.C.A., dissenting).

76. Pamajewon, supra note 8.

77. Protection de la jeunesse–623, J.E. 93–1018 (C.Q.).

78. R. v. Kokkinerk, J.E. 93–1379 (C.A.); R. v. Neeposh, J.E. 94–562 (C.Q.).

79. R. v. Cross, [1992] R.J.Q. 1001 (Sup. Ct.) at 1008: “The accused here and their compatriots were no doubt motivated by a sincere and honest belief in the legitimacy of the natives' land claims and the frustration, bitterness and intense anger which are the legacy of centuries of neglect, unfairness, hostility, contempt, discrimination and racism. Some will say that there is no place for such comments in a sentence pronounced by a court. I do not agree with such views. The criminal acts committed during the Oka Crisis, try as one might, cannot be entirely dissociated from the historical and political origins and background of that crisis.”

80. R. v. Naapaluk (1993), 25 C.R. (4th) 220; R. v. Alaku (1993), 112 D.L.R. (4th) 732.

81. On the reception of certain forms of community justice mechanisms and aboriginal criminal customs in Canadian criminal law, see Melançon, Hugues, La Reconnaissance des systèmes juridiques autochtones en droit criminel canadien, (LI.M. Dissertation, Faculty of Law, Université de Montréal, 1995) [unpublished].Google Scholar

82. See Indian Act, supra note 38, s. 88.

83. An Act respecting Health Services and Social Services, S.Q. 1991, c. 42.

84. Groupe-Conseil sur la Politique culturelle du Québec, Une Politique de la culture et des arts, (Arpin, chairman) presented to Liza Frulla-Hébert, Minister of Culture, Québec.

85. See supra note 2.

86. Rémillard M.N.A., Québec, Assemblée nationale, Journal des débats, vol. 31 (21 June 1990) at 3973–74Google Scholar [prior to the crisis].

87. For convenience and rhythm, contributors to the debates are referred to by their surnames only. A list is annexed of their full names, their party allegiance, and the constituency they represented, with a mention of their cabinet post(s) when applicable. See Appendix 1.

88. Rémillard M.N.A. (Minister for Justice), Québec, Assemblée nationale, Journal des débats, vol. 31 (30 April 1991) at 1444–48Google Scholar [after the crisis].

89. Ryan M.N.A. (Minister for Public Security), Québec, Assemblée nationale, Journal des débats, vol. 31 (18 October 1990) at 4513–64Google Scholar [after the criris].

90. Rémillard M.N.A., Québec, Assemblée nationale, Journal des débats, vol. 31 (11 April 1991) at 1277–81Google Scholar [after the crisis].

91. Ibid.

92. Blackburn M.N.A. (Minister for Recreation, Fish and Game), Québec, Assemblée nationale, Journal des débats, vol. 31 (9 December 1991) at 11331–32Google Scholar [after the crisis].

93. Sirros M.N.A., (Minister for Aboriginal Affairs), Québec, Assemblée nationale, Commissions parlementaires, Commission des institutions, Journal des débats, (12 June 1991) at CI-9141–44Google Scholar [after the crisis].

94. Perron M.N.A., Québec, Assemblée nationale, Journal des débats, vol. 31 (21 June 1990) at 3977–80Google Scholar [prior to the crisis]; Lazure M.N.A., Québec, Assemblée nationale, Journal des débats, vol. 31 (18 October 1990) at 4513–64Google Scholar [after the crisis].

95. Motion of the Quebec Cabinet (9 February 1983).

96. “Their belonging to Indian and Inuit nations, which were the first nations to inhabit this contry and to develop it for the benefit of man, places Quebec's society before unquestionable demands, occasionally to recognition of particular rights, always to a strict right to benefit from the totality of the services offered to the general population” [our translation]: then premier René Lévesque, Québec, Assemblée nationale, Journal des débats, vol. 28 (19 March 1985) at 2493.Google Scholar

97. Ciaccia M.N.A (then Minister for Aboriginal Affairs), Québec, Assemblée nationale, Journal des débats, vol. 31 (21 June 1990) at 3977–80Google Scholar [prior to the crisis].

98. Our research shows that, during the 1989–1992 period, a total of 19 M.N.A.s discussed Aboriginal rights (see Appendix 1). Of those 19 members, 9 were from the P.Q., 7 from the P.L.Q. and 3 from the P.E. Even if the number of P.Q. M.N.A.s who affirmed the existence of aboriginal rights was small in absolute terms (5), it was in fact larger than that of P.L.Q. and P.E. members. Thus, the number of P.Q. M.N.A.s who actually spoke on the issue of aboriginal rights is somewhat misleading, since the P.Q. had adopted a more comprehensive party position on aboriginal rights while in power in 1983 and 1985.

99. Claveau M.N.A., Québec, Assemblée nationale, Journal des débats, vol. 31 (6 November 1991) at 10391–93Google Scholar [after the crisis].

100. Harel M.N.A., Québec, Assemblée nationale, Commissions parlementaires, Commission des institutions, Journal des débats (28 May 1991) at CI-1574Google Scholar [after the crisis]; Perron M.N.A., supra note 94 at 3973–74.

101. Perron M.N.A., ibid.; Lazúre M.N.A., supra note 94.

102. Ibid.

103. Harel M.N.A., supra note 100 (21 January 1991) at CI-877–87 [after the crisis].

104. Perron M.N.A., supra note 94 at 3973–74; Lazure M.N.A., supra note 94 at 4538–40.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid.

108. Perron M.N.A., supra note 94 at 3973–74.

109. Perron M.N.A., ibid.; Lazure M.N.A., supra note 94 at 4538–40.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid.

112. Perron M.N.A., supra note 94.

113. Harel M.N.A., supra note 100; Perron M.N.A., ibid.

114. Trudel M.N.A., Journal des débats, vol. 31 (18 October 1990) at 4538–40 [after the crisis].

115. Harel M.N.A., supra note 100.

116. Chevrette M.N.A., Québec, Assemblée nationale, Commissions parlementaires, Commission des institutions, Journal des débats (24 April 1991) at CI-1361Google Scholar [after the crisis].

117. Rémillard M.N.A., supra note 86 at 3973–74 [prior to the crisis]; Ciaccia M.N.A., supra note 97.

118. Sirros M.N.A., (then Minister for Aboriginal Affairs), Québec, Assemblée nationale, Commissions parlementaires, Commission des institutions, Journal des débats (30 April 1991) at CI-1444-–8Google Scholar [after the crisis].

119. Ibid.

120. Belisle M.N.A., Québec, Assemblée nationale, Journal des débats, vol. 31 (31 October 1990) at 4786–16Google Scholar [after the crisis]. The context of this affirmation should however be taken into account: it is used as an argument to exclude Aboriginal representation on the Commmission on the political and constitutional future of Québec.

121. Savoie M.N.A. (Minister for Revenue), Québec, Assemblée nationale, Journal des débats, vol. 31 (12 November 1991) at 10491–92Google Scholar [after the crisis].

122. Ciaccia M.N.A., supra note 97 at 3977–80 [prior to the crisis]; Sirros M.N.A., supra note 118 at CI-1234–35 [after the crisis].

123. Ryan M.N.A., supra note 89.

124. Ibid.

125. Sirros M.N.A., supra note 118 at CI-1235, 1241, 1243.

126. Rémillard M.N.A., supra note 88.

127. Ryan M.N.A., Québec, Commissions parlementaires, Commission des institutions, Assemblée nationale, Journal des débats (24 April 1991) at CI-1361–1364Google Scholar [after the crisis].

128. It follows from the very nature of implicit discourse and the consequent requirements of the method used for its analysis (just described, supra at pp. 76–77) that it is not possible to connect the content we have ascribed to it with specific excerpts of the debates reports: they are inferred from the whole subtext. Hence, we will simply “narrate” these implicit conceptions as they emerge from our work, without footnotes.

129. Monologism is characterized by techniques of application and interpretation of the law according to the single set of majority values in a given society (or state, if also statocentric); its alternative, dialogism allows a choice between several integrating principles for the application-interpretation of the law. See Timsit, Gérard, “Sur l'engendrement du droit” (1988) R.D.P. 39Google Scholar; Timsit, Gérard, Les Noms de la loi (Paris: P.U.F. 1991).Google Scholar

130. It is entirely possible that Ryan would have shared their opinion, had he not been more often than not confined to answering questions about police intervention in his capacity as Minister of Public Security: the pragmatic tone of his discourse makes him an implicit member of this subgroup.

131. He was Federal Deputy Minister for Indian Affairs in the 1970s and then a key negociator of the James Bay agreement.

132. See Lajoie et al, supra note 12.

133. As developed, amongst others, by Weber. See Reinstein, M., ed., Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955)Google Scholar; Belley, J.-G., “L'État et la régulation juridique des sociétés globales: Pour une problématique du pluralisme juridique” 18:1Sociologie et sociétés 11CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Griffiths, J., “What Is Legal Pluralism?” (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Carbonier, J., Sociologie juridique (Paris: P.U.F., 1978)Google Scholar; Arnaud, A.-J., Critique de la raison juridique (Paris: L.G.D.J., 1981).Google Scholar

134. Prefering the dialogical approach, successive provincial governments have, since Oka, largely refrained from criminal law enforcement in Mohawk communities. In 1994, an agreement entered into between the provincial government and the Band Council of Kahnawake provided for the official recognition of Mohawk Peacekeepers as the local police force. In 1996, the same type of arrangement was arrived at for the community of Kanesatake (Oka).